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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis investigates the integration of unmanned surface vehicles into the 
order of battle for Distributed Maritime Operations. The purpose is to design a cost 
effective and operationally effective unmanned system of systems capable of contributing 
the DMO concept in the 2030–2035 timeframe. This thesis determines the mission set 
and combination of USVs that is both operationally impactful and cost effective in the 
conventional carrier strike group, expeditionary strike group and/or surface action group, 
and whether unmanned systems could potentially replace or supplement a number of 
current manned systems mission sets. The primary finding is that USVs can significantly 
supplement manned assets in the following two mission areas: (1) Intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance mission set, and (2) the anti-missile defense mission set. 
The secondary finding is an initial $500 million investment into building approximately 
10 USV platforms, with the aforementioned mission sets, is paramount to meet the 
measures of effectiveness described in this thesis. The author’s recommendation for the 
U.S. Navy is to implement a standardized USV design, focusing on an AMD and ISR 
mission package. Secondly, the investment of approximately $500 million to build 10 of 
these platforms and integrate them into one of the current CSGs, ESGs, or SAGs, would 
be the stepping stone for transition to implementing USVs into the future fleet. 
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This thesis examines the integration of Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) into the 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept via a development of a systems 
architecture and an associated discrete event simulation. The goal is to research potential 
mission areas for unmanned surface forces in the DMO concept and then construct a 
functional and physical architecture of a standardized USV. The author uses a similar 
concept as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) by providing external mission module packages 
to be installed on the standardized USV for the identified mission areas. Following the 
architectural definition, a model was developed by using a discrete event simulation 
software. The model’s scenario is defined as a fleet-on-fleet engagement against a near 
peer adversary in the 2030–2035 timeframe. Measures of effectiveness were used to 
analyze the operational impact that the proposed USVs provide throughout the simulation. 
Upon completion of the model analysis, the author concludes with a cost analysis of the 
proposed USV platforms versus their overall operational impact on the outcome of the 
fleet-on-fleet engagement.  
A.   OVERVIEW OF DMO AND USVS 
In 2017, the Navy Warfare Development Command created the phrase “Distributed 
Maritime Operations,” which was derived from ADM Rowden’s (2017) “Distributed 
Lethality” (DL). DMO looks at distributed forces in more of an all-encompassing fleet-
centric fighting power, rather than small force packages as described in the DL definition. 
The supreme goal of the DMO concept is to allow commanders greater diversity of options 
or combinations of sensors/platforms/weapon employment availability and adequate time 
that outpaces the adversaries. DMO takes into account the merging of resources, 
information and technologies with key decision makers at all levels of an organization. 
This encapsulates the DMO concept well when the U.S. Navy views a system as a 
distributed network. A distributed network that has the integration capability of all 
available platforms across all operational domains will enhance the U.S. Navy’s offensive 
and defensive capability. The focus of this thesis toward the design and acquisition of 
unmanned surface vehicles in this distributed network will not only provide a cost effective 
 xxiv 
alternative to manned assets, but also provide a much lower risk-management scenario due 
to the limited human intervention.  
Unmanned Systems have the potential to be a key force multiplier in the future 
force structure of the U.S. Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Richardson (2016), 
lays out four key “lines of effort” in his strategic vision for the Navy. One of the lines is to 
“Strengthen Naval Power at and from Sea,” which encourages exploration of “alternative 
fleet designs, including kinetic and non-kinetic payloads and both manned and unmanned 
systems” (6). This thesis covers the basic tenants of unmanned surface vehicles including 
the hierarchy, classes, and mission types that are currently available. The thesis also 
addresses the potential contribution that USVs could bring to the DMO concept in the 
future construct of fleet forces, as well as touches on key enabling technologies that are 
essential for future research and development of unmanned surface vehicles. 
For the purpose of this thesis, three alternatives USVs, with their three applicable 
mission packages, were analyzed through modeling and simulation. The chosen platforms 
to be investigated were the USV ISR mission platform, USV Surface Warfare mission 
platform and the USV Anti-Missile Defense mission platform, since they were identified 
as the most relevant in the context of DMO. The author notes that these three alternatives 
are not readily available on the current market, as prescribed in this thesis, but the objective 
of proposing a functional and physical architecture was to shape the development of future 
work to be feasible and congruent with the U.S. Navy’s vision and objectives concerning 
unmanned systems.   
Table 1 summarizes the three alternative USVs that the author analyzes using 
modeling and simulation with their applicable class type and payloads as annotated.  
  
 xxv 
Table 1.      Three Alternative USV Specifications 
  USV ISR USV SUW USV AMD 




Missile # None 4 - 4 8 - 16 
 
B.  MODEL DEFINITION 
To facilitate analysis of the alternative USVs, the author developed a simulation 
model. To ensure that the DMO concept was analyzed in a realistic scenario and 
operational environment, the focus was geared towards a littoral conflict in the South China 
Sea. The model is broken down into four primary phases; the threat generation phase, the 
finding phase, the targeting phase, and the engagement phase. The three alternative USVs, 
presented in Table 1, were implemented in the model. The USV AMD was split into two 
unique platforms: AIR and MISSILE; these configurations were meant to defend against 
air platforms and incoming missiles, respectively. All alternative USVs brought additional 
countermeasures to the friendly order of battle, including chaff, active and passive decoys, 
flares, and IR and visual smoke. The missile carrying USVs also brought their specific 
payloads, as annotated in Table 1, which provided additional ordnance in the distributed 
resource pool of friendly forces. The USV ISR provided a capability unique to the rest of 
the USV alternatives. This platform’s capability was added during the enemy’s targeting 
and engagement phase and allowed every potential friendly missile an extended range to 
hit incoming enemy platforms or missiles. 
C.   OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
Data analysis showed that, with respect to multiple different measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs), some of the conceptualized USVs not only were statistically 
significant, but operationally significant as well. The three measures of effectiveness that 
turned out to be interesting when analyzing how USVs contributed to the DMO concept 
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where: (1) MOE #2: Surviving Enemy Forces, (2) MOE #4: Percentage of Enemy Missiles 
with in 10 Nautical Miles, and (3) MOE #6: Defensive Measure Success (note that the 
numbering convention corresponds to the full text of the thesis). The alternative USVs that 
were the most operationally impactful were the USV ISR platform, USV AMD AIR 
platform, and the USV AMD MISSILE platform, whereas the USV SUW platform proved 
to be not operationally significant throughout the entire analysis. The results of the analysis 
were inconclusive: unmanned surface vehicles were most effective by supplementing the 
manned naval assets in two primary mission sets in the confines of the DMO concept: (1) 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mission set, and (2) anti-missile defense  
mission set (for both anti-air and anti-missile defense). This envisions more of a defensive 
posture approach for the implementation of USVs, either by counter-engaging enemy 
platforms or missiles in the defense-in-depth layered strategy. 
D.   COST ANALYSIS 
To augment the operational effectiveness analysis, the author chose to use a 
parametric approach to derive a cost model that predicts the cost of the alternative USVs 
described in this thesis. The author identified 40 platforms that had historical procurement 
costs and researched their design specifications for the parametric approach. Contour maps 
were generated to facilitate a trade-off analysis between operational effectiveness and cost 
for multiple investment scenarios. The analysis suggested that a minimum investment of 
$500 million, to enable acquisition of approximately 10 capable USVs, was necessary to 
realize operationally significant gains of effectiveness. An additional investment of $1000 
million (for a total of $1500 million) resulted in a potential increase to a total of 35 USVs, 
which is associated with a 31.2% improvement from the baseline investment scenario for 
the percentage of enemy missiles within 10 nm of friendly forces (MOE #4) and a 9.9% 
improvement from the baseline investment scenario for the percentage of successful 
countermeasures (MOE #6). 
E.   CONCLUSIONS 
The incorporation of USVs in DMO provides both a cost effective and 
operationally effective order of battle compared to the conventional force structures of the 
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U.S. Navy’s CSG, ESG and SAG. The Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
mission as well as the Anti-missile Defense mission proved to have the most statistical 
significance and operational impact in regard to the prescribed measures of effectiveness 
annotated in the section C of this summary. The following bullet points explain the three 
most interesting measures in the context of the operational impact from USVs: 
* MOE #2: Surviving Enemy Force. This MOE was significantly impacted by 
whether an USV ISR platform was present or not. A maximum decrease of approximately 
5.9% of the enemy force survivability can be expected if the USV ISR platform is present.  
* MOE #4: Percentage of Enemy Missiles within 10 NM. This MOE was 
significantly impacted by the number of USV AMD MISSILE and USV AMD AIR 
platforms present in the model. A maximum decrease in approximately 8.5% of the number 
of enemy missiles reaching 10 nautical miles is expected when given the correct 
composition of USV AMD platforms.  
* MOE #6: Defensive Measure Success. This MOE was significantly impacted by 
the number of USV AMD MISSILE and USV AMD AIR platforms present in the model. 
A maximum increase of approximately 4% of the defensive measure success is expected 
when given the correct composition of USV AMD platforms.  
For the cost effectiveness aspect, described in section D of this summary, it was 
shown that the only USVs worth investing in were the USV ISR, USV AMD AIR and the 
USV AMD MISSILE platforms. For the specified concept of operations and the fixed order 
of battle, in regard to manned assets, the author believes that implementing specific 
combinations of USVs in the order of battle is a cost effective approach in achieving the 
desired measures of effectiveness. 
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A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
Rowden (2015), prior Commander of Naval Surface Forces, published an article in 
January of 2015 titled, “Distributed Lethality.” His concept describes a force shift and 
change in ideology that moves toward taking the offensive and increasing the lethality of 
surface action groups. This would in turn “provide more strike options, provide another 
method to seize the initiative, and add battlespace complexity to an adversary’s calculus” 
(Rowden 2015) and their Observation, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Loop.  
Kline (2016), the Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA) chair at Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), summarizes the concept well: “In broad terms, distributed lethality proposes 
creating offensive adaptive force packages comprised of surface action groups with a 
variety of support elements that operate across a wide region and under an adversary’s anti-
access sea denial umbrella.”  
To contribute to the concept further, in 2017 the Navy Warfare Development 
Command (NWDC) deemed the phrase “Distributed Maritime Operations,” which looks 
at distributed forces in more of an all-encompassing fleet-centric fighting power rather than 
small force packages as described in the Distributed Lethality definition. In a recent Fleet 
Design Brief in 2017, CDR Canfield from NWDC said, “This concept uses all available 
assets, including unmanned systems, to empower warfighters at all echelons by providing 
synchronized operations and employment of multi-domain and cross-component 
capabilities in order to fight and win in complex, contested environments.” This, in turn, 
triggered a coordinated Naval Postgraduate School Cross-Campus Project FY17-18, 
termed: “Distributed Maritime Operations: Joint, Combined, and Coalition Warfare at Sea” 
(Kline 2017). Synchronized by OPNAV N91 Chair of Systems Engineering Analysis, the 
focus of this project was to develop concepts, technologies, tactics, and relations to advance 
the DMO concept. 
Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 27 further developed the DMO concept by 
“designing a cost effective, and resilient unmanned and manned system of systems capable 
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of contributing to the Distributed Maritime Operation concept in the 2030–2035 timeframe. 
Focusing on design contributions in counter-targeting, decoys, deception, electromagnetic 
warfare and the manned-unmanned tactics associated in achieving desired effects in 
supporting tactical offensive operations in the air, surface, undersea and cyber domains” 
(Kline 2017). 
This thesis will continue the work that the SEA 27 team started, to further explore 
the functionality of the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept. It will use a 
substantial amount of information gathered from SEA 27’s work and will use the baseline 
model with modifications for the analysis portion. The principal topic of research will be 
one component of DMO: Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) integration into the order of 
battle. The research will consist of an analysis of USVs operational effectiveness, as well 
as a cost analysis of different USV configurations.  
The supreme goal of the DMO concept is to allow commanders greater diversity of 
options or combinations of sensors/platforms/weapon employment availability and 
adequate time that outpaces the adversaries. DMO takes into account the merging of 
resources, information and technologies with key decision makers at all levels of an 
organization. This encapsulates the DMO concept well when the U.S Navy views a system 
as a distributed network, as explained by Paul Baran of the RAND Corporation in his 
distributed network concept (Baran 1964). The basis of modern internet data routing 
architecture is the distributed network paradigm. Having an undisrupted distributed 
network is the key to DMO’s success, having everything interconnected and the potential 
to utilize all the strengths of each platform even from over the horizon distances. Baran 
addresses the alternative networks as centralized, whereby one commander receives all 
inputs to make a decision, and decentralized, whereby multiple commanders are 
interconnected and the decision making process is delegated from the key decision maker. 
A graphic depicting generic nodes and network configurations are shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Distributed Network versus Centralized and Decentralized 
Networks. Adapted from Baran (1964). 
Distributed Maritime Operations will emphasize the importance of counter-
targeting, decoys, deception, electromagnetic warfare and the manned-unmanned tactics in 
support of tactical offensive operations in the air, surface, undersea and cyber domains. 
Ultimately, the critical measure of effectiveness for the DMO concept is how well the U.S. 
Navy can deter, distract, disrupt, deceive and distribute the adversary’s forces and 
resources in such a manner that it will cause an offensive advantage in the U.S. Navy’s 
favor.  
B. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
The DMO concept is new in the arena of Navy terms and has not been implemented 
into the operational Navy. Hence, the study of the DMO concept, specifically using 
unmanned surface vehicles, has the potential to influence the future force structure of the 
U.S. Navy, as well as help define requirements needed to fill the gap in the current 
configurations of the Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and 
Surface Action Group (SAG). The current Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 
(USIR) for FY2013-2038 states, “recent combat operations in Southwest Asia have 
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demonstrated the military utility of unmanned systems in today’s combat environment,” 
and that “rapid integration of unmanned technologies into the joint force structure” is 
paramount for the future of our Naval Forces (USIR 2013). The USIR (2013) specifically 
predicts that unmanned systems may be required to operate in areas where freedom to 
operate is contested and seeks to determine “levels of effectiveness…affordability…and 
other key parameters needed to meet future operational requirements” (v). 
The ultimate goal is to leverage unmanned systems to enhance cross domain 
operations. Currently the future naval warfighting scenarios point to contested 
environments in close proximity to land masses. The open ocean “blue navy” seems to be 
drifting away, which requires a new force to supplement the dynamic environment of 
today’s threat. According to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (2018), “In 
December 2016, the CNO completed a Force Structure Assessment (FSA) to determine the 
correct mix of platforms needed to address the evolving and increasingly complex 
responsibilities of the Navy. The FSA detailed a requirement of 355 ships based upon 
analysis and acceptable strategic and operational risk” (3). Interestingly, the FSA findings 
also showed that unmanned systems were integral in the analysis and could be key enablers 
in the coming decades for the fleet architecture (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
2018). Also, the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act required three fleet 
architecture studies to be conducted to project what the Navy force structure should look 
like in 2030. All three studies were conclusive in determining that unmanned systems 
played a key role in the force structure of the U.S. Navy’s 355 ship fleet, with two of the 
studies estimating that the Naval fleet required 321 manned ships with 136 large unmanned 
vehicles, and 340 manned ships with 90 unmanned vehicles, respectively (O’Rourke 
2018a). To follow up with the FSA study, in May 2017 ADM Richardson stated in the 
Navy’s vision plan, “The Future Navy,” that there is, “no question that unmanned systems 
must be an integral part of the future fleet. The advantages such systems offer are even 
greater when they incorporate autonomy and machine learning” (Richardson 2017). Due 
to the never-ending fiscal budget constraints that the Navy has to deal with, the topic that 
late Senator John McCain examined in 2017 was imperative. Can the Navy consider 
moving away from the conventional high value units, like the carrier, to a more robust 
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inventory of smaller cheaper maritime vessels? McCain (2017) describes the end state of 
our future 355 ship fleet, “The goal should be a future fleet and air wing comprised of 
larger numbers of small relatively cheaper systems [possibly unmanned systems] that can 
operate in denied environments, rather than smaller numbers of larger and more expensive 
systems that are adversaries can increasingly locate and target” (9). 
C. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis includes: (1) an examination of USVs in the context of the 
DMO concept; (2) identifying the capabilities that USVs provide in the DMO force 
structure; (3) a proposed future USV configurations for DMO; and (4) a tradeoff of 
operational effectiveness and cost for USV configurations. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
(1) Does the incorporation of unmanned surface vehicles, in the context of 
Distributed Maritime Operations, provide a more cost- and operationally- 
effective order of battle compared to the conventional United States (U.S.) 
Navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG) configuration, Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG) configuration or the Surface Action Group (SAG) 
configuration? 
i) What is the tradeoff analysis in cost versus overall operational
effectiveness in DMO when reconfiguring unmanned surface
vehicles to support different mission sets, specifically in the Anti-
Missile Defense (AMD),  Surface Warfare (SUW) and
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capable
mission roles?
ii) What realistic combination of unmanned surface vehicles provides
the most operationally effective scenario in the context of DMO?
(2) What are the critical parameters that need to be met in the future designs 
of unmanned surface vehicles specific to the DMO concept? 
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E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of the following steps: 
 (1) Review SEA 27’s capstone project, including the tasking statement, DMO 
breakdown, focus of research effort, mathematical model and analysis, and 
recommendations and future work. 
(2) Conduct a literature search of books, online articles, Navy reports, related theses 
(USV, Unmanned Systems, Autonomous systems), the internet, and other library 
information resources on the topic. 
(3) Conduct a summary of current USV platforms. 
(4) Conduct a requirements analysis of capability gaps in the DMO concept, and 
how USVs could fill those gaps. 
(5) Perform a functional and physical decomposition of a desired USV to fit the 
requirements analysis from the capability gaps. 
(6) Revise SEA 27’s mathematical model and conduct a design of experiments for 
proposed USV configurations. 
(7) Conduct a model analysis from the output data. 
(8) Conduct a cost analysis of the proposed USV configurations. 
(9) Provide recommendations and conclusions from the research findings. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I: INTRODUCTION. This chapter provides the research questions, a brief 
discussion of the topic and benefits that could be gained from this thesis. 
Chapter II: BACKGROUND. The chapter describes the concept of Distributed 
Maritime Operations and breaks down what exactly unmanned systems are, specifically 
focusing on unmanned surface vehicles. Later in the chapter, the thesis discusses what 
USVs could provide to the DMO concept as well as the technologies and platforms that 
are currently available.  
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Chapter III: ARCHITECTURE. This chapter considers the surface domain mission 
sets and how USVs could either supplement or replace current naval force configurations. 
The Chapter decomposes both the functional and physical side of a proposed USV design 
and addresses the mission module packages that could be incorporated into the DMO 
concept.  
Chapter IV: MODEL DESCRIPTION. This chapter looks at the SEA 27 capstone 
concept of operations and describes the mathematical model in depth. The model was 
implemented in ExtendSim, which is a standard simulation modeling tool. The chapter also 
addresses the changes made to incorporate the potential USV alternatives and the model’s 
assumptions and limitations. 
Chapter V: DATA ANALYSIS. This chapter discusses how the author measured 
operational effectiveness for the implemented USVs and then analyzes the output data 
derived from the ExtendSim model using statistical analysis software. Throughout the 
chapter, insights and conclusions from the data analysis are conferred for each measure of 
effectiveness provided.  
Chapter VI: COST ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS. This chapter concludes 
the thesis with a cost analysis versus operational effectiveness of the alternative USVs 
discussed throughout the report. The chapter provides reasonable expectations of what the 
outcome will be in the specified scenario given different sums of investment in regard to 
future acquisition of USVs. The remainder of the chapter introduces recommendations as 
well as future research in the development of the DMO concept. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents the background information relevant to this research. 
Specifically, it reviews both the DL and DMO concepts, presents a high-level overview of 
USVs as well as the role that USVs may play in the DMO concept, and identifies key 
technological enablers for USVs. 
A. WHAT IS DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS? 
Before getting into the explicit definition of DMO, it is important to reflect on the 
influencer that was the root for the exploration of this new concept: Distributed Lethality 
(DL). DL is a paradigm shift for the conventional U.S. Navy’s “defense in depth” concept. 
Currently, the maritime arsenal is made up of mostly surface-to-air defensive missiles, the 
Standard Missiles series, as well as close-in weapons systems to protect the Navy’s high 
value units. Initially introduced in 1977, with the latest upgrade in 2015, the last surface-
to-surface (SSM) missile designed to fire from a naval surface platform was the Harpoon, 
termed the “only offensive SSM of the surface fleet.” A look at the cost breakdown of what 
the DoD requested in Fiscal Year 2016 for the development of offensive Surface-to-surface 
missiles shows their priority. The amount requested was only 285.5 million in RDT&E 
according to the Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System (Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense 2015). This is only 11.3% of the total amount requested from the 
Navy for their missiles and munitions allotment. Only recently has the shift in research and 
development for more offensive type missiles begun, including the Maritime Strike 
Tomahawk variant (MST) and the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). The U.S. 
Navy has been focused on defending their assets rather than developing an offensive “strike 
first” mentality. This development has been a transition from World War II battleship vs 
battleship to the more conventional carrier strike group approach that uses the strike 
mission and air superiority as their main deterrence, with the carrier as the center of gravity 
and the rest of the combatants defending the carrier-based air operations.  
ADM Rowden describes DL as “increasing surface-force lethality – particularly in 
our offensive weapons and the concept of operations for surface action groups – will 
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provide more strike options to joint-force commanders, provide another method to seize 
the initiative, and add battlespace complexity to an adversary’s calculus” (Rowden 2015, 
8). This concept moves away from a defensive approach to a more offensive strike first 
mentality. DL provides more power in more places, providing a dispersed force to make it 
more difficult for the adversary to allocate their critical and limited resources. Again, ADM 
Rowden states that the DL doctrine is simply “the condition gained by increasing the 
offensive power of individual components of the surface force (cruisers, destroyers, littoral 
combat ships, amphibious ships, and logistic ships) and then employing them in dispersed 
offensive formations known as ‘hunter-killer SAGs’” (Rowden 2015, 10). 
The DMO concept was then developed by the U.S. Naval Warfare Development 
Command with the DL model as the main influencer. As DMO is an emerging concept in 
modern naval warfare, the fighting doctrine and open literature discussions are very 
limited. Mark Coffman, NWDC’s DMO concept writing team lead, described the desired 
end state of DMO: “DMO will describe the fleet-centric warfighting capabilities necessary 
to gain and maintain sea control through the employment of synchronized kinetic/non-
kinetic mission execution that may be distributed over vast distances, multiple domains, 
and a wide array of platforms in order to fight, and win in complex contested environments” 
(Navy Warfare Development Command 2017). 
The SEA 27 capstone team, tasked to develop a system of systems that 
encompassed the DMO paradigm, took the NWDC’s broad definition and scoped and 
bounded the concept into a functioning system that was easily comprehendible. They 
defined DMO as the ability to distribute offensive capability across all domains and 
platforms in a contested environment (SEA 27 2018). Their main effort of development is 
described in the following paragraphs.  
The SEA 27 tasking statement bounded the time horizon to the 2030 – 2035 
timeframe. This allowed the team to narrow the scope of the project based off the projected 
type of platforms, technologies, tactics and possible domains that would be key in the DMO 
concept in the next couple of decades. Through the iterative process of a modified systems 
engineering v-model methodology, the SEA 27 team developed a scenario and concept of 
operations, determined requirements and performance parameters, conducted a stakeholder 
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analysis, and decomposed the DMO concept into five operational domains with five focus 
areas. The five focus areas specified for consideration in the system of systems design were 
counter-targeting, decoys, deception, electromagnetic warfare, and manned-unmanned 
tactics (SEA 27, 2018). Each of these subsets of DMO could be a focus area of study by 
itself. Figure 2 depicts the breakdown of the areas that the SEA 27 team set out to 
investigate. 
 
Figure 2.  DMO Domains and Focus Areas. Source: SEA 27 (2018). 
The SEA 27 team then created a functional description of the DMO concept with 
the primary function decomposed into sub functions that considers each operational 
domain; see Figure 3. The primary function of DMO is to “Perform Distributed Maritime 
Operations,” and the subset functions are performing DMO in each specified domain. This 
encompasses the distributed aspect of DMO, making available all the resources that each 
platform brings for a combined cross-domain effort to win the fight. 
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Figure 3.  DMO Functions. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 
SEA 27 further constructed an additional functional decomposition based off the 
direction of focus they chose; the employment of tactics within the Distributed Maritime 
Operations concept (see Figure 4). The primary tactics considered for DMO across all 
specified domains were grouped into four main categories: swarming tactics, mechanical 
and physical decoy and counter-measures, management of electromagnetic emissions, and 
electronic jamming tactics.  
 
 


































For the purpose of this thesis, the tactics functional architecture as well as the top-
level architecture will be further investigated, decomposed and modified to include 
unmanned surface vehicles and how they specifically integrate into the DMO construct. 
The objective is to determine how operationally effective USVs can perform in the DMO 
paradigm as well as a cost analysis of the implementation of USVs in the conventional U.S. 
Navy fleet.  
1. SEA 27 Summary 
The SEA 27 (2018) team developed a complex model, similar to the one described 
in Chapter IV of this thesis, using the four primary tactics employed in the DMO concept 
as well as the rearrangement of force structure of the current fleet. The goal of the model 
was to simulate a balanced fleet-on-fleet engagement between a near-peer adversary in the 
context of the DMO concept. The team then identified specific measures of effectiveness 
(MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) to analyze so that they could address the most 
significant factors that contributed to the overall DMO success. The primary MOEs were 
survivability of both friendly and enemy forces, as well as the enemy forces effectiveness 
throughout their kill chain. They created two design of experiments (DOE) to implement 
into the model. The first DOE was based on a dynamic friendly force structure, which 
changed the input variables for all friendly platforms as well as the employment of DMO 
tactics for the simulation. The second DOE fixed the friendly force structure and varied 
only the DMO tactics that were employed for the simulation. The remaining paragraphs of 
this section will briefly describe SEA 27’s significant findings from both sets of DOEs and 
will put into perspective this thesis’ attempt for further analysis on the DMO concept. For 
further discussion on the findings of SEA 27 capstone report, refer to chapter 7 of the SEA 
27 capstone report. 
2. SEA 27 Results and Conclusions 
It was found that the most significant factor in both the fixed and variable force 
structures was the use of jamming tactics, specifically spot and barrage jamming. These 
two tactics were “consistently noticed as key performance enablers in measuring friendly 
force success” (SEA 27 2018, 115). SEA 27 (2018) states, “The jamming tactics have an 
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evident impact due to the ability for the tactic to degrade the adversary in the critical phases 
of targeting and engagement within the kill chain. Additionally, with a minimal penalty 
imposed on friendly forces for employing jamming, it is apparent that this tactic 
demonstrates the greatest impact on the survivability and associated ability to conduct 
offensive engagements against degraded enemy threats” (115). In Chapter III, regarding 
the Functional and Physical architecture, the author identified the significance of jamming 
to be useful in the creation of a standardized physical architecture of future USVs.  
Chapter III will address alternative USVs with self-defense suites, that have applicable 
jamming capabilities, which add more available Electronic Warfare (EW) platforms and 
extend the effectiveness of the EW mission. 
Other factors considered significant were the missile carrying platforms. In the 
variable force structure DOE, the destroyer and cruiser, both having numerous VLS cells, 
brought the only effective strike capability. This allowed for both offensive and defensive 
postures since the two platforms brought a balanced payload of LRASMs, MSTs, Standard 
Missiles, and ESSMs. This was significant for the author to observe and was the sole reason 
to design and implement a more offensive strike USV platform described in Chapter III. 
The other significant factors are listed in Table 1. They are broken up between the two 
force structures analyzed and show that most DMO tactics played a role in the success of 
the specified MOEs and MOPs. 
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Table 1.   Ranking of the Significant Factors for Fixed and Variable 
Force Structure. Source: SEA 27 (2018). 
 
 
SEA 27’s “model and analysis provided fundamental insights for the architectures 
of various force structure and the relative employment of offensive counter-targeting assets 
and defensive counter-measures with respect to survivability and lethality of the friendly 
forces” (SEA 27 2018, 117). One of the capstone team’s recommendations was the further 
study and development of the employment of jamming techniques to ensure a more realistic 
scenario. Model simplifications resulted in an overly optimistic representation of the 
impact of jamming. They also identified that the Navy should continue the efforts in the 
development of new unmanned systems. SEA 27 (2018) states, “Moving towards what 
DMO brings to the fight: allowing time for decision makers, counter-targeting, deception, 
and confusing the adversary; the integration of the tactics discussed…provide an effective 
alternative vice relying solely on our missile carriers to win the fight” (120). Since the 
missile-carrying platforms serve as the primary force multiplier in the DMO concept, 
adding additional unmanned platforms with similar capabilities could be a major cost 
advantage as well as reduction in risk to friendly forces. Adding more unmanned systems 
is a much more feasible option, in the context of financial constraints, then it is to build 
and outfit more destroyers and cruisers. A cost analysis of unmanned surface vehicles will 
be addressed in Chapter VI after the initial model analysis is complete. 
 
Fixed Baseline Force Structure DMO Variable Force Structure  
Spot Jamming Barrage Jamming 
Barrage Jamming Spot Jamming 
DRFM Jamming Quantity of DDG-51 
Sweep Jamming  DRFM Jamming  
Swarm Sweep Jamming 
EMCON (DDG-51) Quantity of CG 
Quantity of Passive Decoys  Quantity of F-35 (Air) 
Quantity of Active Decoys  Quantity of F/A-18 (Air) 
 Quantity of MDUSV 
 Quantity of TERN  
 
 16 
B. WHAT ARE UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES? 
Unmanned systems have the potential to be key force multipliers in the future force 
structure of the U.S. Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Richardson (2016), lays 
out four key “lines of effort” in his strategic vision for the Navy. One of the lines is to 
“Strengthen Naval Power at and from Sea,” which encourages exploration of “alternative 
fleet designs, including kinetic and non-kinetic payloads and both manned and unmanned 
systems” (6). The U.S. military has already introduced multiple unmanned systems, 
ranging from aerial vehicles like the Triton to unmanned robotics that support the 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams. They have already shown and continue to show 
potential in providing reduced risk to our high value units as well as manned forces, 
performing tasks that manned vehicles cannot, and do this at a typically much lower cost 
than manned systems. The bulk of the information about unmanned surface vehicles can 
be found in just a few references: The Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master Plan and 
the Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038 are the primary sources that 
date back from 2007 and 2013, respectively. Since 2013, there have been additional and 
updated information from the Unmanned Surface Vehicle Program Office PMS-406, and 
other more recent articles that have contributed to the scope of research about unmanned 
surface vehicles and will be addressed as needed. Figure 5 provides the the physical 
hierarchy of the different types of unmanned systems. 
 17 
 
Figure 5.  Unmanned Systems Physical Hierarchy. Adapted from USIR 
(2013). 
This thesis focuses on Unmanned Surface Vehicles (highlighted in green in Figure 
5) and what capabilities they bring in the context of the DMO concept; therefore, the 
following terms were extracted from both primary sources and were deemed essential to 
define. 
• Unmanned: “Capable of unmanned operation. Can be manned for dual use 
or for testing and evaluation. Has varying degrees of autonomy” 
(Department of the Navy [DoN] 2007, xi). 
• Unmanned Maritime Systems: “UMS comprise unmanned maritime 
vehicles (UMVs), which include both unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) 
and unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs), all necessary support 
components, and the fully integrated sensors and payloads necessary to 
accomplish the required missions” (USIR 2013,8). 
• Surface Vehicle: “Displaces water at rest. Operates with near continuous 





















• Semi-autonomous: “Some vehicle behaviors are completely autonomous 
(e.g., transit to station, activate sensors). Vehicle refers to its operator 
when directed by the operator or by its own awareness of the situation 
(e.g., for permission to fire)” (DoN 2007, xi). 
• Autonomous: “The vehicle governs its own decisions and makes its own 
decision from launch point to recovery point” (DoN 2007, xi). 
As shown in Figures 6–7, Unmanned Surface Vehicles are categorized into class 
and craft type. The Class Type decomposition is updated from current development given 
by PMS-406 as well as from a recent RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) 
study. The proposed classes E, F and G are added, which considers larger USVs that are 
greater than the Fleet Class that has a maximum length of 11 meters. 
 
Figure 6.  Unmanned Surface Vehicle Classes. Adapted from Savitz et 
al. (2013). 
In Table 2, the seven classes of USVs can be compared to the following craft that 















Table 2.   Unmanned Surface Vehicle Class Comparison. Adapted 
from Savitz et al. (2013). 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
Class: 
Similar in Size to: Size Range: 
X Modular Unmanned Surface 
Craft Littoral 
3 meters or less 
Harbor 7 Meter Rigid Hulled 
Inflatable Boat (RHIB) 
4-10 meters 
Snorkeler Semi-Submersible 4-10 meters 
Fleet 11 Meter RHIB 11 meters 
E Special Operations Craft 
(MARK V SOC) 
12-25 meters 
F Landing Craft Air Cushion 
(LCAC) 
25-40 meters 
G Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 41 meters and above 
 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles are currently categorized into five primary hull types, 
as shown in Figure 7. The “other craft type” category constitutes all the remaining hulls 
that could be used to design USVs. The most common in this category are trimarans craft, 
displacement hulls, and mono-hull fast sealift (MFS).  
 
Figure 7.  Unmanned Surface Vehicle Craft Types. Adapted from Savitz 
et al. (2013). 
A relative comparison of waterline length versus maximum speed in knots is shown 
in Figure 8. This depicts a generic overview of how craft types perform in the context of 
speed through the water. The objective in showing this figure is to show the limitations and 
abilities that different lengths and hull types bring to the DMO concept. This will be 
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important when determining the required speed for USVs in the context of DMO, as well 
as the limitations that each hull type has when considering payload capacity, drag through 
the water, sea state stability, etc. Currently all USVs are in the upper left quadrant, ranging 
from planning hulls to MFS. However, larger craft with displacement hulls are currently in 
research and development, like the Rolls Royce USV prototype that Hutchison (2017) 
states is similar to the Nanuchka-class corvette, weighing 700 tons, as well as the current 
proposals from the Strategic Capabilities Office for the ghost fleet called the Overlord 
USV. The Defense Systems Information Analysis Center states that the Overlord concept 
seeks to develop and demonstrate the capability for larger USVs to independently deploy 
up to 90 days and conduct operations such as surface warfare, strike warfare, and electronic 
warfare (Berkof 2018). These USVs would be converted from previously manned ships 
like the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates (Hudson 2017). 
 
 
Figure 8.  Maximum Speed in Knots versus Waterline Length Graphical 
Representation. Source: Pike (2011). 
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C. WHAT CAN USVS BRING TO THE DMO CONCEPT? 
USVs are also categorized into different mission types, which directly relate to the 
type of capabilities they have. The USV Master Plan identified seven main mission sets in 
2007; however, in 2013 the National Defense Research Institute expanded the mission sets 
to ten primary categories. Figure 9 shows the original set of capable missions that USVs 
were identified to perform defined by the USV roadmap, as well as the RAND contribution 
that revised the potential mission sets. Not all USVs can perform each mission set, 
therefore each USV class will be broken down into different mission set capabilities and 
what they could potentially provide to the DMO concept.  
 
Figure 9.  Unmanned Surface Vehicle Mission Types. Adapted from 
DoN (2007) and Savitz et al. (2013). 
The mission sets are described in Table 3 with the potential Class of USV 
prescribed. The table also describes the technology maturity in a rating system called 
Technology Readiness Level (TRL). The mission sets require certain technologies to be 
mature to perform at the level desired. The Defense Acquisition University (2017) 
describes the rating system with a range from TRL 1 to TRL 9. TRL 1–3 tells that the 
research of the desired technology is proven feasible. TRL 4–7 tells that the technology 
has been developed and demonstrated. TRL 8–9 tells that the system is developed, and the 
technology is fully mature and able to complete a successful mission. The TRLs for each 





Employment Options for Unmanned Surface Vehicles. This gives an idea of what 
technologies are currently available and what could be available during the next few 
decades that aligns well with the time horizon that this thesis focuses on, the 2030–2035 
timeframe. 
Table 3.   Potential Mission Sets for USV Employment. Adapted 
from Savitz et al. (2013) and Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] (2016). 
 
Mission Set Description Potential USV Class TRL
Persistent ISR: TRL 8-9      
ISR Contested Environment: TRL 1-3
Communication Relay: TRL 4-7
Deploy Sensors/Networks: TRL 4-7
Harbor and Above Armed Escort: TRL 4-7
All Classes Counter-FAC (Autonomous): TRL 1-3
All Classes Counter-FAC (remote control): TRL 8-9
F and G Class ASCM attack: TRL 1-3
Fleet and Above Presence Patrol: TRL 4-7
Harbor and Above ASW Sensor: TRL 4-7
G Class ASW Tracking: TRL 1-3
F and G Class Armed Wartime ASW: TRL 1-3
All Classes ASW Maritime Shield: TRL 8-9
Sensing and Warning: TRL 4-7
Non-Kinetic Defense: TRL 4-7
Communication Deception: TRL 4-7
Radar Deception: TRL 4-7
Decoy/countermeasures: TRL 4-7
Tactical Jamming: TRL 4-7
Computer Network Attack: TRL 4-7
Acoustic Deception: TRL 4-7
Harbor and Above Unmanned Vehicle Support: TRL 4-7
F and G Class Resupply of manned ships: TRL 1-3
E Class and Above Short/medium range: TRL 1-3
E Class and Above Long Range: TRL 1-3
Complex SAR: TRL 1-3
SOF Cargo Delivery: TRL 1-3
Test and Training: TRL 8-9
Vehicle as a Surface Weapon: TRL 4-7
Blockship operations: TRL 1-3
Deliberately allowing capture: TRL 1-3
ASW
"Operations Conducted with the intention of 
denying the enemy the effective use of 
submarines" (JCS 2016, 13).
All Classes
An acronym for Command, Control, 




"The portion of maritime warfare in which 
operations are conducted to destroy or 
neutralze enemy naval surface forces and 
merchant vessels" (JCS 2016, 230).
"Planning and executing the movement and 
support of forces" (JCS 2016, 142).Logistics
Kinetic or non-kinetic actions executed to 
degrade the adversaries ground positions, 
vehicles, supplies, and infrastructure
Ground Attack
Mine Laying: TRL 1-3Fleet and Above
"The strategic, operational, and tactical use of 
mines and mine countermeasures either by 
emplacing mines to degrade the enemy's 
capabilities to wage land, air, and maritime 
warfare or by countering of enemy-emplaced 
mines to permit friendly maneuver or use of 
selected land or sea areas" (JCS 2016, 154).
Mine Warfare
All Classes




Missions that aren't currently being 
conducted by manned or unmanned systems
Functions All Classes
Functions that USVs could perform to 
reduce manning requirements and allocation 
of resources 
AMD
"The integration of capabilities and 
overlapping operations to defend the 
homeland and United States national 
interests, protect the joint force, and enable 
freedom of action by negating an adversary's 
ability to create adverse effects from their air 
and missile capabilities" (JCS 2016, 113).
G class
Kinetic Defense: TRL 1-3
Military Deception 
and EW
"Actions executed to deliberately mislead 
adversary military" (JCS 2016, 152). The 
purpose of EW is to deny the opponent an 
advantage in the EM spectrum and ensure 
friendly access to the EM spectrum.
All Classes
Mine Sweeping: TRL 8-9
Mine Hunting: TRL 4-7
Harbor and Above 
All Classes
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As was shown in Figure 2: DMO Domains and Focus Areas, the area of research 
in this thesis narrows down the DMO concept to fit into a subdomain consisting of 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles. This is depicted below in Figure 10, which decomposes the 
Surface Domain into manned and unmanned assets, allowing both subdomain components 
to contribute to the overall DMO concept. 
 
Figure 10.  Decomposition of Surface Domain 
The conclusions drawn from Table 3, specifically in the context of Distributed 
Maritime Operations mission areas, show that USVs have the potential to be effective 
across multiple different mission sets, bringing a number of invaluable additions to the 
force structures of conventional Carrier Strike Groups, Expeditionary Strike Groups and 
Surface Action Groups. Whether they replace current assets or provide a necessary 
supplement will be further addressed in the coming chapters. However, based off the 
potential missions that USVs provide, the most suitable missions from a DMO perspective 
were identified as Military Deception (MD) and Electronic Warfare (EW), Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR), Surface Warfare (SUW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Anti-Missile 
Defense (AMD). All of these align well with the focus areas that the SEA 27 team 
investigated, specifically the Military Deception, EW and C4ISR capable missions. These 
specific mission sets will be described below and will be further explored in Chapter III in 











• Military Deception: USVs of any type may provide a variety of physical 
or mechanical means of deceiving an adversary. They have potential in 
being deceptive targets by influencing the adversary to target and launch 
weapons at them instead of high value units, leading the enemy to 
misallocate important resources. This is normally termed a “missile 
sponge.” They could also introduce false information through deceptive 
radar, comms, or acoustics to further confuse the adversary. This ties into 
the EW mission set described in the following definition.  
• Electronic Warfare: USVs could jam or spoof networks, conduct 
cyberattacks, as well as passively or actively receive electronic signatures 
to help identify locations of the adversary. The USVs required for this 
mission set can be all classes; however, there is a tradeoff when 
considering the power requirements as well as the size requirements for 
jamming and sensor equipment. The larger the EW payload, the more 
restrictive the class type due to the weight and sizing limitations of smaller 
class USVs.  
• C4ISR: All USVs have the potential to gather and collect intelligence, 
conduct surveillance, and recon areas of interest in the maritime domain. 
ISR is defined as: 
The capability to graphically display the current and future locations of 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance sensors, their projected 
platform tracks, vulnerability to threat capabilities and meteorological and 
oceanographic phenomena, fields of regard, tasked collection targets, and 
products to provide a basis for dynamic retasking and time-sensitive 
decision making. (JCS 2016, 116).  
C4ISR could be done in a relatively stealthy, cost effective way, especially 
if all unmanned systems were networked into the same system of systems 
so they could relay all available information. This is a main contributor to 
the DMO concept, where one of the main assumptions is interconnectivity 
of all platforms amongst multiple domains.  
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• SUW: USVs have the potential for employment as armed escorts as well 
as countering fast attack craft, but one of the key capabilities that could be 
incorporated into the DMO concept would be the anti-ship cruise missile 
(ASCM) attack USV platform. This could be a key force multiplier in the 
context of offensive strike against surface adversaries. To have the SUW 
ASCM mission set, the USV platforms would need considerable payload 
capacity for the required sensors and combat systems, as well as 
significant range and endurance capabilities. The SUW mission set would 
fit into the realm of the F or G class USVs. 
• ASW: The U.S. Navy has a significant advantage with using USVs for 
area sanitization in a specific area of operation. They could detect and 
classify enemy submarines while providing lower risk with less demand 
on manned assets. The endurance and range of sensing is directly related 
to the size of the platform, therefore, larger class type USVs would be 
more suitable for this mission type. Lastly, an armed ASW platform would 
take considerably more payload requirements due to adding torpedoes into 
the mix; F and G class USVs would be ideal for this type of mission set. 
• AMD: USVs have the potential to be outfitted with air and missile defense 
modules and the applicable sensors to add an additional layer of defense 
against incoming adversary missiles and aircraft. This would allow a more 
distributed network of platforms able to defend our high value assets as 
well as provide a significant early warning sensing capability if the USVs 
are able to be dispersed at substantial distances from their assigned CSG, 
ESG, or SAG. 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has conducted 
research in the area of potential contributions that USVs could provide that reinforces the 
above information, specifically in the AMD and ISR realms. A simplified graphic from 
DARPA is depicted in Figure 11 to show the concept of operations. 
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Figure 11.  DARPA Proposed USV CONOPS. Source: Gallup (2018). 
The top picture depicts a typical scenario of a sea skimming anti-ship cruise missile 
inbound from an adversary and the friendly destroyer having only its sensors to detect the 
incoming missile. The middle picture utilizes an unmanned surface vehicle to detect with 
its organic sensors and relay targeting information to the destroyer, this could be considered 
a C4ISR mission set. The bottom picture depicts the AMD mission set where the unmanned 
surface vehicle provides its own kinetic kill option while still providing relay targeting 
information to the destroyer. The last two cases provide an illustration of what a distributed 
network system could look like in the DMO concept of operations. 
D. WHAT ARE KEY ENABLER TECHNOLOGIES FOR UNMANNED 
SURFACE VEHICLES? 
The Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2035 determined that there 
were six areas of technology that were key for the DoD to research and develop (R&D) for 
future concept of operations involving unmanned systems. These technologies are different 
than the TRLs that were mentioned in the previous section. The mission sets with their 
specified TRLs were only considering the applicable operational capability, whereas, the 
six areas of technology are the baseline enablers for a resilient, trusting, operationally 
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effective unmanned system. The technologies are listed below with some insight into each 
area (USIR 2013). 
• Interoperability and Modularity – USVs must have inter-platform and 
intra-platform congruency amongst other unmanned systems as well as 
current and future manned assets. 
• Communications systems, spectrum and resilience – USVs must deal with 
the challenges of “available links, the amount of data that can be 
transmitted, and the resilience of all radio frequencies against 
interference” (USIR 2013, 39).  
• Security: Research and Intelligence/Technology Protection – “USVs must 
include appropriate security measures...to prevent unauthorized access/
control, unauthorized or unintentional disclosure of data, and the 
perseveration of technology superiority” (USIR 2013, 29). 
• Persistent Resilience – USVs must have “improved reliability, 
maintainability, and survivability” (USIR 2013, 29). 
• Autonomy and Cognitive Behavior – greater autonomy is a key driving 
force for USV technology in the context of reducing manpower 
involvement. Nearly all unmanned systems require active control in some 
way whether that is pre-determined mission parameters, refueling/
recharging batteries, or reloading spent ordnance.  
• Weaponry – full integration of the use of weapons is essential on 
unmanned systems. 
In short, since the inception of the Roadmap in 2013, all of the key technologies 
have been further developed and most are mature and available for integration into USV 
platforms. The three technological areas that still remain a concern are fully autonomous 
and cognitive decision making, communications in a C4ISR denied or diminished 
environment, as well as the use of available weaponry, specifically in the realm of anti-
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ship cruise missiles, strike capability, and anti-ship missiles defense. Many R&D programs 
are currently working on these items of concern as well as perfecting the other key enabler 
technologies listed above. Some of the leading companies currently in R&D of autonomous 
vehicles are ASV Global, DARPA, and Google. Whereas, for the weaponry and C4ISR 
concerns, multiple entities are working on R&D like PMS-406, Office of Naval Research 
(ONR), Naval Postgraduate School, and Lockheed Martin. 
The Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division (NSWCDD) points out that 
the use of Unmanned Surface Vehicles is only limited to people’s imagination. The Navy 
and public companies have shown to be dedicated to collaborate, combine resources and  
integrate similar ideas into working concepts. Specifically, in the context of the 
interoperability and modularity technology, NSWCDD is developing a concept of a 
“mission package that could slide into a USV modular mission bay that provides a direct 
and indirect fire capability” (Joyce 2018). Joyce (2018), from NSWCDD corporate 
communications says: “For surface and expeditionary warfare mission, warfighters could 
use a modular, plug and play unit designed to fit [into the designed USV] mission bay. 
These mission modules include sensors for targeting, a weapon station with a gun and a 
launcher system for missiles. It could provide capabilities to enable a myriad of missions 
outlined in the Unmanned Surface Vehicle Master Plan.” 
These mission packages could be developed into many of the mission sets that were 
described in Table 3: Potential Mission Sets for USV Employment. Joyce (2018) expressed 
that, “other ideas in the works for mission packages include intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance. We can [also] develop mission packages to support the carrying and 
launching of UAV’s – armed and unarmed.” For the purposes of this thesis, since the given 
time horizon of the DMO concept in 2030–2035, the desired capabilities and technology 
readiness levels that were given in Table 3 as well as the key technological areas discussed 
in this section will be assumed fully mature and ready for operational use and 
implementation. 
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1. Current USVs Available  
The chosen USVs, depicted in Table 4, are not a comprehensive list of all the USVs 
currently available, but rather a list of current USVs that fit the role of the potential capable 
mission sets for DMO that were identified in Table 3. The objective in addressing some of 
the potential USVs is to determine if there are any capability gaps, requirements, and 
design issues. The desired outcome is not necessarily to choose 2 to 3 USVs and 
reconfigure them to fit the user requirements for the DMO concept. The idea is to determine 
what capabilities current USVs bring, and potentially provide a design solution of one or 
more USVs that can perform at an operationally effective level and to fill the gap of 
acceptable risk and cost savings that normal manned assets provide. As stated in  
Chapter I, the objective for this thesis is to determine the most operationally effective, cost 
effective and capable USV or combination of USVs to fit into the DMO force structure. 
This will be addressed throughout the data analysis in Chapter V and the cost analysis in 
Chapter VI. 
Each USV is categorized by country, current mission set capability, class type, 
payload potential, and potential missions. A summary of the conclusions drawn from  
Table 4 is that, (1) most of the USVs currently have some form of ISR and ASW capability, 
(2) most USVs have the potential to fit into the MD mission set and the EW mission set, 
and (3) some of the bigger platforms have the potential to be reconfigured to a SUW and 








Table 4.   Current USVs in the Industry. Source: Jane’s by IHS 
Markit (2018e) and Navaldrones.com. 




Length Payload Potential 
Mission 
ACTUV USA ISR, 
ASW 
F Class 40 m 20,000 lbs MD, EW, 
SUW, 
AMD 




11 m 5,000 lbs MD 
Interceptor USA ISR Harbor 
Class 
8.1 m 2,400 lbs MD, EW 
USSV-HS USA EW Harbor 
Class 
10.9 m 4,500 lbs MD, ISR 
Hammerhead Canada ISR, EW Harbor 
Class 
5.2 m ~ MD 











Katana Israel ISR, 
SUW 
E Class 11.9 m 4,400 lbs ASW, 
MD, EW 
Seagull Israel ASW E Class 12 m 5,500 lbs MD, EW, 
SUW,  
ISR 





10.7 m 5,500 lbs MD, 
ASW 
Protector Israel ISR, EW Fleet 
Class 
9-11 m 3,000 lbs MD 
Tamin UAE SUW Fleet 
Class 




2. Possible Modifications of Current USVs 
The objective behind modifying current USVs on the market is to see if it is possible 
to combine multiple mission sets into one platform. Table 4: Current USVs in the Industry, 
shows that there is a wide variety of candidates, but most only provide ISR capabilities. 
The key enabler for combining mission sets is a mission module bay concept. The concept 
is a mission package that can fit into a predesignated compartment in the USV so that it 
can perform the required mission set. This technology is developed and mature for some 
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platforms and is similar to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Mission Module and the 
proposed concept by NSWCDD. Just like the ASW, MCM, and SUW modules on the LCS, 
this thesis proposes a standardized design structure allowing USVs to perform mission 
types as shown in Figure 9. 
For this to happen a functional and physical decomposition would need to take 
place, thereby identifying the required functions and components of a typical USV. If the 
physical architecture was standardized as a requirement for military operations specifically 
in the DMO concept, the way ahead would require communication of key stakeholders and 
industry leaders identifying the standards and specifications across industry in the context 
of payload capacity, sea state stability, size capacity, endurance and many other factors that 
would affect whether the USVs can physically handle certain mission packages. 
Henceforth, in Chapter III this thesis proposes a functional and physical architecture design 
addressing the potential mission sets that USVs could perform. It does not include 
specifications of all the parameters, but merely presents a broad, high level functional and 
physical architecture for a mission bay module concept. 
A recent thesis, Casola 2017, considered a similar concept as mentioned in the 
preceding paragraphs, but focused on only one USV, the Medium Displacement Unmanned 
Surface Sea Hunter. The thesis analyzed the Medium Displacement Unmanned Surface 
Vehicles (MDUSV) potential contribution to the DL concept in the context of the SUW 
mission. Casola’s idea of reconfiguring an already developed vessel into different mission 
sets gave a baseline to start with in this thesis and is summarized in the following 
paragraphs. 
Casola (2017) described Adaptive Force Packages (AFP) comprised of MDUSVs 
consisting of a both offensive and defensive roles in the SUW mission set. The offensive 
MDUSV considered the Harpoon Block II Extended Range (ER) as the best missiles for 
the SUW-variant. This variant would be able to have a total of three Mk 141 Launchers 
configured on the MDUSV, for a total of 12 Harpoon Block II missiles available as the 
offensive munition. Casola considered two defensive MDUSV variants. One considered 
using counter missiles for the AMD mission set and the other used ship-launched 
countermeasures. The counter missile MDUSV used the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe 
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Missile, which was decided as the best counter-missile defense. This variant would be able 
to have a total of two Mk 49 missile launching systems for a total of 22 RIM-116 missiles 
per MDUSV. The ship-launched countermeasure MDUSV variant used the Mk 36 Super 
Rabid Blooms Offboard Countermeasures (SRBOC) Chaff and Decoy system.  
Using ExtendSim modeling software, Casola created a simulation with a number 
of enemy ASCMs inbound to a variety of combinations of the above MDUSV offensive 
and defensive configurations. He determined that using the offensive variant with the 
defensive SRBOC variant was the most statistically significant in regard to number of 
friendly force ships killed. Casola gave a few recommendations for future research, (1) 
looking at larger hull USVs could allow for great payload capacity with the potential of 
vertical launch systems instead of just canister launched missiles systems, and (2) looking 
at advanced missile development specifically the LRASM and MST. Overall, his 
conclusions point out that the MDUSV can indeed be an effective SUW platform to support 
DL-based SUW. For the purposes of this thesis, a similar approach of using USVs will be 
made using the same simulation software; however, the scenario will be more complex, 
considering multiple platforms from both friendly and adversary forces, multiple domains 




A. OVERALL SURFACE DOMAIN DMO CONCEPT 
Based off the author’s operational experience and his interpretation of the needs of 
the surface DMO domain, the potential mission areas as well as the applicable surface 
platforms were identified for the DMO surface domain missions as depicted in Figure 12: 
DMO Surface Missions and Platform Allocation. This figure demonstrates the full 
spectrum of surface platform missions ranging from Command and Control to Strike 
Warfare, and also illustrates the diversity of platforms that the surface fleet has in the U.S. 
Navy’s inventory. Of note, this thesis suggests that USVs could potentially supplement or 
replace manned assets in certain areas as identified in Chapter 2, Figure 9; these areas are 
highlighted in green in Figure 12. This chapter does two things: it presents a systems 
architecture representation of USVs is a broad context from both a functional and physical 
perspective and presents the associated USV configurations that may have utility based on 
those architectural representations. 
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Figure 12.  DMO Surface Missions and Platform Allocation 
B. ARCHITECTURE OF UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES 
A system’s architecture is the underlying structure of that system. In the context of 
unmanned surface vehicles, their architectures will serve as a powerful tool for 
requirements traceability from the basic “I want,” through functional analysis and physical 
allocation. The following two sections describes these two approaches, functional analysis 
and physical allocation.  
1. Functional Architecture 
To provide a foundation, a functional analysis was performed to present a high-
level functional architecture for the DMO concept, incorporating the USVs and showing 
where they fit into the big picture of the system of systems. SEBok (2015a), states that the 
Functional Architecture is “a set of functions and their sub-functions that defines the 
transformations performed by the system to complete its mission.” Blanchard and 
Fabrycky (2011), describe that the functional architecture establishes “a functional baseline 
for all subsequent design and support activities, which in turn provide a foundation from 
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which all physical resource requirements are identified and justified” (86). Consistent with 
the intended purpose and utility of functional architectures, an SV-4: Systems Functionality 
Description, a methodology derived from the Department of Defense Architecture 
Framework (DoDAF), was designed showing the tentative functional decomposition that 
USVs will perform in Figure 13: Unmanned Surface DMO Functions. Of note, this 
functional decomposition is not considering all the functions and sub-functions that 
unmanned surface vehicles perform but is only considering the high-level functions in the 
context of the DMO concept.  
There are a number of theses and publications that portray what the generic 
functions are for USVs, breaking down functions like the navigation of the system or the 
machinery of the system. Some of these ideas can be referenced in Cox (2011) or Johnson 
(2010) theses. For the purposes of this thesis, generic functions as described above will not 
be identified, but rather assumed in the functional decomposition of a generic USV in the 
DMO concept. It should be noted that all functions in a functional decomposition should 
be mapped to a physical component or multiple components of a system as well as all 
physical components mapped to functions of the system. The following section defines the 
physical decomposition of a generic USV in the confines of the requirements needed in the 
DMO concept. For the same reason as mentioned before, not all generic physical 
components of a typical USV are identified and not all physical components map to  
Figure 13. The six primary functions shown in Figure 13 are traced from the six mission 
areas identified in Figure 12.  
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Figure 13.  Functional Architecture of Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
2. Physical Architecture 
SEBoK (2015b) defines the physical architecture as “an arrangement of physical 
elements which provides the design solution for a consumer product or life-cycle process 
intended to satisfy the requirements of the functional architecture and the requirement 
baseline.” The physical architecture annotated in Figure 14 is a high-level conceptual 
architecture that is useful in moving forward with this thesis’ analysis. Current USVs in 
the international market are not designed explicitly as Figure 14 illustrates, but the 
objective in showing this is to give a future design model for the physical components of a 




















































Figure 14.  Physical Architecture of Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
All USVs should have the basic physical components that make up the engineering 
plant, physical structure, C2 suite, and common sensors, but not all of today’s current USVs 
have the optional external payload mission packages, self-defense suite or the fully 
autonomous suite. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, NSWCDD and many industry 
manufacturers have accepted this concept of modular mission packages. Some examples 
of current industry leaders that have moved toward this concept of incorporating capacity 
and interoperability in their USV designs are Elbit, Israel Aerospace Industries, Textron 
Systems and Singapore Technologies Electronics, which make the Seagull, Katana, 
Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV) and Venus, respectively. Ultimately, it 
would be ideal to have a standardized high-level physical architecture layout that conforms 
to the U.S. Navy’s requirements and expectations with which the USV industry could 
comply.  
Each high-level physical component from Figure 14: Physical Architecture of 

















































































• External Payload Mission Packages: This component is external to the 
system and requires a decision maker to choose which package to 
configure to the specified USV. Each of the six mission packages are 
congruent with the Functional Architecture of Unmanned Surface 
Vehicles illustrated in Figure 13. The USV should be expected to support 
only one mission package at a time; it would be required to be docked and 
a team of personnel to change-out mission packages as applicable. The 
mission packages will be similar to the current Littoral Combat Ship 
Concept. They are illustrated in the simplified modular concept shown in 
Figure 15: Simplified Mission Package Modular Concept. 
 
Figure 15.  Simplified Mission Package Modular Concept. Adapted from 
Beery (2018). 
• Physical Structure: The physical structure is made up of the hull and 
superstructure of the system that allow it to float and be watertight under 
specified sea state requirements. The left picture in Figure 15 shows that 
the hull and superstructure are configured to meet sea state, payload and 
capacity requirements specified by the U.S. Navy. 
• Autonomous Suite: The autonomous suite is viewed as a key capability of 
this system and is the stepping stone for future cooperative and multi-
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domain operations. The definition of autonomy can be referenced in 
Chapter 2 section B. Every USV will have an autonomous suite that 
consists of multiple software and hardware components. This is a baseline 
component as depicted in the left picture in Figure 15. 
• Engineering Plant: The engineering plant consists of all the hardware and 
mechanical means of propulsion, auxiliaries, and electronics. All USVs 
will have a baseline engineering plant that will meet the specified 
requirements for endurance, speed and electrical power. 
• C2 Suite: The C2 suite is another baseline component for all USVs. It will 
have the capability to receive and transmit information, have the necessary 
security measures, provide and receive a common operating picture, as 
well as an onboard planning module that allows for human interface, if 
necessary.  
• Common Sensors: The common sensor components are made up of 
several generic over-the-counter sensors as well as some military standard 
sensors to perform the required functions of any maritime vessel. These 
sensors are integrated into the Autonomous Suite so they can be managed 
and the applicable information can be identified and interfaced into the 
decision making process of the system.  
• Self Defense Suite: This thesis proposes that all USVs should be designed 
with a Self-Defense Suite. This Self-Defense Suite will have non-kinetic 
countermeasures like chaff, flares, and IR smoke, as well as a limited 
capability to utilize its EW suite with jamming tactics and active decoys. 
Research was conducted on feasible options to support this suite on the 
generic USVs operating in the DMO concept. The most practical and cost 
effective option identified for non-kinetic countermeasures is a system 
called the Centurion, developed by Chemring. The Centurion system has 
12 barrels that can store multiple calibers of countermeasures, including 
 40 
active decoys, IR and RF seduction countermeasures, as well as RF 
distraction countermeasure. It has a small deck footprint of less than 1,500 
mm diameter, as well as weighs less than 1,000 kg and requires 440V 3 
phase power (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018c). Figure 16 shows the 
Centurion System. 
 
Figure 16.  Centurion System. Source: Jane’s by IHS Markit (2018c). 
The EW suite will have to be something similar to Northrop Grumman’s 
AN/SLQ-32(V)6, which is a part of the Surface Electronic Warfare 
Improvement Program (SEWIP) Electronic Attack (EA) variants. This 
system provides active-electronic attack capabilities, i.e., simultaneous 
jamming of multiple threats, along with passive measures “providing early 
warning, identification and direction finding capabilities of simultaneous 
multiple threats” (Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018a). The SEA 27 (2018) 
analysis results, which were discussed in Chapter 2, noted that the 
employment of jamming tactics and the use of physical and mechanical 
countermeasures were significant in the operational success of the DMO 
concept. For this reason, all USVs will have a self-defense suite consisting 
of the previously discussed subsystems. 
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C. POTENTIAL USV VERSIONS THAT WILL BE ADDRESSED IN THIS 
THESIS 
The objective of Chapter II was to present current USVs and their potential 
capabilities in the spectrum of possible mission areas. Chapter III has narrowed down the 
mission areas in the context of the Surface Domain Distributed Maritime Operations and 
has presented a functional and physical architecture for future USVs. For the purpose of 
this thesis, three alternatives will be analyzed through modeling and simulation. These 
three alternatives are not readily available on the current market, but the objective of 
proposing an architecture is to shape the development of future work to be feasible and 
congruent with the U.S. Navy’s vision and objectives concerning unmanned systems. 
Chapter VI presents a cost analysis of these alternatives using the results from the modeling 
and simulation outputs to compare operational effectiveness to cost.  
Before addressing each alternative, two major concerns need to be discussed in 
relation to the current configurations of most USV platforms; Vertical Launching System 
(VLS) support and sensing capability. Currently no unmanned system has the capability 
and hardware to support a VLS (known as the Mk 41), which is one of the main assets that 
the U.S. Navy has for firing its missiles. The VLS is very expensive and has huge payload 
requirements that current USVs cannot support. As mentioned in Chapter II, Casola (2017) 
determined that the only legitimate launching system that the U.S. Navy’s biggest 
unmanned surface vehicle could currently support was the Mk 141, which launches 
Harpoons. The U.S. Navy has proven that one of its key force multipliers, in both the 
current and future maritime domain, is the capability of launching numerous missiles from 
their vertical launching systems. Both the destroyer and cruiser can hold upwards to 96 and 
122 missiles, respectively. These missiles range from any of the Standard Missiles (SM-2, 
SM-3, and SM-6 versions), the Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST), the Evolved Sea 
Sparrow Missile (ESSM), as well as the newly developed Long Range Anti-Ship Missile 
(LRASM). The desire for USV’s is to have a similar capability, like the VLS, that can 
support firing the above mentioned missiles.  
Until recently, the concept of having a similar system like the VLS on smaller 
platforms was unheard of; however, in early 2018, during the Surface Navy Association’s 
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National Symposium, BAE unveiled its Adaptable Deck Launcher (ADL). The ADL is a 
deck-mounted launcher “that allows any number of launch cells to be configured at a low 
angle…for varying ship applications” (BAE System 2018). BAE has stated that the ADL 
can launch the same missiles as the MK 41 VLS, and benefits from a modular design that 
allows for multiple cell configurations. BAE has deemed that the ADL “answers the call 
for Distributed Lethality and Distributed Maritime Operations for platforms big and small” 
(BAE Systems 2018). Figures 17 and 18 illustrate the concept of the ADL; Figure 17 shows 
a design concept of a 4 canister ADL and Figure 18 shows a conceptualization of the MK 
VI with 4 LRASMs in the ADL. 
 
Figure 17.  ADL Concept. Source: Navy Recognition (2018a). 
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Figure 18.  Mk VI with ADL. Source: Navy Recognition (2018b). 
The ADL is a much more feasible option than installing a Mk 41 VLS on an 
unmanned surface vehicle for more multiple reasons. The primary one being the Mk 41 
VLS requires a certain depth in the hull greater than or equivalent to the length of the 
missile canister. Large warships have this design characteristic of beneath deck capacity, 
whereas, large USVs currently do not. A deck mounted launcher only requires the topside 
deck space vice the VLS requiring both the depth capacity and topside deck space. One of 
the other easily identifiable reasons that the ADL is a feasible option is that an empty ADL 
weighs 20,300 pounds and a fully loaded ADL with 16 ESSMs weighs 42,600 pounds 
(BAE Systems 2018). The VLS has a similar weight, approximately 20,000 pounds empty 
(Jane’s by IHS Markit 2018d). The weights change depending on what missiles are 
installed and how many are carried, but the underlining fact is that USVs could support 
this concept.  
This thesis is implementing BAE’s ADL system into the USVs that will be 
analyzed. However, it is interesting that multiple sources are investigating and developing 
deck-mounted launchers similar to the ADL that support the same functions as described 
in the previous paragraphs. One industry leader is Lockheed Martin, which states that they 
will be developing a new topside or deck-mounted launcher that can go on multiple 
platforms. They recently received a contract to collaborate with the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) and the Defense Advanced Project Research Agency (DARPA) in 
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developing the LRASM. They would like to develop a deck-mounted fire technology that 
would enable the LRASM to fire from more than just the Mk 41 VLS (Osborn 2016). 
Another industry leader is RAFAEL, which is developing their Iron Dome Counter-Rocket, 
Artillery and Mortar defense system (C-RAM) to the surface domain, termed “C-Dome” 
(Eshel 2014). These are just two examples of how the industry is moving toward 
interoperability of weapon systems in the surface domain.  
Based on Chapter II’s USV classes in Figure 6, the F and G class could potentially 
fill the role with the payload requirements of the ADL. Concepts under development that 
were previously discussed, like the Rolls Royce USV and the Overlord USV, have the 
capacity to support the mission modules that would use the ADL. Figure 19 and 20 depict 
the conceptualization of the Rolls Royce USV and the potential conversion of previously 
manned ships, like the Monsoon Class, to autonomous unmanned surface vehicles. This 
new technology opens the door to concepts that could not be conceived previously.  
 
Figure 19.  Rolls Royce USV. Source: Hutchinson (2017). 
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Figure 20.  Monsoon Class. Source: Navsource (n.d.). 
The second major concern is the sensing capability for unmanned surface vehicles, 
specifically in regard to targeting, fire control solutions, size and power requirements. 
Currently the sensing capability is limited amongst known USV industry standards, and 
USVs that do have targeting and fire control data are constrained by range, power, and size 
and must rely on land based systems or manned systems supplementing targeting solutions. 
This thesis considered different radar configurations, keeping in mind the cost of the U.S. 
Navy’s current radars being used for targeting and fire control data. The desire is to provide 
a reasonable tradeoff for the sensing capability to be cost effective but also operationally 
effective. The design concept would allow the installation of the necessary radar and 
equipment to the specified mission package module. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
most realistic radar that was considered for the three alternative mission modules was either 
a two or four fixed faced phased array radar similar to the proposed Aegis SPY-1K radar. 
The SPY-1K is described by Janes IHS Markit as, “a scaled-down version of the SPY-1F 
for corvette and light frigate applications,” and is approximately “one quarter of the size 
and weight of the USN’s SPY-1D(V) system, provides concurrent volume and horizon 
search, target tracking, fire-control target tracking, and uplink and downlink 
communications with mid-course guided missiles” (Janes IHS Markit 2018b). The Aegis 
weapons system and the associated SPY-1 E/F band radar family has shown to be key 
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enablers for the USN surface platforms. The costs of such systems are extremely high, but 
with the mitigation of reducing size, power, and the number of panels per USV could 
reduce the cost and provide a feasible targeting and fire control radar for the 2030–2035 
timeframe. A cost estimate will be provided in Chapter VI and will incorporate both the 
ADL and the equivalent phased array mentioned in the above paragraphs. 
1. USV ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE Alternative 
The AMD USV will supplement the existing surface platforms in the AMD mission 
set for the surface domain. The objective is to provide multiple USV platforms with the 
AMD mission module dispersed amongst the CSG, SAG or ESG. They will provide 
additional support, early warning sensors, as well as a cooperative engagement capability 
in conjunction with the friendly kill chain. This not only gives more available firepower 
but adds additional targets for the adversary to decide from, allowing more time for friendly 
forces to counter target or counter engage. The concept behind having multiple AMD 
USVs would be that it is a cost-effective alternative in the U.S. Navy’s layered defense; 
having 5 to 6 AMD USV’s destroyed in a maritime war vice having a manned cruiser 
destroyed is a colossal difference.  
The AMD USV was outfitted with two different payloads for the discrete modeling 
and simulation. It is important to understand that these payloads are up to interpretation 
and can be configured however way the user wants, but for the purposes of this thesis the 
following alternatives were configured with specific quantities of missiles based off the 
author’s operational experience and from a feasibility standpoint of what USVs could 
potentially hold due to payload capacity. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the design specifications 





Table 5.   USV AMD A (Air) Specifications 
USV AMD A (Air) 
Class Type: G 
Mission Module 
Payload: 75 tons 
ADL Footprint: 105 sqm 
Missile Type: SM-6 
Number of Missiles: 8 
Launch Cells: 8 






Table 6.   USV AMD M (Missile) Specifications 
USV AMD M (Missile) 
Class Type: F or G 
Mission Module 
Payload: 45 tons 
ADL Footprint: 85 sqm 
Missile Type: ESSM 
Number of Missiles: 16 
Launch Cells: 4 







2. USV SURFACE WARFARE Alternative 
The SUW USV will supplement the existing surface platforms in the SUW mission 
set for the surface domain. The objective is to provide multiple USV platforms, with the 
SUW mission module, dispersed in the maritime area of operation providing forward 
projection and deterrence. The SUW USV will solely be an offensive strike asset carrying 
several ASCMs. This is similar to the PLA’s Type 055 Houbei, which carries a heavy 
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punch at a low cost of approximately $17 million (FY2018) per unit (Galrahn 2009). Just 
like the USV AMD version, the SUW USV adds additional targets for the adversary to 
decide from that allows more time for friendly forces to counter target or counter engage. 
This again is a cost effective alternative for the U.S. Navy’s layered defense and provides 
a more “strike first mentality” with the given missiles that the SUW USV carries.   
Similar to the AMD USV, the SUW USV was outfitted with a payload for the 
discrete modeling and simulation. For the purposes of this thesis, the following alternative 
was configured with the specific quantities of missiles based off the author’s operational 
experience and from a feasibility standpoint of what USVs could potentially hold due to 
payload capacity. The following table illustrates the design specifications as well as the 
payloads for the USV SUW platform. 
Table 7.   USV SUW Specifications 
USV SUW 
Class Type: G 
Mission Module 
Payload: 75 tons 




Number of Missiles: 4 - 4 
Launch Cells: 8 
Centurion System: 1 
Countermeasures: 12 
Centurion Footprint: 0.0012 sqm 
 
3. USV ISR Alternative 
The ISR USV will supplement the existing surface platforms in the IO/INT mission 
set for the surface domain. The objective is to provide multiple USV platforms, with the 
ISR mission module, dispersed in the maritime area of operation. They would provide early 
warning detection, a larger common operating picture, as well as extended firepower reach 
with targeting solutions for multiple domain assets. The ISR USV will not play any 
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offensive or defensive role but will be solely the eyes and ears of the surface domain. Just 
like the USV AMD version, the ISR USV adds additional targets for the adversary to decide 
from that allows more time for friendly forces to counter target or counter engage. This 
idea of having multiple ISR surface platforms, at a reduced cost, supplementing the use of 
manned assets, could play a major role in the future fleet. UAVs are already playing a key 
role in this matter, therefore, having multiple manned and unmanned systems working 
cooperatively to display the common operating picture could be a major force multiplier in 
the DMO concept.   
The ISR USV was outfitted with a payload for the discrete modeling and 
simulation. Since its role is completely different than the first two USV alternatives, the 
payload mission module does not need an ADL configuration but only the required sensors 
and equipment for long range sensing, transmitting, and communicating. For the purposes 
of the discrete simulation, the ISR USV provides an extended range for all missile types 
when actively conducting its ISR mission and is assumed to have the capability to transmit 
and receive data link to all platforms in the DMO concept. The following table illustrates 
the design specifications as well as the payloads for the ISR USV platform. 
Table 8.   USV ISR Specifications 
USV ISR 
Class Type: E - G 
Mission Module 
Payload: <20 tons 
ADL Footprint: N/A 
Missile Type: N/A 
Number of Missiles: N/A 
Launch Cells: N/A 
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IV. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
This chapter presents the simulation model, consistent with the system architectures 
presented in Chapter III, to analyze the potential operational utility of USVs. The chapter 
specifically addresses the concept of operations, the order of battle for the adversary and 
friendly forces, a summary of the model, the model’s limitations and assumptions, and 
lastly, the author’s hypothesis of the implementation of USVs into the DMO concept. 
A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
The SEA 27 (2018) capstone project gave a specific setting and scenario to scope 
the model and simulation. The intention was to provide an underlying operational situation 
with platforms and technologies equivalent to the 2030–2035 time frame with a near peer 
competitor. The SEA 27 team wanted to ensure that the DMO concept was analyzed in a 
realistic scenario and operational environment, so the focus was geared towards a littoral 
conflict in the South China Sea. For this thesis, the same scenario and setting will be carried 
forward with minor changes to both the friendly and enemy order of battle. Chapter III in 
the SEA 27 (2018) capstone report has a detailed description of the concept of operations; 
however, the following paragraphs are a summary derived from their report, which 
provides the reader context moving forward.  
1. Scenario 
The basis of the scenario derives from the narrative described in the “Maritime War 
of 2030” framework from the Joint Campaign Analysis course (Kline 2018). The narrative 
can be found in Appendix A. SEA 27 (2018) summarizes the scenario in the following 
paragraph: 
The geopolitical situation in the year 2030 is characterized by continued 
tension between the United States and the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in the South China Sea region, with PRC continuing to construct 
military basing on contested islands. With the increased threat of PRC 
expansionism and potential conflict, the United States maintains its routine 
patrols through the region and maintains its defense treaties with established 
regional partners. The maritime war at sea in the 2030 to 2035 timeframe 
progresses from escalating aggression and unlawful PRC activities in the 
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region, to harassment of neighboring nation’s fishing vessels and the 
massing of PRC maritime forces in the South China Sea. The United States 
obtains intelligence of the PRC objective to capture the Philippine island 
nation of Palawan. The U.S. friendly forces anticipate imminent 
engagement with PRC enemy forces and are consequently conducting 
preparations for combat at sea, with immediate mobilization of regional 
friendly assets to the South China Sea (SCS), specifically to the 
northwestern edge of Palawan. (SEA 27 2018, 15) 
2. Operational Environment and Tasking 
The primary tasking for the U.S. maritime forces is to establish a defensive 
perimeter off the western coastline of Palawan. The U.S. will maintain a defensive posture 
for its allies until the enemy initiates hostile intent towards either friendly forces or allied 
forces. The execution of a defensive operation in the protection of an island from an 
imminent attack is primarily the operational scenario; however, friendly forces will have 
an offensive “strike first” posture when the situation presents itself as prescribed by the 
DMO doctrine. SEA 27 (2018) states that “U.S. maritime assets must apply the DMO 
concept through the employment of traditional warfare areas including air and missile 
defense, surface warfare, and at-sea strike, as well as manned-unmanned tactics, counter-
targeting, deception operations, and electromagnetic warfare” (16). All friendly platforms, 
whether they are manned or unmanned, are integrated into a weapon system network that 
allows for distribution of friendly intelligence as well as ordnance. A defensive posture 
will resemble maritime and air superiority in the area of operation by creating a distributed 
tactical common operating picture that allows all friendly forces, manned and unmanned, 
situational awareness for the approaching adversary.  
3. Area of Operations 
The SCS is the primary area of operation, with the western coastline of Palawan 
and beyond, extending north-west, as the focal point in the scenario. As depicted in  
Figure 21, the white outline represents the potential operating locations for both friendly 
and adversary forces, while the yellow outline shows the island of Palawan. This area of 




Figure 21.  Projected Operating Area. Source: SEA 27 (2018). 
B. ORDER OF BATTLE 
 
This thesis’ analysis will be bounded by the area and setting of the scenario defined 
in Section A of this chapter. The order of battle (OOB) was developed for both the friendly 
and enemy forces based off of historical open source databases for platforms in the 
specified region. To suit the 2030–2035 timeframe, the author extrapolated some of the 
current performance characteristics as well as platforms and technologies that are not fully 
mature or developed. The OOB is comprised of surface ships, aircraft, and unmanned 
systems (including unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned surface vehicles), as well as 
their weapons systems and sensors. For this scenario, only U.S. and the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) platforms are considered in the OOB. All allied assets for both the U.S. 
and PRC remain neutral for this thesis’ simulation; therefore, allied nations will not be 
considered in the OOB. A more detailed look at the friendly and enemy OOB can be found 
in Appendix B and the details and characteristics of each generic sensor for both the enemy 
and the friendly forces are referenced in Appendix C. 
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1. Friendly Order of Battle 
The area of operations is in the Pacific Commands (PACOM) area of responsibility 
(AOR); therefore, the OOB considers the current number of platforms that are typically 
deployed or deployable within this region. The major force concentration bases that 
provide U.S. platforms are Japan, Guam, Hawaii and San Diego. These platforms are 
usually deployed in action groups such as Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), Expeditionary 
Strike Groups (ESG) or Surface Action Groups (SAG). To meet the desired operational 
objective of providing a defensive perimeter around the Western coastline of Palawan, the 
following paragraphs address the composition of CSG, ESG, and SAG platforms. 
(1) Friendly Surface Platforms 
Table 9 shows the different types of friendly surface platforms that will be modeled 
in the simulation of the thesis scenario. Most of the vessels are currently in the U.S. Navy’s 
inventory; however, the conceptualized unmanned surface vehicles presented in  
Chapter III are also considered in the OOB. The vessels described in Table 4 may already 
be deployed in the region, be en-route to the region, or be reassigned to the region due to 
operational tasking. 
Table 9.   Friendly Order of Battle – Surface Platforms. Adapted from 
SEA 27 (2018). 
Ship Type Ship Class Designator Manning 
Aircraft Carrier Nimitz/Gerald R. Ford CVN Manned 
Amphibious Assault America/Wasp LHA/LHD Manned 
Amphibious Transport Dock San Antonio LPD Manned 
Guided Missile Cruiser Ticonderoga CG Manned 
Guided Missile Destroyer Arleigh Burke DDG-51 Manned 
Guided Missile Destroyer Zumwalt DDG-1000 Manned 
Littoral Combat Ship Freedom/Independence LCS Manned 
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Ship Type Ship Class Designator Manning 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
Intelligence, Surveillance, & 
Reconnaissance 
E-G Class USV ISR Unmanned 








Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
Anti-Missile Defense 
F-G Class USV AMD Unmanned 
 
(2) Friendly Air Platforms 
Table 10 shows the different types of friendly air platforms that will be modeled in 
the simulation of the thesis scenario. These aircraft will be either assigned to a Carrier Air 
Wing (CVW) that will be attached to the CSG, an Aviation Combat Element (ACE) that 
will be attached to the ESG, a detachment to a smaller surface combatant, or a foreign 
operating base (FOB) in the region. The aircraft described in Table 10 may already be 
deployed in the region, be en-route to the region, or be reassigned to the region due to 
operational tasking. 
Table 10.   Friendly Order of Battle – Air Platforms. Source: SEA 27 
(2018). 
Aircraft Role Aircraft Type  Designator  Nomenclature Manning 
Stealth Multi-role 
Fighter 
Fixed Wing  F-35 Lightning  Manned 
Multi-role Combat Fixed Wing F/A-18 Super-Hornet  Manned 
Electronic Warfare Fixed Wing EA-18 Growler Manned 
Airborne Early 
Warning  
Fixed Wing  E-2 Hawkeye  Manned 
Maritime Patrol  Fixed Wing  P-8 Poseidon Manned 
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Aircraft Role Aircraft Type  Designator  Nomenclature Manning 
Multi-role Maritime 
Helicopter  
Rotary Wing MH-60 Seahawk  Manned 
Attack Helicopter  Rotary Wing  AH-1 Super Cobra/
Viper   
Manned 
Autonomous 
Surveillance   
Fixed Wing  MQ-4 Triton  Unmanned 
Autonomous 
Helicopter  





















(3) Friendly Sensors 
Table 11 shows the different types of friendly sensors with their parent platforms 
that will be modeled in the simulation of the thesis scenario. The sensors’ primary roles in 
the context of DMO and the modeling and simulation on the scenario is to detect, track and 
target, and engage hostile contacts that pose a threat to the defense of the Island of Palawan. 
The sensors described in Table 11 are generic in nature and will be modeled as such. For 
example, there are many variations of Fire Control (FC) radars; however, for this thesis all 
platforms that have a FC Radar will be modeled with a generic baseline FC radar.  
Table 11.   Friendly Order of Battle – Sensors. Adapted from SEA 27 
(2018). 
Sensor Parent Platforms 
Visual  All Surface, All Air, All Unmanned 
 
Infrared CVN, LHD/LHA, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD,                 
F-35, F/A-18, EA-18, E-2, P-8, MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8 Fire 
Scout, MQ-4 Triton, TERN 
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CVN, LHD/LHA, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD,  
USV ISR, USV SUW, USV AMD, F-35, F/A-18, EA-18, 
E-2, P-8, MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8 Fire Scout, MQ-4 Triton 
 
Air Search Radar  CVN, LHA/LHD, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD, 
USV AMD, MH-60, AH-1, TERN 
Surface Search Radar  All Surface Platforms,  
MH-60, AH-1, TERN 
Fire Control Radar  CVN, LHD/LHA, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000, LCS, LPD, 
USV SUW, USV AMD, MH-60, AH-1, MQ-8 Fire Scout 
Navigation Radar All Surface Platforms 
Phased Array Radar  CVN, CG, DDG-51, DDG-1000 
AESA (Active 
Electronic Scanned 
Array Radar)  
 
F-35, F/A-18, EA-18, E-2, P-8, MQ-4 Triton 





Radar – Maritime  
 
MH-60, MQ-8 Fire Scout, MQ-4 Triton  
 
(4) Friendly Missiles 
Table 12 shows the different types of friendly missiles with their parent platforms 
that will be modeled in the simulation of the thesis scenario. Missiles will be used in both 
an offensive and defensive role in the context of DMO. A wide range of types of missiles 
were chosen to be modeled, from air-to-air missiles (AAM) to anti-ship cruise missiles 
(ASCM). As mentioned in Chapter III, the LRASM and MST are not fully developed, but 
will be implemented into the missile OOB with the assumption that by the 2030–2035 
timeframe they will be technologically mature.  
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Table 12.   Friendly Order of Battle – Missiles. Adapted from SEA 27 
(2018). 
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Evolved Sea Sparrow - 
Medium Range Surface to Air 
Missile 
CVN, LHA/D, LPD, CG, 
DDG-51, DDG-1000, 
















AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air to Air 
 
F-35, F/A-18 
HARM AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation F-35, F/A-18 
 
2. Enemy Order of Battle 
The area of operations is in the South China Sea; therefore, the PRC has prime real 
estate in not only its well-established mainland naval bases, but also throughout its forward 
operating bases on the contested reefs and island chains. The PRC also has a clear 
advantage when it comes to employment options. The enemy OOB consists of not only 
surface and air platforms, but also land-based missiles that can be fired from predesignated 
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areas. The major force concentration bases that provide enemy platforms are the Spratly 
Islands, Paracel Islands, and the Southern Naval Theater Head Quarters. These platforms 
are usually deployed in action groups similar to the friendly forces. According to Cole 
(2010), the Chinese will use a strategic operational “Clausewitzian measure: how much 
naval force can be deployed against a given objective at a time of Beijing’s choosing” and 
also states that it is, “fairly certain that China will be able to seize the initiative when 
employing its new Navy” (p 113). To meet the enemy’s desired operational objective of 
establishing a military presence on Palawan, the necessary composition of action groups is 
addressed in the following paragraphs. 
(1) Enemy Surface Platforms 
Table 13 shows the different types of enemy surface platforms that will be modeled 
in the simulation of the thesis scenario. The list encompasses the most technologically 
advanced platforms currently in the PRC naval forces as well as platforms that are still in 
development. Of note, no USVs were used in the Enemy’s OOB due to the lack of public 
information available on characteristics and performance. The vessels described in Table 
13 may already be deployed in the region, be en-route to the region, or be reassigned to the 
region due to operational tasking. 
Table 13.   Enemy Order of Battle – Surface Vessels. Source: SEA 27 
(2018). 
Ship Type Ship Class Designator Manning 
 






Guided Missile Cruiser/Destroyer Renhai Type 055 Manned 
Guided Missile Destroyer Luyang III Type 052D Manned 
Multi-role Frigate Jiangkai II Type 054 Manned 
Multi-role Corvette Jiangdao Type 056 Manned 
Stealth/Missile Boat Houbei Type 022 Manned 
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Ship Type Ship Class Designator Manning 








Amphibious Transport Dock Yuzhao Type 071 Manned 
Landing Ship – Tank Yuting II Type 072A Manned 
 
(2) Enemy Air Platforms 
Table 14 shows the different types of enemy air platforms that will be modeled in 
the simulation of the thesis scenario. Most of these PRC aircraft will be employed by land 
bases in the vicinity of the aforementioned force concentration bases, apart from the J-15, 
which is specifically designed to deploy from the new 001A aircraft carrier. The enemy 
aircraft OOB has much more variety and quantity than the friendly counterpart’s due to 
ample supply of ground bases and logistical lines. Of note, this thesis chose to model three 
UAVs similar to the friendly force’s UAV OOB. This was done for simplicity’s sake due 
to the multitude of variants and unique UAVs that the PRC has developed. The aircraft 
described in Table 14 may already be deployed in the region, be en-route to the region, or 
be reassigned to the region due to operational tasking. 
Table 14.   Enemy Order of Battle – Air Platforms. Source: SEA 27 
(2018). 
Aircraft Role Aircraft Type  Designator  Nomenclature Manning 
Air Superiority Fighter Fixed Wing J-11 Flanker B+ Manned 
Carrier Based Fighter Fixed Wing J-15 Flying Shark Manned 
Multi-role Strike Fighter Fixed Wing J-16 Shenyang  Manned  
Electronic Warfare 
Fighter 
Fixed Wing J-16D Shenyang Manned 
Multi-role Stealth 
Fighter 
Fixed Wing J-20 Chengdu Manned 
Attack & Close Air 
Support 




Aircraft Role Aircraft Type  Designator  Nomenclature Manning 
Strategic Bomber Fixed Wing H-6K Xian  Manned 
Airborne Early Warning  Fixed Wing KJ-3000 Mainring  Manned 
Maritime Patrol  Fixed Wing Y-8FQ Shaanxi  Manned 
Utility/ASW Helicopter  Rotary Wing Z-18 Changhe Manned 







Super Frelon  
 
Manned 
High Altitude Long 















Stealth Supersonic UAV Fixed Wing AVIC 601 Dark Sword  Unmanned 
 
 
(3) Enemy Sensors 
Table 15 shows the different types of enemy sensors with their parent platforms 
that will be modeled in the simulation of the thesis scenario. The sensors are characterized 
the same as the friendly sensors and are generic in nature. Through operational experience 
as well as information from open-source literature, the author used different performance 
parameters for each sensor depending on the parent platform and the contact being sensed.  
Table 15.   Enemy Order of Battle – Sensors. Source: SEA 27 (2018). 
Sensor Parent Platforms 
Visual  All Surface, All Air, All Unmanned  
 
Infrared Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Houbei,  
J-11, J-15, J-16, J-20, Z-18, Z-8AEW 
ESM (Electronic  
Support Measures)  
Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Helicopter Dock, 
Landing Dock, J-15, J-16, J-16D, J-20, KJ-3000 
 
Air Search Radar  Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Helicopter Dock, 
Landing Dock, All Manned Aircraft  
 Aircraft Carrier, All Amphibious Assault,  
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Sensor Parent Platforms 
Surface Search 
Radar  
Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Houbei 
J-15, J-16, Q-5, H-6K, KJ-3000, Z-18, Z-8AEW 
Fire Control Radar  All Surface, J-11, J-15, J-16, J-16D, Q-5, H-6K, Z-18, Z-8AEW 
Navigation Radar All Surface  
Phased Array Radar  Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai, Jiangdao  
AESA (Active 
Electronic Scanned 
Array Radar)  
 
Renhai, J-15, J-16, J-16D, J-20, All Unmanned Air  
Over the Horizon 
Radar  
 
Renhai, Luyang, Jiangkai 
Synthetic Aperture 
Radar – Maritime  
Aircraft Carrier, Renhai, Luyang,  
KJ-3000, Y-8FQ, All Land-Based Missiles & Unmanned Air  
Synthetic Aperture 
Radar – Space  
 
Yaogan Satellite  
 
 
(4) Enemy Missiles 
Table 16 shows the different types of enemy missiles with their parent platforms 
that will be modeled in the simulation of the thesis scenario. Unlike the friendly missiles, 
the enemy missiles are used solely in an offensive manner due to the nature of the enemy’s 
operational objective of attacking and controlling the Island of Palawan. Similar to the 
friendly missiles, a wide range of types of missiles were chosen to be modeled. Since the 
scenario’s time horizon is a few decades in the future, one missile that is currently in 
development – the Very Long Range Air to Air Missile (VLRAAM) – will be considered 
in the enemy missile OOB as technologically mature.  
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Table 16.   Enemy Order of Battle – Missile. Source: SEA 27 (2018). 
Missile Designator  Type   Launching Platform  
Dong-Feng 
21 
DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
(ASBM) 
Land – Mobile Launcher  
Dong-Feng 
26 
DF-26 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile 
(ASBM) 
Land – Mobile Launcher 
Silkworm  HY-2 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
(ASCM) 
Land – Mobile Launcher 
Eagle Strike-
12 
YJ-12 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
(ASCM) 




YJ-18 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
(ASCM) 




YJ-62 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
(ASCM) 
Land – Mobile 







Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
(ASCM) 
Lyuang, Jiangkai, 




YJ-100 Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
(ASCM) 





FN-16 Man Portable Air Defense 
(MANPAD) Surface to Air  
Jiangdao, Houbei, All 






Surface to Air Aircraft Carrier, Luyang, 
Jiangkai, Jiangdao 
Hongqi-16 HQ-16 Medium Range Surface to 
Air  
Renhai, Luyang  
 CM-102 Anti-Radiation/Anti-Ship   J-16D  
Thunderbolt-
9 
PL-9 Short Range Air to Air 
Missile  




PL-12 Medium Range Air to Air 
Missile 
J-11, J-15, J-16, J-20 
 VLRAAM Very Long Range Air to Air 
Missile 
J-11, J-15, J-16, J-20 
 
Both the enemy and friendly order of battle have been detailed in the preceding 
paragraphs. These are all inputs that will be utilized in the modeling and simulation of the 
DMO scenario, along with the employment of the DMO tactics. The intent in the following 
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sections is to summarize the model, discuss the assumptions and limitations of the model, 
and set the stage for the implementation of the unmanned surface vehicles described in 
Chapter III. 
C. MODEL SUMMARY 
The purpose of modeling the given scenario is to evaluate the alternative unmanned 
surface vehicles discussed in Chapter III. By constructing a model, the author is able to 
examine the appropriate unmanned surface vehicle force structure best suited to the 
Distributed Maritime Operations concept. ExtendSim, a discrete event simulation (DES) 
software, was chosen to perform an analysis of USVs in DMO. According to Brailsford 
(2014), “A DES models queuing systems as they progress through time. In doing so it 
represents the world as entities that flow through a network of queues and activities” (17). 
The model used was derived from the original creation of SEA 27’s capstone report (2018) 
with multiple changes and updates throughout. The model is broken down into four 
primary phases; the threat generation phase, the finding phase, the targeting phase, and the 
engagement phase. This is demonstrated by the typical military application of the F2T2EA 
kill chain, described by Joint Publication 3–60 (JCS 2013). The F2T2EA model is 
decomposed into the following subtasks: find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess. The 
SEA 27 report combined these subtasks for simplification and for a more realistic 
viewpoint, since some of these subtasks are completed near simultaneously as shown in 
the Figure 22. 
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Figure 22.  Simplification of the F2Y2EA Kill Chain. Adapted from JCS 
(2013). Source: SEA 27 (2018). 
The Find, Target, Engage (FTE) kill chain is a step-by-step process where the 
enemy or friendly platform finds a potential contact (which entails fixing and tracking the 
contact), acquires a targeting solution on the contact (depending on sensor performance), 
and ultimately engages the contact with a salvo of missiles and assesses the damage 
inflicted. This kill chain is a systematic process that can be easily disrupted since any one 
deficiency in the chain will interrupt the entire process.  
Phase one of the model introduces the threat generation, which consists of the 
creation of enemy platforms, the mission assignment and pairing of contacts, the clutter 
attributed to maritime traffic and potential contacts, as well as environmental effects on the 
enemy’s sensors. Phases two through four of the model illustrate the enemy’s FTE kill 
chain, with friendly forces trying to disrupt, deceive, confuse or destroy the enemy’s kill 
chain before it resolves into a successful engagement. In the pursuit of the operational 
objective of protecting the Island of Palawan, the intention behind incorporating the DMO 
concept into the scenario is three-fold: (1) employing tactics, (2) counter-targeting, and 
lastly (3) counter-engaging the enemy throughout their kill chain. 
The employment of tactics, as mentioned briefly in Chapter 2 of this thesis, is 
addressed in depth in the SEA 27 (2018) capstone report Chapter 4, Section C. The four 
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primary DMO tactics – emission control, physical and mechanical measures, swarm, and 
jamming – are implemented throughout all the phases, whereas the counter-targeting and 
counter-engaging only occur at the targeting phase (phase three) and engagement phase 
(phase four), respectively.  
Each function of the model will be summarized in the following paragraphs and  
derives from the detailed description in the SEA 27 (2018) capstone report in chapter 4, 
section 1. Figure 23 depicts a summarized graphic of the model and lists each function as 
mentioned previously.  
 
Figure 23.  Primary Functions of the DMO Model. Source: SEA 27 
(2018). 
(1) Threat Generation 
The enemy OOB is created at the start of the simulation. The number of surface 
platforms, air platforms, and land-based missiles add to 149 unique entities, which 
distributes into approximately 29% surface platforms, 55% air platforms, and 16% land-
based missiles. Chapter 5, Table 26 references the specific Enemy OOB numbers. The 149 
enemy assets remain constant for every simulation and are given specific attributes that are 
written in a database labeled “Threat” in the ExtendSim software. This database provides 
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specific characteristics of each enemy platform, including sensor type, missile type and 
quantity, and velocity of platform. The enemy platforms also are given an initial range from 
Palawan, based on platform type and a normal distribution. This gives the model a more 
realistic scenario where the enemy platforms do not all start from the same location or 
distance from friendly assets.  
(2) Mission Assignment 
The enemy platforms are then cycled through a queue to be assigned a friendly 
platform to find, target and engage. The assignment process is probabilistic in nature and 
depends on three main factors. (1) Does the enemy have the correct ordnance to destroy 
the desired target? For example, if the enemy platform has only air-to-air missiles, then it 
will not target a friendly surface platform. (2) Does the friendly platform actually exist in 
the given run? This thesis analyzes the operational effectiveness of unmanned surface 
vehicles; therefore, the design of experiments will focus on changing the USV force 
structure while all other friendly platforms remain constant. For example, if an enemy 
platform is assigned a USV SUW and that platform does not exist in that applicable run, 
then the enemy goes through a reassignment process. Chapter 5 will address the details of 
the design of experiments. Lastly, (3) how long has the enemy been trying to find the 
assigned target? If the time lapse in the finding phase is greater than 75% of the allowable 
time the enemy platform is in the model, then the enemy is reassigned a new friendly 
platform. To note, once assigned a platform, the enemy will not deviate from its mission 
assignment even if they “find” other friendly platforms. 
A multicriteria scoring model determined the probabilities of assignment. Ragsdale 
(2015) states that “[t]he multicriteria scoring model is a simple procedure in which we 
score (or rate) each alternative in a decision problem based on each criterion…Weights are 
assigned to each criterion indicating its relative importance to the decision maker. For each 
alternative, we then compute a weighted average score” (783). The scoring model 
considered the combat power and sensor reach of each of the friendly platforms and gave 
a representative score for each. These two factors were then weighted, and the average 
score was calculated for each platform. This approach ensured that each platform was 
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compared to the same scoring matrix, allowing for a systematic prioritization of the 
friendly assets available for the enemy to target. The combat power factor considered the 
ordnance inherent to the platform as well as the organic assets attached to the platform, 
whereas the sensor reach factor considered the maximum range of sensors, network 
capability, and operational range of the platform. Combat Power was given a weight of 
60%, whereas sensor reach was given a weight of 40%. This was chosen to represent the 
prioritization of the enemy targeting the more offensively capable platforms. Appendix D 
details the scoring matrix and the applicable data.  
The process of assignment then continues using the applicable scores from the 
scoring model for each friendly platform. The following is an example of how friendly 
platforms are given a probability of assignment: if a specific enemy platform is only able 
to be assigned a surface platform, then the sum of the scores of the friendly surface 
platforms become the denominator and each individual surface platform score becomes the 
numerator. It turned out that the friendly CVN and LHA/LHD  had the highest weighted 
score amongst the available friendly platforms. This directly corresponds to reality since 
these are both considered “high value units” and crippling these assets would leave a 
devastating impact to our strategic and tactical objectives. Retired U.S. Navy Captain 
Bernard Cole (2010), in his book The Great Wall at Sea, states that “Chinese analysts and 
strategists consider the aircraft carrier as the center of gravity of the U.S. potential…and 
have made explicit anti-aircraft carrier doctrine that employ anti-ship ballistic and long-
range cruise missiles for carrier mission kills” (148-149). In the mission assignment 
process most of the enemy platforms have high probabilities to find both the CVN and 
LHA/LHD, and the land-based enemy missiles, specifically the DF-21 and DF-26, are 
assigned only to these two friendly platforms. 
(3) Clutter Creation 
Clutter is defined as “stuff” that the enemy has to filter through during the finding 
phase of its assigned friendly platform. Clutter is modeled in three different ways, and each 
factor has variability causing each run to have different input data. First, the model takes 
into consideration the maritime and commercial airline traffic that typically transits through 
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the region. This is given by a random variable normally distributed between 55–75 
contacts. This range was determined using the annual average of Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) tracks during a three hour time interval that traveled through the SCS region 
(Marine Vessel Traffic 2018) and can be referenced in Appendix E. Clutter also considers 
friendly platforms that the enemy is not assigned to destroy; meaning that if an enemy 
platform has a E-2D mission assignment, it has to filter through all the “clutter,” including 
commercial air traffic and friendly platform aircraft. Lastly, one of the DMO tactics 
contributes to the clutter factor in the model. Passive and active decoys, subfunctions of 
the Physical and Mechanical countermeasures, play a role in causing more potential targets 
that the enemy needs to filter through until finding its pre-determined assigned friendly 
platform.  
(4) Environment Setting 
Weather can greatly affect sea state as well as radar performance for both enemy 
and friendly platforms. The climate of Western Palawan and its surrounding seas is 
relatively calm for six months, while the other six months have torrential rain, and the 
South China Sea region has seasonal monsoons and typhoons that typically occur during 
the summer months. The typical visibility ranges from five miles to ten miles off the 
Northern Coast of Palawan (World Weather 2018). The effects of weather are modeled by 
randomly attributing a degradation factor to all sensors, ranging from 30% degradation 
(typical storm and rain effects) to no degradation (negligible cloud cover and rains), which 
impairs every platform’s ability to find, target and engage for each run in the simulation. 
The details for the environmental factors can be referenced in Appendix E. 
(5) Kill Chain 
As previously mentioned, the kill chain series of functions is impersonating the 
enemy’s FTE Kill Chain. Of note, the enemy has a number of ways of finding its designated 
target: using multiple radars, using electronic support measures (ESM), and visually 
acquiring the target either by infrared or the naked eye. Prior to each enemy platform 
starting their kill chain against their assigned target, a number of degradation factors are 
calculated that affect the find phase and target phase. The model uses built-in databases to 
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determine the degradation factors by referencing if any of the friendly platforms on that 
specific run are in EMCON A (the most restrictive emission control that permits zero 
promulgating of any electromagnetics) and if any of the jamming tactics are being 
employed. If any of these DMO tactics are being employed, there could either be a positive 
or negative impact for the friendly forces. For example, if any of the jamming tactics are 
employed, which specifically targets the enemy’s radar, the electromagnetic signature of 
the friendly platform dramatically increases, elevating the risk of being found due to ESM 
used by the enemy. This potentially allows the enemy to have a higher probability of 
finding or targeting the friendly platform. However, if the jamming is very effective against 
the enemy’s radar, then the radar degradation factor could significantly increase, causing 
the enemy to have a lower probability of finding or targeting the friendly platform using 
its radars. These input variables change during each run, allowing the author to determine 
if any of these tactics are significant in regard to the measures of effectiveness, which will 
be addressed in Chapter 5. 
(a) Find Phase 
The find phase consists of each enemy platform running through a sequence of 
subfunctions to determine if it finds its desired mission assignment. The two main factors 
that determine if the enemy will find its target are its sensor reach (the range of its sensors) 
and its radar performance parameter characterized as the probability of find (Pfind). The 
Pfind is referenced in one of the model’s databases and is specific per pairing of enemy 
platform to friendly platform for every unique sensor as depicted in Table 15. The author 
used open source data and operational experience to determine the Pfind for the generic 
sensors modeled. Friendly platform radar cross section (RCS), electromagnetic shielding, 
and infrared radiation were also considered in this process, as illustrated in the following 
example: the friendly CVN has a higher probability of being found across all enemy 
sensors due to its large RCS, whereas the new DDG-1000 has a lower probability of being 
found due to the technological advancement in reduced RCS as well as the implementation 
of electromagnetic shielding. An example of the probability of finding a CVN is annotated 
in Appendix C. 
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As mentioned previously, the enemy’s Pfind can be degraded by either using 
jamming tactics or emission control tactics. The model also considers a unique factor 
deemed Area of Uncertainty (AOU). The AOU factor is only applicable in the find phase 
and demonstrates the friendly platform’s speed of advance as the enemy platform reduces 
its distance between its assigned target. The AOU of a specific target increases as the 
enemy searches for it and is calculated by multiplying the speed of the friendly platform 
by the time the enemy takes looking for it. The longer it takes to find, the greater the AOU 
of the friendly platform. The model has implemented AOU levels that, once reached, will 
increase the degradation factor and decrease the probability of finding the friendly 
platform.  
Once the enemy runs once through the find phase, it either will find its assigned 
target and move to the next step in the kill chain or will restart the finding process. Of note, 
each iteration of the find phase increases the AOU of the assigned target, but also decreases 
the clutter that the enemy must filter through to find its mission assignment.  
(b) Target Phase 
The target phase consists of a similar process as the find phase, except instead of 
using Pfind, the model extracts a probability of target (Ptarget) from a unique enemy sensor 
performance database per enemy platform. Degradation factors still influence the enemy’s 
sensors; these include the environmental settings factor, the radar degradation factor from 
jamming tactics, as well as the ESM degradation factor from emission control (a list of 
degradation factors for jamming can be found in Appendix F). Therefore, the enemy’s 
Ptarget can be significantly reduced from its original value, causing the enemy to take a 
much longer time acquiring a targeting solution. This phase runs through many iterations 
until the enemy either successfully targets and moves on to the next step in its kill chain or 
fails to target and is either counter-targeted or exits the model.  
This is the first phase that introduces a counter-offensive posture from the friendly 
forces. As the enemy is inbound to its designated contact, friendly forces have multiple 
opportunities to counter-target, especially if the enemy has been delayed in any way. 
Counter-targeting is the ability to take action prior to an adversary missile launch to prevent 
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friendly forces from being targets or being engaged. One of the major assumptions of this 
model and thesis is that friendly forces are all networked within the same common 
operating picture. This allows for forces to be distributed, yet still share the essential 
information and resources, such as targeting solutions and ordnance. For example, if the 
USV ISR is able to find and target an enemy aircraft, it is able to relay the targeting data 
to a missile carrier, like a destroyer, which is able to fire an assortment of anti-air missiles 
to intercept the inbound enemy aircraft. Figure 11, in Chapter 2, illustrated a similar 
scenario. 
Modeling the concept of shared resources and information was developed by 
making a resource pool of friendly missiles available at the start of each run scenario. The 
model adds the payloads of each friendly platform brought to the fight and creates a 
dynamic pool of the missiles listed in Table 16. If any of the friendly platforms are in 
EMCON Alpha, their missiles do not count towards the resource pool and cannot be used 
throughout the scenario. The missiles are then reduced from the pool as friendly forces 
counter-target or counter-engage the enemy. The listed missiles have different operational 
ranges; therefore, the limiting factor for counter-targeting the enemy is not the range of any 
specific friendly sensor, but the range of the missile being employed. Each friendly missile 
also has a probability of hit (Phit) and a specified salvo quantity that is fired per 
engagement. During the targeting phase, the friendly forces determine the current range of 
the inbound enemy and apply the most effective missiles that are available from the 
resource pool. Hence, if the resource pool has exhausted all standard missiles, an enemy 
aircraft will be able to approach undeterred until friendly forces use a missile that can meet 
the operational range requirement.  
(c) Engage Phase 
The engagement phase starts once the enemy has successfully targeted its assigned 
contact. The enemy platform immediately employs a specified salvo and turns outbound to 
its original point of origin at the start of the scenario. This begins the counter-engagement 
phase for friendly forces. Whatever friendly missiles were fired during the counter-
targeting phase still apply and have an opportunity to hit outbound enemy targets. 
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However, friendly forces shift to a more defensive posture after the release of enemy 
missiles. Each enemy missile is a discrete entity that needs to be dealt with accordingly. 
For example, if the Houbei fires four ASCMs toward a friendly CVN, each ASCM needs 
to be counter-engaged with friendly missiles.  
Each enemy missile, listed in Table 16, has a specific terminal guidance as well as 
a probability of hit (Phit) that is referenced from one of the model’s databases. As the 
enemy missile approaches the designated target, friendly forces may have multiple 
opportunities to counter-engage with missiles just like the counter-targeting phase, 
however, once the enemy missile is within 10 nautical miles of its target, the friendly forces 
shift to using countermeasures. Countermeasures that are designed in this model are a last 
resort option when all counter-targeting and counter-engaging efforts fail. Similar to the 
missile resource pool, friendly forces have a distributed countermeasure pool from which 
to pull, allowing dissimilar platforms to help defend against inbound missiles. 
Countermeasures were created to illustrate one of the four DMO tactics. The 
countermeasures are a design of experiments for this thesis, therefore quantities change run 
by run. The modeled countermeasures were chaff, flares, active decoys, and infrared smoke 
and visual smoke. These countermeasure are employed based on the specifications of the 
enemy’s missile terminal guidance and have their own probability of counter-engaging the 
inbound missile.  
Pending on whether the enemy missiles are successful in avoiding any counter-
engagement, a one-time Phit is used to determine if the friendly platform is successfully 
hit. For this model, a successful hit is quantified as a mission kill. A few things take place 
when this occurs: (1) it counts toward a “killed” friendly platform in the output database, 
(2) it reduces the missile resource pool by a random factor of what that specific friendly 
platform brought in terms of friendly missiles (this simulates a real life situation where if 
a friendly platform is hit by a missile, it does not necessarily mean that they cannot continue 
fighting), and (3) the enemy missile is removed from the model. If the first of four missiles 
from the salvo of 4 ASCMs, as described earlier in the Houbei versus CVN scenario, hits 
the friendly platform, the remaining three missiles will still engage the CVN. However, 
this doesn’t count for multiple “kills” in the output database. Once the CVN is hit, it is 
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considered “killed” whether or not it is hit multiple times or is assigned by multiple enemy 
platforms.  
D. MODEL LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The goal of the model was to simulate a balanced fleet-on-fleet engagement 
between a near-peer adversary in the context of the DMO concept with the implementation 
of new unmanned surface vehicles. Every model has to be bounded and given direction to 
receive the desired effects of the simulation; with that comes many assumptions that the 
author had to consider while reorienting SEA 27’s baseline model. Assumptions had to be 
made to simplify the complexity of the scenario, but not to the degree of restricting the 
simulation to a realistic operating condition. This facilitated the gathering of insights as to 
how operationally effective unmanned surface vehicles could be in the context of a 
Distributed Maritime Operation.  
Table 17 lists the primary assumptions with the justification as well as the incurred 
limitations of the model. The author also annotates if the assumption is advantageous for 
either the enemy or friendly forces. 
Table 17.   Assumptions and Limitations of the Model. Adapted from 
SEA 27 (2018). 





Determined as a 
function of the slowest 
moving platform in the 
enemy OOB. 
The model is 
effectively 
examining only 
the initial round of 
engagements. 
Neutral. 
Friendly forces are 
assumed to have a 
network established 
for shared offensive 
strike capabilities and 
shared defensive 
capabilities. 
Since this thesis is 
focused on the DMO 
concept, it was 
assumed that all 
friendly forces would 
be able to be 
distributed yet share 
the common operating 
picture. 
This is not 
necessarily true in 














enemy versus the 




Assumption Reason Limitation Advantage 
Enemy platforms are 
assumed to operate 
independently with 
no shared detection or 
targeting information 
The model was created 
in such a way that it 
only simulates discrete 
one on one 
engagements and does 
not allow multiple 
simultaneous attacks. 
In a real life 
scenario, the 
















targets in the find 
and targeting 
phase. 
The enemy’s best 
inherent sensor is 
assumed operational 
and able to be 
employed against 
friendly assets 
For simplicity sake, all 
enemies were modeled 
with the best available 
generic sensor that is 
common for the given 
platform. 
All similar radars 
were modeled the 
same way, for 
example: The 
phased array radar 
on the Renhai 
class destroyer 
was modeled the 
same as the 





Luyang has a 
lower performing 
radar, yet it is 
modeled with the 
equivalent of a 
Renhai. 
Advantageous for 
the enemy since 
the scenario is 
assuming that 
each platform has 
an operationally 
perfect radar. 
The model does not 
consider logistical 
operations. 
Since the model is 
only covering a short 
time period, the 
logistical side of the 
fight is assumed to 
take place after the 
initial engagements.  
This is a limitation 
to the model in 
two ways: (1) it 
does not consider 




and (2) It assumes 
that all platforms 
in the AOR are 
Neutral. 
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Assumption Reason Limitation Advantage 
initially refueled 
and rearmed.   
The employment of 
decoys serves only as 
additional clutter for 
enemy forces 
The model only 
considers decoys as 
additional contacts, 
which potentially 
influence the enemy to 
allocate unnecessary 
resources to “fake 
contacts.” 




which does not 









tactics are used, the 
model assumes 
friendly forces have 
knowledge of enemy 
operating frequencies. 
In addition, jamming 
tactics impact all 
enemy threats 
simultaneously. 
For simplicity sake, 
the model was created 
to assume that when 
using jamming that the 
user’s not all know the 
frequency to jam but 
also that it’s effective 
against all enemy 
platforms that operate 





by not considering 
the size and power 
requirements for 
jamming 
equipment as well 
as not considering 
the anti-jamming 
techniques that the 
enemy could use 









tactics throughout the 
model. 
The model only 
considers the initial 
wave of enemy 
engagements with the 
focus on the offensive. 
The enemy has the 
same capabilities 
as friendly forces 
when it comes to 
defensive tactics. 
This is not 
considered in the 
model, which 
limits the realism 




Assumption Reason Limitation Advantage 
Each friendly force 
countermeasure is 
considered only 
effective against one 
type of enemy missile 
terminal guidance. 
This was modeled for 
simplification sake. 
The model considered 
Chaff, Flares, IR 
Smoke, Visual smoke, 
and active/passive 
decoys. Each 
impacting only one 
type of inbound 
missile. 
This impacts the 





as a function of 
enemy missile 
quantity and type. 
Advantageous to 
enemy forces. 
The model does not 
include undersea or 
cyber domains. 
The author’s expertise 
is in the areas of 
surface and air 
domains. For this 
reason, domains that 
were not well 
understood were 
excluded from the 
model. 
This limits the 
diversity of 
capabilities that 
both the enemy 
and friendly 
platforms bring to 
the scenario.  
Neutral. 
The model does not 
include close-in 
weapon systems, like 
CIWS,  to defend 
from inbound enemy 
missiles. 
One of the goals of 
DMO is to employ 
specific tactics to 
deter, distract or 
destroy the enemy. If 
an enemy missile 
comes within 10 
nautical miles of any 
friendly platform the 
specified 
countermeasures are 
used to disrupt the 
enemy missile. 
This limits the 




forces would use 
their close-in 
weapon systems 







forces are not 
using one of their 




Assumption Reason Limitation Advantage 
When implementing 
the USV ISR 
Platform, the model 
considered it as a 
binary variable; either 
on or off. 
The binary variable 
was used for 
simplification and 
allowed the author to 
easily determine if the 
factor was significant.  
This assumption 
assumes that one 
USV ISR platform 
provides perfect 
information to all 
friendly forces in 
the scenario. In 
actuality, multiple 
platforms would 
need to be 
distributed 
throughout the 




due to optimistic 
nature of only 
one USV ISR 
platform 
providing the ISR 
capability. 
 
In the following section the author annotates the significate changes that were made 
to the SEA 27 model as well as a few hypothesis’ that were determined before the analysis 
of the output data discussed in Chapter 5. 
E. IMPLEMENTATION OF USVS IN OPERATIONAL SIMULATION 
The inherent structure of the SEA 27 model remained the same as described by 
Figure 23: Primary Functions of the DMO Model. Changes were made throughout the 
model to improve or fix written code, add different capabilities, and implement USV 
platforms in the friendly OOB. The biggest change was the four platforms that were added 
and their applicable capabilities: USV ISR, USV SUW, USV AMD AIR, and USV AMD 
MISSILE platforms. These represent the three alternative mission package designs 
described in Chapter III, with the USV AMD split into two unique platforms: AIR and 
MISSILE; these configurations are meant to defend against air platforms and incoming 
missiles, respectively.  
All alternative USVs brought additional countermeasures to the friendly OOB, 
including chaff, active and passive decoys, flares, and IR and visual smoke. This allowed 
for more defensive capability when inbound enemy missiles approached within 10 nautical 
miles. The missile carrying USVs also brought their specific payloads, as annotated in 
Chapter III, which provided additional ordnance in the distributed resource pool described 
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in the model summary. However, the author believes that one of the most significant 
changes was the implementation of the USV ISR platform. The USV ISR provided a 
capability unique to the rest of the new platforms. This platform’s capability was added 
during the enemy’s targeting and engagement phase and allows every potential friendly 
missile an extended range to hit incoming enemy platforms or missiles. The USV ISR 
platform does not replace the already existing E-2D capability of an extended range of 
networks, communication and common operating picture, but adds additional “eyes and 
ears” in the maritime arena. The model takes this into consideration when either the E-2D 
or USV ISR platform are present and adds additional capability when both are present in 
the model. Appendix G shows the specifics of the extended ranges that both the E-2D and 
USV ISR platform bring per friendly missile type. 
Another significant change was the overly optimistic effectiveness of any jamming 
technique. Both the SEA 27 team and the author realized that the jamming assumptions 
were too advantageous to friendly forces, therefore, the model reflects a more conservative 
jamming tactics approach. The assumptions still remain that jamming is effective against 
all applicable enemy sensors and that friendly forces have knowledge of what frequency 
the enemy is operating with, but the degradation factor is significantly decreased, making 
jamming tactics not as effective when compared to the operational analysis conducted by 
SEA 27. Other changes throughout the model included the change in mission assignment 
probabilities for the enemy forces being assigned a friendly platform, the effectiveness of 
countermeasures in the counter-engagement phase, the effectiveness of enemy missiles and 
their terminal guidance, and added EMCON capable platforms to include all the new USV 
platforms as well as the CVN and LHA/LHD.  
The author believes that the USV ISR platform as well as the contribution of 
multiple missile carrying USV platforms will significantly impact the operational 
effectiveness of friendly forces in the context of the DMO concept, specifically in regard 
to the survivability of friendly forces, the survivability of enemy forces, as well as the 
offensive and defensive posture of the U.S. Navy’s maritime assets. The following chapter 
will first address the specific MOEs of this thesis, secondly, the design of experiments for 
 80 
the input data to the model, and lastly the analysis of the operational effectiveness of the 
USVs implemented into DMO. 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
The arranged sections will develop how the author measured operational 
effectiveness in the context of unmanned surface vehicles as well as introduce the creation 
of the design of experiments that the model implements. The data analysis will address 
each individual MOE and how unmanned surface vehicles performed throughout the 
simulation. In Chapter 6 a simplified cost analysis versus operational effectiveness is 
discussed and will conclude with a summary of findings and recommendations for future 
work. 
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Six principal measures of effectiveness were evaluated using three alternative 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles implemented into the DMO scenario. The thesis’ MOEs serve 
to measure how operationally effective the USVs are in the context of the DMO concept. 
The author identified quantifiable measures that could be collected from the model and 
analyzed to determine the level of success that each alternative brings and what 
compositions of USV ISR, USV SUW and USV AMD platforms are key enablers in the 
DMO force structure of the future CSGs, ESGs and SAGs. The subsequent paragraphs 
develop the specific MOEs and discuss the evaluations of each.  
1. MOE #1: Surviving Friendly Forces 
One of the key metrics in determining the overall operational success in any 
engagement is to look at what was brought into the fight, and what came out unscathed. 
Retired Navy Captain Hughes, in his book Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, states that 
“success is measured in ship casualties and a comparison of the numbers put out of action 
on both sides” (Hughes 1999, 8). The mathematical representation can be shown as the 
ratio of surviving friendly forces to the initial quantity of friendly forces at the beginning 
of the engagement. This was easily collected from the model by creating a formula using 
the Blue Quantity database. Of note, taking the percentage of surviving friendly forces does 
not necessarily tell the whole story; additional metrics to consider when determining 
operational success was calculating the percentage of specific platforms that survived, like 
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high value units, missile carrying platforms, aircraft and USVs. Table 18 shows the 
formulas that computed this MOE. 
Table 18.   MOE #1 Metrics. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 







2. MOE #2: Surviving Enemy Forces 
Not only is the percentage of surviving friendly forces key to determining the 
operational success of the engagement, but so is taking into consideration what the friendly 
forces destroyed in the context of enemy forces. MOE #2 considers the number of enemy 
forces remaining at the end of the engagement. The mathematical representation can be 
shown as the ratio of surviving enemy forces to the initial enemy forces at the beginning 
of the engagement. Table 19 shows the formula that computed this MOE. 
 
Surviving Friendly Forces
Quantity of Friendly Forces surviving at end of simulationPercentage
Quantity of initial Friendly Forces
=
Surviving High Value Units
Quantity of High Value Units surviving at end of simulationPercentage
Quantity of initial High Value Units
=
Surviving Missile Carrying Platforms
Quantity of Missile Carrying Platforms surviving at end of simulationPercentage
Quantity of initial Missile Carrying Platforms
=
Surviving Aircraft
Quantity of Aircraft surviving at end of simulationPercentage
Quantity of initial Aircraft
=
Surviving USVs
Quantity of USVs surviving at end of simulationPercentage
Quantity of initial USVs
=
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Table 19.   MOE #2 Metrics. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 
MOE #2: Surviving Enemy Forces 
 
 
Since this scenario focused on the defense of the Island of Palawan, the additional 
metrics, similar to MOE #1, to determine specific enemy platforms’ surviability were 
neglected. When considering operational success, the only metric in regards to percentage 
of surviving enemy forces is the cumulative aspect, not the specific type of platform. 
Friendly forces are not actively on the offensive and are not concerned with destroying 
specific enemy platforms, but rather with defending their national assets and providing 
support for their allied nation.  
3. MOE #3: Percentage of Enemy Missiles Destroyed 
One of the primary roles of the USV AMD is to provide a layered defense for 
friendly forces’ high value units by intercepting inbound enemy missiles and platforms. A 
metric that can easily be determined for operational success is the number of inbound 
enemy missiles destroyed throughout the engagement. MOE #3 considers the ratio of the 
number of successful enemy missiles countered to the quantity of total enemy missiles 
fired. An enemy missile can only be created in the model once the enemy has successfully 
completed its targeting phase in the kill chain and has engaged its designated target by 
releasing a salvo of missiles. A countered enemy missile is when a friendly force missile 
or countermeasure has successfully deterred, distracted, disrupted or destroyed the inbound 




Quantity of Enemy Forces remaining at end of simulationPercentage
Quantity of total Enemy Forces
=
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Table 20.   MOE #3 Metrics. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 
MOE #3: Percentage of Enemy Missiles Destroyed 
 
 
4. MOE #4: Percentage of Enemy Missiles within 10 Nautical Miles 
Another metric that was considered when determining the operational effectiveness 
of unmanned surface vehicles was the percentage of enemy missiles that made it within 10 
nautical miles of friendly forces. MOE #4 is another way of measuring the effectiveness of 
the friendly forces’ anti-missile defense, similar to MOE #3. This MOE provides insight 
into the ability of the friendly forces to counter-engage enemy missiles with their own 
missiles before they shift to using only counter measures. If an enemy missile passes the 
threshold of 10 nautical miles within the friendly forces’ layered defense, the friendly 
forces will then counter only with the applicable countermeasures as described in Chapter 
4 in the model assumptions and limitations. The mathematical representation can be shown 
as the ratio of enemy missiles within 10 nautical miles to the total quantity of enemy 
missiles fired throughout the engagement. Table 21 shows the formula that computed this 
MOE. 
Table 21.   MOE #4 Metrics. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 





Quantity of Succesful Enemy Missiles CounteredPercentage
Quantity of total Enemy Missiles
=
Red Missiles in 10 NM Range
Quantity Enemy Missiles within 10 NM rangePercentage
Quantity of total Enemy Missiles
=
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5. MOE #5: Offensive Strike Success 
As previously described in Chapter 4, friendly forces have two distinct 
opportunities to strike offensively: (1) during the enemy’s targeting phase, and (2) during 
the enemy’s engaging phase. For this thesis, offensive strike is described as engaging an 
enemy platform during the targeting and engaging phases of the enemy’s kill chain, 
whereas defensive measures are engaging an inbound enemy missile after the enemy has 
successfully completed its kill chain. An offensive strike success is the successful “hit” of 
an enemy platform with friendly forces’ missiles. A “hit” does not necessarily mean a 
destroyed enemy platform, but for the confines of this thesis it counts as a successful 
offensive strike. The mathematical representation of this metric is the ratio between the 
quantity of successful friendly offensive missile “hits” to the quantity of friendly missiles 
fired at enemy platforms. Table 22 shows the formula that computes this MOE. 
Table 22.   MOE #5 Metrics. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 
MOE #5: Offensive Strike Success 
 
 
6. MOE #6: Defensive Measure Success 
The last metric is very similar to MOE #5 except that it is only considering the 
defensive measure successes. Once an enemy platform has fired a salvo of missiles toward 
their designated target, friendly forces have two options based on the model design logic: 
(1) continue attacking the outbound enemy platform, or (2) counter-engage the inbound 
enemy missiles. For a successful defensive measure, the inbound enemy missile has to be 
deterred, distracted, or destroyed by either friendly forces’ missiles or countermeasures. 
The mathematical representation of this metric is the ratio of the quantity of successful 
friendly defensive measures to the quantity of total defensive measures expended (chaff, 
Success Friendly Missiles - Offensive
Quantity of successful Friendly offensive missilesPercentage
Quantity of Friendly missiles engaging Enemy platforms
=
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flares, smoke, etc.) throughout the scenario. Table 23 shows the formula that computed this 
MOE.  
Table 23.   MOE #6 Metrics. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 
MOE #6: Defensive Measure Success 
 
 
B. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
A design of experiments (DOE) was created to facilitate an analysis of the impact 
that each input variable, in terms of USV and friendly force configuration, had on 
operational effectiveness, as defined by the aforementioned MOEs. This thesis took all the 
input variables, whether continuous or discrete, and created a nearly orthogonal balanced 
(NOB) design for the DOE. The NOB design facilitates a well-balanced DOE that accounts 
for the full spectrum of potential combinations that the input variables could fill, as well as 
minimizes the correlation between the input variables. Since simulating every known 
combination of variables is time consuming, the creation of the DOE allows for a 
representative sample of the solution space. Vieira (2012) describes that “nearly orthogonal 
means that the maximum absolute pairwise correlation between any two design columns 
is minimal,” and “nearly balanced means that for any single factor column, the number of 
occurrences of each distinct factor level is nearly equal.” Vieira’s 512 datapoint 
spreadsheet was used to create the DOE, and the model ran 30 replications of the 512 
datapoints (totaling 15,360 datapoints), which were used in the data analysis portion of this 
chapter. Utilizing the 30 replications accounted for the impact of variability throughout the 
model. 
Model output was analyzed to determine the operational effectiveness of the 
alternative USVs in the construct of the DMO concept. To accomplish this, the author 
designed a fixed baseline force structure consisting of one CSG, one ESG, and a mixture 
Successful Defensive Measures
Quantity of successful Defensive MeasuresPercentage
Quantity of Total Defensive Measures Expended
=
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of independent friendly force platforms to make up a generic force structure called a SAG, 
as well as changed input variables (according to the experimental design strategy) that 
could potentially affect the outcome of the engagement. The baseline composition, shown 
in Table 24, is the author’s opinion of a force structure commonly available within 72 hours 
of a warning order for the specified region. The summary of input variables, shown in 
Table 25, is a combination of the alternative USVs addressed in Chapter III, the operational 
velocity of those USVs, as well as the four primary DMO tactics previously summarized 
in Chapter 2 and detailed in the SEA 27 Capstone report. The four primary DMO tactics 
were chosen to remain in the DOE due to the fact that all the alternative USVs contribute 
to the tactics is some way. For example: all alternative USVs have a number of 
countermeasures (physical and mechanical measures), have the ability to control 
electromagnetic emission (EMCON), have the capability of performing Electronic Warfare 
(Jamming), and are able to conduct military deception, which was the primary objective of 
the SWARM tactic in the SEA 27 report. 
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Table 24.   Baseline Fixed Force Structure. Adapted from SEA 27 
(2018). 
Carrier Strike  
Group (CSG) 
 Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG) 
 Independent  
Units  
1 CVN  1 LHA/LHD 1 DDG-1000 
2 CG 2 LPD 2 DDG-51 
2 DDG-51 1 DDG-51 2 LCS 
1 LCS 2 LCS 3 P-8 MPRA 
12 F-35 (Air) 4 F-35 (Air) 2 MH-60 R/S 
12 F-35 (Surface) 4 F-35 (Surface) 6  MQ-8 
6 F/A-18 (Air)  4 MH-60 R/S 4 MQ-9 
6 F/A-18 (Surface) 6 AH-1 2 MQ-4 
6 EA-18 2 MQ-8 12 TERN 
1 E-2D 2 MQ-9   
4 MH-60 R/S 4 TERN   
2 MQ-8    
2 MQ-9      
















Table 25.   Summary of Input Variables. Adapted from SEA 27 
(2018). 
Alternative USVs and DMO Tactics 
Variable Minimum Maximum Type  
USV ISR 0 1 Discrete 
USV SUW 0 25 Continuous 
USV AMD A 0 25 Continuous 
USV AMD M 0 25 Continuous 
Velocity 0.005       0.02 Continuous 
Swarm 0 1 Discrete 
Chaff 0 200 Continuous 
Flares 0 50 Continuous 
Visual Smoke 0 50 Continuous 
IR Smoke 0 50 Continuous 
Active Decoys 0 25 Continuous 
Passive Decoys  0 300 Continuous 
Spot Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
Barrage Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
Sweep Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
DRFM Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
GPS Jamming 0 1 Discrete 
CG EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
DDG-51 EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
DDG-1000 EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
CVN EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
LHA/LHD EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
USV ISR EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
USV SUW EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
USV AMD A EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
USV AMD M EMCON 0 1 Discrete 
 
Figure 24 depicts a selection of the DOE input variables; this is called a Scatterplot 
Matrix and it demonstrates the space-filling properties of the experimental design. Each 
square presents a two dimensional projection of the design space, where each black dot 
corresponds to a single system configuration. Note that each projection is nearly 
completely covered by an even dispersion of dots, suggesting that the design space is well 
filled. To note, in the example depicted in Figure 24, the USV ISR platform took the 
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discrete quantity of either 0 or 1; therefore, the space-filling effect looks different from the 
variables that are continuous in nature. 
 
Figure 24.  Input Variable Multivariate Scatterplot 
Figure 25 shows the correlations between each of the input variables. The 
correlation of the variables is the quantity measuring the extent of their interdependence 
amongst each other. The objective is to have every input variable as independent as 
possible; this thesis had no correlation amongst variables with a quantity greater than .08. 
This in turn allowed unbiased results in the data collection, since variables were not 






Figure 25.  Correlations Between Input Variables 
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The enemy forces had a fixed composition to meet the desired operational objective 
of invading the Island of Palawan. Table 26 shows the fixed composition, totaling 149 
enemy platforms, which are created in the beginning of the simulation. The enemy OOB 
is composed of the author’s opinion of what the PRC would use in the 2030–2035 time 
horizon. By no means is the composition factual, but for the purposes of this thesis, had to 
be fixed to run the simulation. 
Table 26.   Fixed Enemy Force Structure. Adapted from SEA 27 
(2018). 
 
C. MODEL ANALYSIS 
The author used JMP, a statistical analysis program, to conduct model analysis. The 
JMP software assists in the determination of significant input variables, specifically 
identifying relationships between variables. The software can process large amounts of 
Surface Combatants   Aircraft   Land Based Missiles   
1 Type 001/002/003 
Carrier 
14 J-11 Fighter 8 DF-21D 
3 Type 055 Renhai  18 J-15 Fighter 4 DF-26 
5 Type 052 Destroyer  18 J-16 Fighter  8 YJ-62 
7 Type 054 Frigate  4 J-16D EW 4 HY-2 
8 Type 056 Corvette  8 J-20 Fighter   
14 Type 022 Missile Boat 4 Q-5 Surface Attack 
1 Type 075 LHD 3 H-6K Bomber  
2 Type 071 LPD 1 KJ-3000 AEW  
2 Type 072 LST  1 Y-8FQ MPRA 
 6 Z-18 Helo  
2 Z-8AEW 
1 Soaring Dragon 
1 Pterodactyl 
1 Dark Sword  
Total Enemy Threats in Model = 149 
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data and create regression models that appropriately fit the input variables against the 
metrics being considered. The author allowed the JMP program to conduct a stepwise 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) type regression before creating the best fitting model 
for each specific MOE. The BIC algorithm has the ability to identify the most significant 
input variables, allowing factors that are not of particular interest to be left out of the 
regression analysis. 
The author collected the output data, consisting of all 15,360 simulation runs, and 
organized the input data and output data so that it could be implemented into JMP. Both 
the output and input data are required for JMP to conduct its regression models; therefore, 
the output data that was captured by the ExtendSim Model had to be congruent to the MOEs 
prescribed. Table 27 illustrates each MOE and the detailed output data that was captured 
and merged with the input variables generated by the DOE. The goal was to determine if 
any of the unmanned surface vehicle input variables were statistically and operationally 
significant in regard to the prescribed MOEs. Appendix H illustrates a sample data set of 
the DOE and the expected MOE outputs. 
Table 27.   Metrics Captured by the ExtendSim Model. Adapted from 
SEA 27 (2018). 
Surviving 
Friendly Forces 
Percentage of Friendly High Value Surface Assets Killed  
      (CVN/LHD/LHA) 
Percentage of Friendly Missile Carriers Killed (DDG(s), CG) 
Percentage of Friendly Force Fighter Aircraft Killed  
      (F-35, F/A-18)  
Percentage of USVs Killed (USV ISR, USV SUW, USV AMD A, 













within 10 NM  










Success of Employed Mechanical and Physical Counter-Measures 
Success of Employed Defensive Missiles  
 
For this analysis, a statistically significant variable was defined as one that received 
a p-value of less than 0.0001. This means the relationship between the specified variables 
and the overall operational effectiveness is likely not caused by random chance. The 
desired outcome would be that any of the USV variables would be considered statistically 
significant throughout the analysis. How operationally impactful the specified variable’s 
relationship is in regard to the overall operational effectiveness defines operational 
significance. The JMP software, during its regression analysis, can identify factors that are 
statistically significant, yet the same factors could have limited operational impact. A 
hypothetical example would be if JMP identified the number of USV SUW’s as statistically 
significant in the context of MOE 2: Survivability of Enemy Forces, but the survivability 
of Enemy Forces only changed from 50% to 49.5% in that specific case. This indicates that 
while certain factors may be statistically significant, the reduction from 50% survivability 
to 49.5% survivability is operationally insignificant. 
The following sections dissect the six measures of effectiveness using the JMP 
software. It was discovered that one or more USV variables made a noteworthy impact in 
three out of the six measures of effectiveness, proving to be not only statistically significant 
in each given circumstance, but also operationally significant. Each MOE analysis provides 
an actual versus predicted plot, an analysis summary, and sorted parameter estimates. The 
actual versus predicted plot provides confirmation that regression is an appropriate analysis 
technique, the analysis summary provides a condensed summary of the regression results, 
and the sorted parameter estimates provide additional detail regarding regression results to 
facilitate identification of results that may be statistically but not operationally significant. 
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If any unmanned surface vehicle variables turned out to be worth continued investigation, 
a follow-on partition tree was developed showing the operationally significant results. The 
author’s intent is to show that the success of the six MOEs had some USV variable 
relationship; however, due to the many factors throughout the model, it was important to 
distinguish what was actually impactful. It is also interesting to note that the DMO tactics 
that the SEA 27 developed proved to be very effective throughout the analysis, specifically 
jamming tactics and emission control. This confirms the importance of the continued effort 
to utilize and control the EW spectrum. 
1. Analysis of MOE #1: Surviving Friendly Forces 
 
Figure 26.  MOE #1 Actual versus Predicted Plot 
Figure 26 presents the results of regression analysis for the survivability of friendly 
forces. The R-squared value of 0.63 indicates an acceptable model fit. Of note, the abrupt 
cutoffs for the predicted values at 0.45 and 0.85 were due to the complex interactions 
among EMCON variables and certain terms in the regression model. The statistically 
significant factors contributing to the friendly force survivability are presented in Table 28 
and the sorted estimates are shown in Figure 27. The number of USV AMD A platforms 
and USV AMD M platforms are listed as statistically significant, yet their operational 
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impact was negligible. The author chose not to display all the metrics of individual 
platforms (Survivability of High Value Units, Missile carriers, Aircraft, and USVs) 
associated with MOE 1 due to the repetition of significant factors in all outputs and the fact 
that no USV variable proved to be operationally significant. 
Table 28.   Analysis Summary of MOE#1: Surviving Friendly Forces. 
















#USV AMD A 




Figure 27.  MOE #1: Statistically Significant Factors – Sorted Parameter 
Estimates 
Surviving Friendly Forces
Quantity of Friendly Forces surviving at end of simulationPercentage




2. Analysis of MOE #2: Surviving Enemy Forces 
 
Figure 28.  MOE #2 Actual versus Predicted Plot 
As with the analysis of friendly force survivability, regression analysis was 
conducted to identify the factors that had a statistically significant impact on enemy force 
survivability. Figure 28 presents the results of regression analysis for the survivability of 
enemy forces. The R-squared value of 0.40 indicates a less desirable model fit and usually 
would be disregarded as not insightful; however, the following results were of great 
interest. The statistically significant factors contributing to the enemy force survivability 
are presented in Table 29 and the sorted estimates are shown in Figure 29. The USV ISR 
platform and USV AMD A platform were shown to be significant factors, but, the ISR 
platform proved to be the only operationally significant USV variable. In fact, one variable 
that did not show up as statistically significant played a key role when combined with the 
ISR platform; the ISR platform was more operationally impactful in conjunction with the 
velocity attributed to USVs. As a reminder, Chapter 4, Table 17, discussed that the model 
took an optimistic approach when considering the USV ISR platform capability. This 
assumption made it so that the capability of the USV ISR platform was not contingent on 
the quantity of ISR platforms, but only if one was present in the specific scenario. 
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Table 29.   Analysis Summary of MOE #2: Surviving Enemy Forces. 









Overall Enemy Force Survivability  
#USV ISR 







Figure 29.  MOE #2: Statistically Significant Factors – Sorted Parameter 
Estimates 
In order to gain additional insight regarding the effectiveness of the ISR platform, 
a partition tree was created for the ISR platform, shown as Figure 30, as well as a branch 
associated with the velocity of the USVs. This figure suggests the operational significance 
of the USV ISR platform. Starting from the top of Figure 30, it is calculated that the average 
survivability of enemy forces is 31%; interestingly though, if the ISR platform is either 
present or not present in the model the resulting survivability of enemy forces are 28% and 
34%, respectively. Further splitting the partition, one can see that having a velocity of 58 
knots or greater for the USV platforms will contribute in decreasing the survivability of 
Surviving Enemy Forces
Quantity of Enemy Fores remaining at end of simulationPercentage




enemy forces to 24%. Therefore, when the ISR platform is present and has a design speed 
of 58 knots or greater, the survivability of enemy forces will decrease by a cumulative 10%. 
This happens to be one of the key findings in this thesis and shows that unmanned surface 
vehicles with ISR capabilities could be key enablers in the DMO concept by supplementing 
the manned assets that already provide an ISR capability. The author believes that the 
reason why the USV ISR was so effective was due to the unique capability of providing 
friendly forces an extended missile range combined with the small likelihood of being 
targeted due to its lack of firepower as described in the enemy mission assignment in 
Chapter 4. One only has to look at Figure 30 to see the distribution in data points when the 
USV ISR platform is greater than or equal to one. The red line indicates that when the USV 
















Figure 30.  MOE #2 Partition Tree 
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3. Analysis of MOE #3: Percentage of Enemy Missiles Destroyed 
 
Figure 31.  MOE #3 Actual versus Predicted Plot 
Figure 31 presents the results of regression analysis for the percentage of enemy 
missiles destroyed. The R-squared value of 0.90 indicates an acceptable model fit. Of note, 
the abrupt cutoffs for the predicted values at 0.2 and 0.8 were due to the complex 
interactions among EMCON variables and certain terms in the regression model. The 
statistically significant factors contributing to the percentage of enemy missiles destroyed 
are presented in Table 30 and the sorted estimates are shown in Figure 32. The number of 
USV AMD A platforms and USV AMD M platforms are listed as statistically significant, 












Table 30.   Analysis Summary of MOE #3: Percentage of Enemy 













#USV AMD A 




Figure 32.  MOE #3: Statistically Significant Factors – Sorted Parameter 
Estimates 
Enemy Missiles Destroyed
Quantity of Succesful Enemy Missiles CounteredPercentage





4. Analysis of MOE #4: Percentage of Enemy Missiles within 10 Nautical 
Miles 
 
Figure 33.  MOE #4 Actual versus Predicted Plot 
Figure 33 presents the results of regression analysis for the percentage of enemy 
missiles within 10 nautical miles of friendly forces. The R-squared value of 0.87 indicates 
an acceptable model fit. The statistically significant factors contributing to the percentage 
of enemy missiles within 10 nautical miles are presented in Table 31 and the sorted 
estimates are shown in Figure 34. Just like MOE #1 and MOE #3, the number of USV 
AMD A platforms and USV AMD M platforms remain statistically significant, yet the 





Table 31.   Analysis Summary of MOE #4: Percentage of Enemy 









Percentage of Enemy Missiles within 10 NM 
#USV AMD A 











Figure 34.  MOE #4: Statistically Significant Factors – Sorted Parameter 
Estimates 
A partition tree, depicted in Figure 35, was created in order to gain additional 
insight regarding the effectiveness of the USV AMD M and USV AMD A. This figure 
suggests the operational significance of the two platforms, with the quantity of USV AMD 
M platforms as the most impactful, and, when combined with a number of USV AMD A 
platforms, can significantly reduce the percentage of close proximity enemy missiles. This 
is intuitive since the AMD M shoots down incoming missiles while the AMD A shoots 
down aircraft that carry missiles. Starting from the top of Figure 35, it is calculated that the 
Red Missiles in 10 NM Range
Quantity Enemy Missiles within 10 NM rangePercentage





average percentage of enemy missiles within 10 nautical miles is approximately 35%. By 
the model’s standards, this means that about one third of the enemy’s missiles get through 
all the initial friendly layers of defense without being countered. When there is 
approximately 15 or more USV AMD M platforms, the percentage of enemy missiles 
crossing the 10 nautical mile line decreases to 31%. Further splitting the partition, one can 
see that having approximately 8 or more USV AMD A platforms decreases the percentage 
of enemy missiles to 29%. When considering having less than 15 USV AMD M platforms, 
the percentage of enemy missiles within 10 nautical miles increases to approximately 38%. 
Therefore, if the friendly order of battle has the right composition of AMD USVs the swing 
in the range of percentages of enemy missiles is around 8.5%, which is operationally 
significant.  
To put this into perspective, a hypothetical example was constructed: imagine 149 
enemy platforms that originally start off in the model and, according to MOE #2, 
approximately 68% are killed. Killed does not necessarily mean that the enemy was not 
able to engage with missiles before being destroyed. So, assume that 90 enemy platforms 
were able to engage, releasing a salvo of 6 missiles each. This is approximately 540 
inbound enemy missiles at different ranges throughout the model, depending on where the 
enemy started, when it found its assignment, and when it successfully targeted its 
assignment. On average, without the correct composition of AMD USV platforms, 38% of 
enemy missiles will reach 10 nautical miles, which is approximately 205 missiles. It is 
important to note that once the enemy missiles reach 10 nautical miles, friendly forces no 
longer use missiles to counter engage, but only physical and mechanical countermeasures 
like chaff, flares, and IR smoke. If the above-mentioned composition of AMD USV 
platforms is utilized, the 205 missiles will now be reduced to 157 missiles, which is a 
reduction of 48 missiles. In context, 48 enemy missiles are the equivalent of the number of 
YJ-100 anti-ship cruise missiles that the Renhai holds within the model parameters. The 
conclusion drawn from this example is friendly forces’ equivalently disable one of the most 
capable enemy platforms from participating in the engagement. This is operationally 
significant when breaking down the mechanics of the situation.  
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Figure 35.  MOE #4 Partition Tree 
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5. Analysis of MOE #5: Offensive Strike Success 
 
Figure 36.  MOE #5 Actual versus Predicted Plot 
Figure 36 presents the results of regression analysis for the offensive strike success. 
The R-squared value of 0.36 indicates a poor model fit; therefore, the information that it 
provides is less actionable compared to the other MOE’s regression analysis models. The 
statistically significant factors contributing to the offensive strike success are presented in 
Table 32 and the sorted estimates are shown in Figure 37. The number of USV AMD A 
platforms, the USV ISR platform, as well as the USV SUW EMCON tactic are listed as 
statistically significant, yet their operational impact was negligible. Based on how the 
model was created, the author realized that almost all the input variables, as well as many 
fixed parameters, affected MOE #5. This, in turn, made it difficult to determine which 
parameter or variable most significantly impacted the offensive strike success. The 
conclusion that can be drawn from MOE #5 is that all aspects of the friendly force structure, 
including their payloads and tactics, contributed somehow to the operational success of 





Table 32.   Analysis Summary of MOE #5: Offensive Strike Success. 
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Figure 37.  MOE #5: Statistically Significant Factors – Sorted Parameter 
Estimates 
Success Friendly Missiles - Offensive
Quantity of successful Friendly offensive missilesPercentage




6. Analysis of MOE #6: Defensive Measure Success 
 
Figure 38.  MOE #6 Actual versus Predicted Plot 
Figure 38 presents the results of regression analysis for defensive measure success. 
The R-squared value of 0.80 indicates an acceptable model fit. Of note, the abrupt cutoffs 
for the predicted values between 0.525 and 0.6 were due to the complex interactions among 
EMCON variables and GPS Jamming tactics. The statistically significant factors 
contributing to the defensive measure success are presented in Table 33 and the sorted 
estimates are shown in Figure 39. Just like MOE #4, the number of USV AMD A platforms 





Table 33.   Analysis Summary of MOE #6: Defensive Measure 
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Figure 39.  MOE #6: Statistically Significant Factors – Sorted Parameter 
Estimates 
A partition tree, depicted in Figure 40, was created in order to gain additional 
insight regarding the effectiveness of the USV AMD M and USV AMD A platforms. Just 
like MOE #4’s partition tree, this also suggests the operational significance of the two 
platforms. The quantity of USV AMD M platforms were the most impactful and when 
combined with several USV AMD A platforms, can significantly improve the defensive 
measure success. Interestingly, two other factors stood out when splitting the partition; the 
velocity of the USV as well as the USV ISR EMCON tactic (if the USV ISR is in EMCON 
A then all electromagnetic emissions are turned off; this means the unique capability of 
providing extended ranges for friendly missiles does not exist, however the USV ISR 
becomes a lot harder to find). When all four factors are combined with the correct 
Successful Defensive Measures
Quantity of successful Defensive MeasuresPercentage





composition, speed, and tactics, the defensive measure success improves even more. 
Starting from the top of Figure 40, it is calculated that the average defensive measure 
success is approximately 76%. By the model’s standards, this means that about three 
fourths of friendly force missiles and countermeasure disrupt the enemy’s inbound 
missiles. When there is approximately 15 or more USV AMD M platforms the defensive 
measure success increases to 78%. Further splitting the partition, one can see that having 
approximately 18 or more USV AMD A platforms the defensive measure success remains 
the same. The most interesting results start when the partition is split further into the two 
remaining factors. If there are less than 18 USV AMD A platforms and the velocity of the 
USV is less than 21 knots the defensive measure success decreases to 63%, a decrease of 
11%. If the velocity of the USV is less than 21 knots and the USV ISR platform is not using 
emission control tactics the defensive measure success remains relatively the same as 
before the splitting of the partition, at 78%, but if the USV ISR platform is in EMCON A 
the defensive measure success drops significantly to 47%. This is an approximately 30% 
change from the original value. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from this particular partition tree is that having 
15 or more USV AMD M platforms is essential for the operational success of the friendly 
forces. If this is not feasible and there is less than 18 USV AMD A platforms present in the 
scenario, then it is absolutely imperative to have the USV velocity be greater than 21 knots, 




Figure 40.  MOE #6 Partition Tree 
The USV AMD M and USV AMD A are significant factors, and coupled with the velocity of the USV, and USV ISR 
EMCON, contribute to the Percentage of Defensive Success. The percentage can span approximately 30.75%  






Average Percentage of Defensive Success: 76.44%  
Average Percentage of Defensive Success 
when USV AMD M >= 15: 78.12% 
Average Percentage of Defensive Success 
when USV AMD M < 15: 75.22% 
Average Percentage of Defensive Success when USV AMD 
M < 15 + USV AMD A >= 18: 78.02%  
Average Percentage of Defensive Success when USV AMD M < 15 + Velocity of USV < 21.2 knots + USV ISR EMCON is 
OFF: 78.82% 
Average Percentage of Defensive Success when USV AMD 
M < 15 + USV AMD A < 18: 74.08%  
Average Percentage of Defensive Success when USV AMD M < 15 + USV AMD A < 18 + Velocity of USV >= 21.2 knots: 
74.29%  
Average Percentage of Defensive Success when USV AMD M < 15 + USV AMD A < 18 + Velocity of USV < 21.2 knots: 
63.10%  
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D. MODEL ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
It was shown throughout the data analysis that some of the conceptualized USVs 
not only were statistically significant, but operationally significant as well. The three 
measures of effectiveness that were the most interesting when analyzing how USVs 
contributed to the DMO concept where: (1) MOE #2: Surviving Enemy Forces, (2) MOE 
#4: Percentage of Enemy Missiles with in 10 Nautical Miles, and (3) MOE #6: Defensive 
Measure Success. The alternative USVs that were the most operationally impactful were 
the USV ISR platform, USV AMD A platform, and the USV AMD M platform, whereas 
the USV SUW platform proved to be not operationally significant throughout the entire 
analysis. To the author’s disappointment, this counters the objective of a more offensive 
strike mentality as proposed in the beginning of this thesis. The results of the analysis are 
inconclusive: unmanned surface vehicles are most effective by supplementing the manned 
naval assets in two primary mission sets in the confines of the DMO concept: (1) 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mission set, and (2) anti-missile defense 
mission set (for both anti-air and anti-missile defense). This envisions more of a defensive 
posture approach for the implementation of USVs, either by counter-engaging enemy 
platforms or missiles in the defense-in-depth layered strategy. The next chapter uses the 
three primary MOEs that the USVs excelled in and develops a cost versus operational 
effectiveness analysis to determine if the proposed alternative USVs, specifically the ISR 
and AMD platforms, could be a smart investment for the United States Navy in the years 
to come.  
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VI. COST ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the cost estimating approach that the 
author used to determine the overall cost of each alternative USV and to provide the cost 
versus operational effectiveness analysis of the specified USVs in the DMO concept. The 
chapter then summarizes the findings by revisiting the original research questions 
prescribed in Chapter 1 and completes the thesis by giving conclusions, recommendations 
and possible future work for the implementation of USVs in DMO.  
A. COST ANALYSIS 
Cost estimation is a challenging endeavor when developing new systems like the 
alternative USVs addressed in this thesis. In general, ships consist of many components 
similar to the physical architecture described in Chapter III, yet the biggest difference 
between the conceptualized designs and common maritime vessels is the autonomous suite 
integration. When looking at Table 4, in Chapter 2, of all the current USVs, only a few 
have available cost data, and only one, the ACTUV, is in the same realm as this thesis’ 
conceptualized USV alternatives in the context of size, tonnage and capability. The current 
number of platforms that are fully autonomous are limited, which makes it difficult to 
extrapolate historical cost data when estimating future costs; hence, the following section 
describes the author’s approach in determining the cost of the alternative USVs. Of note, 
cost estimation is a tool that provides an analytic backing to support decision makers. Cost 
estimation is never 100% accurate since predicting the future is impossible. However, the 
objective of this cost analysis is to provide a risk management tool and potential enabler 
for investment in future development of unmanned surface vehicles for the DMO concept.  
1. Parametric Approach 
The author chose to use the parametric approach, as referenced by Mun (2016), to 
derive a cost model that predicts the cost of the alternative USVs described in this thesis. 
The parametric approach uses historical cost data from publicly available procurement 
information provided by multiple countries for all different sizes of maritime vessels. This 
approach is known as the statistical method and generates a cost estimate based on system 
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performance or design characteristics. The objective of using historical data is to create a 
multiple non-linear regression model for cost associated with three unique variables: size 
of the vessel in meters, tonnage of the vessel and speed of the vessel in knots. The author 
identified 40 platforms that had historical procurement costs and researched their design 
specifications for the parametric approach. Table 34 organizes the platforms by the three 
unique variables and displays the cost in fiscal year 2018 money.   
Table 34.   Historical Cost Data of Maritime Vessels. Adapted from 
Historical Cost Data Sources listed in Appendix I. 







Amazonas-class corvette Brazil 90.5 2,000 25 62.421 
Hero-Class Patrol Vessel Canada 42.8 253 25 25.314 
Orca-Class Patrol Vessel Canada 33 210 20 11.873 
Type 056 corvette China 90 1,500 25 53.225 
Houbei Type 22 missile boat China 42.6 220 36 16.798 
Iver Huitfedt-class Frigate Denmark 138.7 6,645 30 345.963 
Gowind-class corvettes Egypt 102 2,500 25 184.052 
Type 23 Frigate England 133 4,900 28 175.265 
Turva Patrol Boat Finland 95.9 1,800 18 126.115 
FTI Medium Size Frigate France 122 4,200 27 843.036 
Braunschweig-Class (corvette) Germany 89.12 1,840 26 355.617 
Holland Class OPV Holland 108.4 3,750 21.5 163.716 
Kamorta-Class (corvette) India 109 3,300 25 311.833 
Saryu-class Patrol Vessel India 105 2,230 25 157.752 
Protector  Israel 11 4 40 3.175 
Seagull Israel  12 5 32 30.843 
Comandanti-Class Patrol Vessel Italy 88.6 1,520 25 153.662 
Protector-class Inshore Patrol 
Vessel 
New 
Zealand 55 340 25 28.208 
Protector-class OPV 
New 
Zealand 85 1,900 22 127.126 
Khareef-Class (corvette) Oman 99 2,660 28 263.343 
Sigma-class corvette Romania 90.71 1,692 28 461.1 
Karakurt-class corvette Russia 67 800 30 32.385 
Gumdoksuri-class Patrol Vessel 
South 
Korea 63 570 44 46.986 
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FFX-II Daegu class Frigate 
South 
Korea 122 3,600 30 307.648 
Diciotti-Class offshore Patrol 
Vessel Spain 53.4 391 23 38.143 
BAM Spain 93.9 2,860 20 238.448 
Visby-Class corvette Sweden 72.7 640 35 245.469 
Tyo Chiang-Class (corvette) Taiwan 60.4 567 40 77.059 
Baynunah-Class corvette UAE 71.3 915 30 187.183 
MDUSV USA 40 145 27 25 
CUSV USA 12 7.7 35 6.3 
Hammerhead USA 5.2 2 35 0.116 
USS Oliver Perry Class (frigate) USA 136 4,100 29 749.834 
USS Freedom Class USA 115 3,500 47 646.2 
USS Independence Class USA 127 3,104 44 646.2 
DDG-51 Flight III USA 155 9,600 30 1800 
WMSL-750 USA 127.4 4,500 28 779.079 
Sentinel-class cutter USA 46.8 359 28 58 
Heritage-class cutter USA 110 3,730 22 391 
Legend-class cutter USA 127 4,600 28 682 
 
One of the requisite assumptions for this regression model was that the alternative 
USVs are similar to the identified platforms listed in Table 34. The author chose mostly 
warships ranging from patrol craft to large frigates; however, some data was available for 
current developed USVs. The author assumed adequate justification since the alternative 
USVs in this thesis require military type systems aboard as shown in Chapter III. The 
prescribed capabilities of the USV AMD A, USV AMD M, USV ISR and USV SUW 
platforms require high-performing sensors and systems similar to the SPY radar, VLS, 
SLQ-32 and countermeasure launchers. This, is turn, allowed a reasonable comparison, 
even though the conceptualized USVs are not the same as a manned warship. Every 
platform listed in Table 34 had at least one of the prescribed capabilities or a mixed 
combination. Therefore, best fitting regression model satisfied the expected costs 
associated with the alternative USVs, even though it did not consider the specific 
components described in Chapter III (the ADL, Centurion System, SPY-1K, SLQ-32v(6), 
and Aegis weapon systems) as a cost per unit. The only unique costs that were considered, 
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in addition to the predicted cost expression given by the regression model, were the 
Autonomous Suite integration and an inflation factor for the 2030–2035 time frame. The 
Autonomous Suite integration cost per platform was a very ambiguous cost estimate, since 
the author found only one historical cost associated with converting a previously manned 
platform to an autonomous platform. In 2017, Leidos Inc., the team that led the design and 
building of DARPA’s Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned 
Vessels (ACTUV), now named SEA HUNTER, successfully demonstrated autonomous 
logistics via an LCM-8 autonomous shore resupply mission. According to Rus Cook, from 
Leidos Inc. (email to author, July 21, 2018), the total cost of the autonomous integration, 
including materials and labor, was approximately $1.3 million. Since the LCM-8 is 
substantially smaller and less complicated than the conceptualized USVs, the author chose 
a $2 million estimate for the autonomous suite integration cost for the alternative USVs. 
The author also added a cumulative inflation rate of 20% to the estimated cost in 
conjunction with the best fitting regression model.  
Using a similar process as the data analysis portion in Chapter V, the author used 
the JMP software to acquire the best fitting multiple non-linear regression model by adding 
quadratic terms and using first order interactions using the 40 datapoints from Table 34. 
Figure 41 depicts the actual versus predicted plot, the summary of fit, the analysis of 
variance, as well as the predicted mathematical expression for the estimated cost of a 
maritime vessel given the size, tonnage and speed. The R-squared value of 0.80 indicates 
an acceptable model fit.  
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Figure 41.  Parametric Cost Model 
Using the predicted mathematical expression derived from the regression model, 
the author was able to estimate the cost of the alternative USVs, shown in Table 35. As 
Chapter III described, the alternative USVs could potentially fit the design characteristics 
of either the E, F or G class, depending on the platform. The author designed the USV 
AMD A and USV SUW platforms to be approximately 51 meters long, which falls into the 
G class unmanned surface vehicle; whereas, the USV AMD M and USV ISR platforms, 
having 40-meter and 30-meter lengths, respectively, fall into the F class unmanned surface 
vehicle. The author’s operational experience, supplemented by reasonable expectations of 
similarly sized platforms, determined each platform’s design speed and tonnage. The initial 
cost was calculated solely based on the model’s mathematical expression, then the 
autonomous suite upgrade as well as the inflation were added to predict the total cost per 
unit in millions of dollars, displayed in the far-right column in Table 35.  
 
 120 
Table 35.   Estimated Alternative USV Costs 


















A 51 550 33 42.43 2 1.2 53.32 
USV AMD 
M 40 495 27 30.49 2 1.2 38.99 
USV SUW 51 550 33 42.43 2 1.2 53.32 
USV ISR 30 220 25 25.13 2 1.2 32.56 
 
The next step in the cost analysis process was to take the total cost per unit of each 
USV platform and implement an equation for each of the 15,360 data runs that the author 
collected at the end of the model simulation. The equation was simply the number of each 
type of USV platform multiplied by the cost of that specified platform to give a total cost 
for USVs in a given scenario. The following section will discuss how the author used this 
information to analyze cost versus operational effectiveness in the DMO scenario. 
2. Cost versus Operational Effectiveness 
The author chose to analyze the cost versus operational effectiveness using the top 
three MOEs identified in Chapter V versus the total cost of the combined USV platforms 
per scenario. Given the subjectivity of the operational requirements and associated risks, 
the author chose to present four investment scenarios that describe the trade space 
associated with each scenario. Those four scenarios are: 
• $0 investment, corresponding to no USV capabilities 
• $500 million investment into the USV program 
• $1000 million investment into the USV program 
• $1500 million investment into the USV program 
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Note that this analysis is not focused on identification of a single combination of 
USVs that is “best” or “optimal” for a given investment scenario, rather the goal is to 
characterize the feasible and infeasible combinations for each scenario and the contour 
profiler approach suggests realistically appropriate combination for each scenario. To 
conduct the analysis, the author made some underlining assumptions and offered applicable 
explanations, depicted in Table 36, to scope the trade-space. 
Table 36.   Cost versus Operational Effectiveness Assumptions 
Assumption Explanation 
The USV ISR platform is always present. The ISR platform was operationally 
significant in both MOE #2 and #6. The 
author considers the ISR platform as a 
necessity in the future force structure of the 
fleet. Having at least one ISR platform will 
add $32.56 million to the overall cost. 
The USV SUW platform are not present. The SUW platform did not provide any 
operational impact to any of the MOEs; 
therefore, it was omitted from the cost vs. 
operational effectiveness analysis. 
Velocity of USV is held constant at 30 
knots. 
The average design speed of all the USV 
platforms was approximately 30 knots. 30 
knots is a feasible speed specification 
compared to an optimistic 58 knot design.  
USV AMD A and AMD M platforms 
were varied from 0–25 in quantity. 
The anti-missile defense platforms proved 
operationally impactful in both MOE #4 
and #6. The author considers a 
combination of these platforms as a 
necessity in the future force structure of the 
fleet. Each platform brings its own 
associated cost, as show in Table 35. 
All other input variables were held fixed 
at their mean. 
The focus of this analysis is the cost of the 
USV platform input variables versus their 
operational impact to the DMO concept. 
No other input variables were considered 
for this particular analysis. 
 
The author used the JMP statistical analysis software, previously used for the data 
analysis, to explore the design space using contour mapping as described in Whitcomb and 
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Beery (2016). Contour mapping is a dynamic analysis that allows the creator to set low or 
high limits of the desired measure of effectiveness to determine the necessary quantities of 
USVs to meet the given objectives. Since the USV ISR platform, the USV SUW platform 
and the USV velocity were all fixed (as expressed in Table 36), the remaining two USV 
platforms (AMD A and AMD M) were set as the x and y axis parameters for all cost 
scenarios. The purpose behind the analysis was to provide the least expensive combination 
of USVs while still having an operational impact in the DMO scenario. The author would 
like to specify that the combinations of the required MOE standards and the amount of 
money associated with the unmanned surface vehicle programs are subjective and have not 
been verified with actual decision makers. It is ultimately up to the designated stakeholders 
to set operational requirements and the associated risks and benefits with cost versus the 
operational impact of the alternative USVs discussed throughout this thesis.  
As mentioned, the first scenario of interest is the scenario where no USVS are 
present in the model, which corresponds to a $0 investment. This was necessary due to the 
importance of establishing a baseline comparison before beginning the analysis of different 
compositions of USVs in the DMO concept. Table 37 depicts the results of the expected 
performance given a zero-dollar investment from the Navy. For the following baseline and 
three investment scenarios, a hypothetical example was used from Chapter 5, Section C, 
for illustration purposes. The example consisted of 90 enemy platforms firing a 6-missile 
salvo each for a total of 540 inbound missiles. Take into consideration that the model is a 








Table 37.   $0 Cost Constraint 
Output Function Results 
Predicted Cost (in millions of dollars) $0 
MOE #2: Predicted percentage of Enemy 
killed 
62% 
MOE #4: Predicted percentage of Enemy 
missiles within 10 nautical miles of 
friendly forces 
46.5% 
MOE #6: Predicted percentage of 
successful defensive measures 
71% 
 
Regarding the example, the minimum quantity of 46.5% of enemy missiles within 
10 nautical miles corresponds to roughly 251 enemy missiles. The predicted percentage of 
successful defensive measures, at 71%, corresponds to approximately 73 out of the 251 
enemy missiles unsuccessfully countered. This is the expected number of enemy missiles 
unsuccessfully countered when the friendly force structure is the conventional CSG, ESG 
and SAG in the DMO scenario. This information is the baseline for the remaining 
investment scenarios to compare and contrast expectations for performance when investing 
in $500 million increments. 
For the first investment scenario (the $500 million investment), the author adjusted 
the desired MOE limits to reflect the improvement in operational effectiveness that can be 
expected as a result of the investment. Table 38 depicts the results of the expected 
operational effectiveness of all three MOEs given the $500 million constraint. Note that no 
formal optimization strategy was employed, rather the author subjectively increased each 
MOE value by an approximately equal amount. Of note, the white space in the contour 
mapping figures depict the trade-space available to meet the required MOEs and cost 
parameters. In every contour map figure, the author chose the combination of USVs that 
were the closest to the cost constraint while satisfying operational constraints associated 
with the improved operational effectiveness shown in Tables 38–40. 
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Table 38.   $500 Million Cost Constraint 
Output Function Results 
Predicted Cost (in millions of dollars) $494 million 
MOE #2: Predicted percentage of Enemy 
killed 
70% 
MOE #4: Predicted percentage of Enemy 
missiles within 10 nautical miles of 
friendly forces 
42% 
MOE #6: Predicted percentage of 
successful defensive measures 
73% 
 
Figure 42 provides the contour map for the $500 million constraint. To meet the 
feasible percentages of the MOEs while still maintaining a cost of less than $500 million, 
the recommended number of USV AMD M and USV AMD A platforms is three and six, 
respectively. This USV combination is approximately $494 million. This is the least 
expensive investment of the three investment scenarios, and when compared to the baseline 
scenario, provides some improvement for all three MOEs. Using the same hypothetical 
example as previously discussed, the minimum quantity of 42% of enemy missiles within 
10 nautical miles corresponds to roughly 227 enemy missiles instead of 251 enemy missiles 
from the baseline scenario. The predicted percentage of successful defensive measures, at 
73%, corresponds to approximately 61 enemy missiles unsuccessfully countered vice the 
73 enemy missiles from the baseline scenario. 
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Figure 42.  Contour Map of $500 Million Investment Scenario 
For the second investment scenario (the $1000 million investment), the author 
adjusted the desired MOE limits to reflect the improvement in operational effectiveness 
that can be expected as a result of the investment. Table 39 depicts the results of the 
expected operational effectiveness of all three MOEs given the $1000 million constraint.  
Table 39.   $1000 Million Cost Constraint 
Output Function Results 
Predicted Cost (in millions of dollars) $1000 million 
MOE #2: Predicted percentage of Enemy 
killed 
70% 
MOE #4: Predicted percentage of Enemy 
missiles within 10 nautical miles of 
friendly forces 
37% 
MOE #6: Predicted percentage of 
successful defensive measures 
76% 
 
Figure 43 provides the contour map for the $1000 million constraint. To meet the 
feasible percentages of the MOEs while still maintaining a cost of less than $1000 million, 
the recommended number of USV AMD M and USV AMD A platforms is 18 and five, 
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respectively. This USV combination is approximately $1000 million. This is the second 
least expensive investment of the three investment scenarios and improves MOE #4 and 
MOE #6. Using the same hypothetical example as before, an MOE #4 of 37% corresponds 
to approximately 200 enemy missiles reaching within 10 nautical miles versus the 251 
enemy missiles from the baseline scenario; and a 76% success rate for MOE #6 reduces 
the number of unsuccessfully-countered enemy missiles from 73 in the baseline scenario 
to 48.  
 
Figure 43.  Contour Map of $1000 Million Investment Scenario 
For the last investment scenario (the $1500 million investment), the author adjusted 
the desired MOE limits to reflect the improvement in operational effectiveness that can be 
expected as a result of the investment. Table 40 depicts the results of the expected 




Table 40.   $1500 Million Cost Constraint 
Output Function Results 
Predicted Cost (in millions of dollars) $1487 million 
MOE #2: Predicted percentage of Enemy 
killed 
70% 
MOE #4: Predicted percentage of Enemy 
missiles within 10 nautical miles of 
friendly forces 
32% 
MOE #6: Predicted percentage of 
successful defensive measures 
78% 
 
Figure 44 provides the contour map for the $1500 million constraint. To meet the 
feasible percentages of the MOEs while still maintaining a cost of less than $1500 million, 
the recommended number of USV AMD M and USV AMD A platforms is 25 and nine, 
respectively. This USV combination is approximately $1487 million. This is the most 
expensive investment of the three investment scenarios and has the best outcome for MOE 
#4 and MOE #6. Using the same hypothetical example as before, an MOE #4 of 32% 
corresponds to approximately 173 enemy missiles reaching within 10 nautical miles versus 
251 enemy missiles from the baseline scenario, and a success rate of 78% for MOE #6 
reduces the number of unsuccessfully-countered enemy missiles from 73 in the baseline 
scenario to 38.  
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Figure 44.  Contour Map of $1500 Million Investment Scenario 
When comparing the three investment scenarios, the common factor that remains 
constant is the percentage of enemy platforms killed, which is approximately 70%. 
Therefore, as an illustration, if a decision maker’s primary concern is MOE #2 (the 
maximum destruction of enemy forces), then the $500 million investment would be the 
best strategic option since there is no additional operational effectiveness, regarding MOE 
#2, with increased investment. However, the ideal choice is subjective since money is the 
limiting factor; therefore, Table 41 illustrates a comparison summary and shows a tangible 
expectation as the cost of investment increases. The tangible expectation is based on the 
hypothetical example given in the preceding paragraphs and is quantified as the percentage 
increase of effectiveness based for MOE #2, MOE #4 and a version of MOE #6 in the given 
investment scenarios. The baseline performance is also shown for the sake of comparison. 
Of note, since the actual number of enemy missiles are changing variables, it is more 
important to focus on the percentage improvements as the investment increases.
 129 
 
Table 41.   Cost Scenario Comparison Summary 
Investment 
Scenario Actual Cost USV Quantity
Predicted Percentage 
of Enemy Killed MOE #2 Comparison
Predicted Percentage of 
Enemy Missiles within 
10 NM
MOE #4 Comparison
















9.9% improvement from baseline$1500 Million $1487 Million 32% 31.2% improvement from baseline 78%70% 12.9% improvement from baseline
2.8% improvement from baseline
$1000 Million $1000 Million 37% 20.4% improvement from baseline 76% 7% improvement from baseline
$500 Million $494 Million 42% 9.7% improvement from baseline 73%70%
70%
12.9% improvement from baseline
12.9% improvement from baseline
Baseline-no improvement$0 Million $0 Million 46.50% Baseline-no improvement 71%62% Baseline- no improvement
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Another insight that was important to address was the performance expectations 
when the USV ISR platform was not present in the analysis. The insight was of particular 
interest since it illustrated the importance of the USV ISR platform and how beneficial it 
was compared to its associated costs. Using the $1500 million investment scenario, when 
investing in one ISR platform, the impact to MOE #2 (the Enemy’s Survivability) changes 
by a total of five percent. This corresponds to eight additional enemy platforms being 
destroyed per run. This is shown in Figure 45, which depicts the contour maps of $1500 
million investments with both scenarios side-by-side and the corresponding MOE #2 
circled in red. The composition of USV AMD A and AMD M platforms had to be 
rearranged to maintain MOE #4 and MOE #6 parameters; however, the cost remained the 
same at roughly $1487 million per scenario. 
 
Figure 45.  USV ISR Platform Improvement 
This is quite interesting since the predicted enemy survivability changes for each 
scenario, yet the cost is the same. It is imperative for the Navy to invest in the USV ISR 
platform, since it results in a 5% decrease to enemy survivability with no decrease in 
performance to any other MOE and without an increase to cost or the total number of 
platforms required for the operation. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the incorporation of unmanned surface 
vehicles in the context of Distributed Maritime Operations. The goal was to expand on 
SEA 27 cohort’s capstone report by focusing on the implementation of unmanned surface 
vehicles in DMO, while still utilizing the effective tactics that the report identified, namely, 
physical and mechanical countermeasures, jamming tactics, emission control, and swarm 
tactics. Chapter 1 presented two research questions; the following paragraphs will address 
and comment on each.  
a. Does the incorporation of unmanned surface vehicles, in the context of 
Distributed Maritime Operations, provide a more cost- and 
operationally- effective order of battle compared to the conventional 
United States (U.S.) Navy Carrier Strike Group (CSG) configuration, 
Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) configuration or the Surface Action 
Group (SAG) configuration? 
The incorporation of USVs in DMO has both a cost effective and operationally 
effective order of battle compared to the conventional force structures of the U.S. Navy’s 
CSG, ESG and SAG. The author initially proposed a functional and physical architecture 
for a generic unmanned surface vehicle in Chapter III, then goes on to develop three 
alternative designs to be analyzed in the thesis’ model as described in Chapter 4. The 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance mission as well as the Anti-missile Defense 
mission proved to have the most statistical significance and operational impact regarding 
the prescribed measures of effectiveness annotated in the beginning of Chapter 5. Three 
measures of effectiveness stood out as the most interesting among the six that were 
identified. The following bullet points explain the three most interesting measures in the 
context of the operational impact from USVs: 
* MOE #2: Surviving Enemy Force. This MOE was significantly impacted by 
whether an USV ISR platform was present or not. A maximum decrease of approximately 
5.9% of the enemy force survivability can be expected if the USV ISR platform is present. 
This seems small, but a 5.9% change is approximately 9 enemy platforms destroyed in the 
given model scenario. 
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* MOE #4: Percentage of Enemy Missiles within 10 NM. This MOE was 
significantly impacted by the number of USV AMD M and USV AMD A platforms present 
in the model. A maximum decrease in approximately 8.5% of the number of enemy 
missiles reaching 10 nautical miles is expected when given the correct composition of USV 
AMD platforms.  
* MOE #6: Defensive Measure Success. This MOE was significantly impacted by 
the number of USV AMD M and USV AMD A platforms present in the model. A 
maximum increase of approximately 4% of the defensive measure success is expected 
when given the correct composition of USV AMD platforms.  
For the cost effectiveness aspect, Chapter 6 addressed a baseline scenario where no 
investment was made into the alternative USVs, and additionally three investment 
scenarios, incremented sequentially by $500 million. Based off the data analysis, it was 
shown that the only USVs worth investing in were the USV ISR, USV AMD A and the 
USV AMD M platforms. For the specified concept of operations and the fixed order of 
battle, regarding manned assets, the author believes that implementing specific 
combinations of USVs in the order of battle is a cost-effective approach in achieving the 
desired measures of effectiveness.  
When looking at just the first increment of $500 million invested compared to the 
baseline scenario, it was determined that the three pertinent MOE’s, #2, #4 and #6, 
improved when compared to a baseline configuration that does not utilize USVs by 12.9%, 
9.7% and 2.8%, respectively. If a decision maker can justify making this investment, which 
is comprised of at least one USV ISR platform, three USV AMD M platforms and six USV 
AMD A platforms, the performance benefits seems to outweigh the initial investment. An 
example is provided to illustrate the cost and risk benefits: suppose the U.S. Navy has the 
procurement option of either one LCS, which is approximately $642 million (O’Rourke 
2018b), or the procurement of 10 USV platforms, which is approximately $494 million. 
The 10 USVs provide a more in-depth distributed layered defense as well as a robust 
maritime ISR platform (using the $500 million investment scenario platform 
recommendation). The risk benefits are also greatly affected since the LCS requires 
approximately 42 core crew plus up to 35 mission crew, whereas the USVs have no risk to 
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human life if destroyed. Also, the LCS is only one ship, providing the enemy one radar 
cross section to find, target, and destroy, whereas 10 USVs provide the enemy more targets 
to find, target, and destroy, causing the enemy to use additional assets and time. As 
previously mentioned in Chapter 1, the U.S. Navy’s ambition is to have a 355-ship fleet. 
This objective is very feasible when considering the above conclusions of the cost 
effectiveness as well as the operational impact that USVs bring to the maritime domain. 
The author agrees with late Senator John McCain’s recommendation of procuring “larger 
numbers of smaller and relatively cheaper systems…rather than smaller numbers of larger 
more expensive systems” (McCain 2017, 9) in the future acquisition the U.S. Navy fleet. 
This thesis’ analysis results have shown that a 355-ship fleet (consisting of both manned 
and unmanned system) is a realistic option in regard to implementing cost effective and 
operationally impactful USVs into the mix. 
b. What are the critical parameters that need to be met in the future 
designs of unmanned surface vehicles specific to the DMO concept? 
This thesis determined through research and analytical tools that the most critical 
parameters that need to be met in the future designs of unmanned surface vehicles are the 
following: (1) Have a standardized USV design configuration that can utilize multiple 
payload mission packages, allowing industry to have specific guidance in terms of U.S. 
Navy requirements. (2) Construct larger unmanned surface vehicles, either in the F or G 
class realm, allowing for greater payloads capacities to support systems like: launching 
systems, missiles, high performance radars, and EW equipment. Lastly, (3) ensuring that 
the USV’s autonomous suite is reliable and functioning and integrated into the command 
and control network and common operating picture. This allows for manned and unmanned 
assets to be in a distributed network where humans and machines can work together to 
accomplish the desired effect, whether that be manned assets acquiring targeting 
information and launching missiles from USVs or USVs providing early warning detection 
and communicating enemy locations via link to manned assets. 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The author’s overall objective in conducting research on unmanned surface 
vehicles in the DMO concept was to ultimately provide a solid recommendation on whether 
the Navy should continue to invest in unmanned systems in the maritime domain. The 
naval community as a whole has accepted and started the transition to utilizing unmanned 
systems, specifically UASs, however, based off the results of his research and analysis, the 
author strongly recommends the continual investment into unmanned surface vehicles.  
The primary recommendation is to implement a standardized USV design based off 
of the necessary stakeholder requirements, like Chapter III’s physical architecture. Once 
the design is standardized, the secondary recommendation is to move towards development 
and construction of multiple USV platforms, specifically having the ISR and AMD based 
mission modules. The recommended investment would be the first investment scenario of 
$500 million, described previously in this Chapter, which would be the procurement of an 
initial 10 USVs: one ISR platform, three AMD M platforms, and six AMD A platforms. It 
would then be imperative to integrate the 10 USVs into one of the CSGs, ESGs or SAGs 
to start the transition and implementation of new tactics, strategy, and naval doctrine. This 
would be the starting point for lessons learned, focus groups, and an iterative learning 
process to ensure that the implementation of USVs in the DMO force structure is as smooth 
transition as any other unmanned system. Baby steps is the key in this process and that is 
why the author recommends the least expensive investment scenario to initiate the 
unmanned surface vehicle paradigm. 
Some areas of future work that was realized throughout this analysis was the fact 
that the research and model omitted two primary domains; the undersea and cyber domains. 
This was due to the author’s lack of operational and tactical experience in these realms. 
The undersea domain, with its corresponding ASW mission, is a definite area that 
unmanned systems are operating and will continue to be key enablers in the future. Future 
work could incorporate both friendly and enemy undersea forces in their applicable kill 
chains, and an analysis of possible USV’s with an applicable ASW mission module 
package. Another idea would be to incorporate the cyber domain by implementing the 
cyber kill chain and the applicable systems that both the enemy and friendly forces could 
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exploit. The concept of unmanned systems having the capability of cyber warfare is a 
unique idea and could be further investigated to see if this is a feasible and effective use 
for USVs. Lastly, another idea for future research could be to conduct an in-depth cost 
analysis of the proposed USVs based off of system components and materials, which is a 
build-up cost approach, the most detailed of all the cost estimating techniques.  
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APPENDIX A. MARITIME WAR OF 2030 SCENARIO 
The following paragraphs set the tone and scenario for the author’s thesis. The 
narrative is extracted from the Naval Postgraduate School’s Joint Campaign Analysis 
(JCA) course and the SEA 27 (2018) capstone report. 
 
2030 Political, Social, and Economic Narrative: 
 
Although China’s economic growth began to slow in 2018, she continued her political, 
fiscal, economic, and military expansionism. In 2030 China is the world’s first economy, 
has a large and growing middle class population and consequently generates a higher 
demand for oil and natural gas. Relationships between Russia and China are thriving, 
underwritten by a strong energy trade. China depends on the trans-Siberian pipeline 
developed after negotiations with Russia on oil purchases were signed in 2014. Further 
economic ties were generated by a series of trade agreements that began in 2019.  
 
Since 2015 the increased economic and social ties between mainland China and Taiwan, 
combined with an economically (yet not necessary democratically) more liberal Chinese 
central government, resulted in a 2025 non-aggression treaty between the two states with 
agreements to begin discussions on unification. By 2030, although not yet under “one 
government,” the Taiwan parliament has Communist party representation and the joint 
government, military and economic initiatives between China and Taiwan have grown to 
the point they are a de-facto Chinese economic and military federation. For example, 
Taiwan has allowed China to build High Frequency Surface Wave radar stations and 
passive collection systems on Taiwan with joint intelligence sharing responsibilities. 
Taiwan no longer relies on military sales from the United States. 
 
China has populated several islands terra-formed through dredging in 2015 with military 
installations. For example, Fiery Cross Reef has a squadron of J-20s (fifth generation plus) 
with 10 Dark Sword UCAVs,  while both Fiery Reef, Gaven Reef , and Hughes Reefs have 
both surface to air installations (S-500) and anti-surface cruise missile mobile sites 
(advanced YJ-62s).   China is now building facilities on terra-formed islands made from 
the western end of the Scarborough Shoal reef, protested by the Philippines and the United 
States. 
 
Tensions remain high on the Korean Peninsula with North Korea developing greater 
ballistic missile and cruise missile capabilities. The successful submarine launched ballistic 
missile in 2017 was followed by a series of failures, then successes of both land launched 
and sea launched ballistic missiles and well as shore to ship cruise missiles. North Korea 
retains a nuclear capability. 
 
Japan and the United States have strengthened their social, economic, and military ties 
in response to China’s and Russia’s growing influence. The Yokosuka naval facility has 
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evolved to a joint JMSDF and United States Navy base with GEORGE WASHINGTON 
and its air wing, three United States DDGs, eight United States LCSs, and the Japanese 
fleet sharing the installation. In Sasebo, the United States Navy retains LHA-6, LPD-25 
and LSD-52 and two LCS for mine clearance and protection. 
 
The United States also established closer ties to Singapore, stationing eight LCSs, a 
squadron of P-8s and their shore support in the city-nation. In addition, the United States 
now maintains logistic support bases in Diego Garcia and pre-positioned expeditionary 
supplies in  Subic, with joint agreements with the U.K. and Philippines respectively.   These 
bases can act as “rapid build-up” support bases if the host country agrees. Additionally, the 
Philippines have invited the United States Air Force to use Clark AFB as an expeditionary 
field. It is currently used in joint training exercises. The United States Air Force has 
retained Kadena AFB on Okinawa, and III MEF completed its move from Futenma to the 
newly constructed land-fill air base in Henoko village. 
 
South and East China Sea:  
In the spring of 2029, a Vietnamese fisher was rammed and sunk by a Chinese maritime 
security ship. The Chinese government justified the unfortunate action as an enthusiastic 
Captain defending China’s EEZ rights, although similar incidents have occurred over the 
past 20 years. Vietnam did not accept the rationale and vowed their fishing fleet, as well as 
their at sea drilling rigs, would henceforth be protected. Two weeks later a Chinese deep-
sea exploration ship exploded without warning 100 nautical miles north of Natuna Besar.   
 
China claimed either Vietnam, Indonesia or the Philippines were responsible. They 
mobilized their South China Seas fleet and demanded restoration from all three countries 
or they would “secure” their sea. One month later the Chinese sank a patrolling Vietnamese 
ship using a land-based surface to surface missile launched from Woody Island (YJ-83) in 
the Paracels and moved a squadron of SU-37s to Woody Island. They announced all traffic 
through the South China Sea would henceforth be subject to inspection and control by 
Chinese forces. They threatened to assume governorship of the island of Natuna Besar 
Indonesia to control the South China Sea’s southern approaches and in compensation for 
the attack on their deep sea exploration ship. The 1st Marine Brigade at Zhanjiang, 
Guangdong has embarked in the South China fleet’s amphibious flotilla (13 landing ships 
modernized Type 71 LPDs and Type 72II LSTH). They can be underway in one day’s 
notice and intelligence indicates their objective is the occupation of Natuna Besar. 
 
During these events a Philippine helicopter fired on a PLAN Type 56 corvette conducing 
gunnery exercises four miles from Palawan Island. In response, China also threatened 
invasion of Palawan. Increased activity by the PLA’s 124th Amphibious Mechanized 
Infantry Division in Guangzhou district indicates they may be readying for this operation. 
Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have requested UN support, specifically calling 
on the United States and Japan to act.   In response, China has warned Japan and the United 
States any interference with their enforcement policy will lead to war, with the threat of 
nuclear escalation. To show their resolve, China mobilized the East Sea and South Sea 
fleets and sailed at least 50 submarines from both fleets, including two SSGN on what are 
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assessed to be strategic deterrence patrols. They have declared a quarantine on all military 
logistics support (including oil) to Okinawa and have set up ships in blocking positions 
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APPENDIX B. DETAILED ORDER OF BATTLE 
This appendix illustrates the loadouts and speed specifications for both friendly and 
enemy force platforms and missiles. 





















































CVN       24     
LHA/
LHD 
      24     
LPD       21     
CG 36 5 25 8 14 8 12     
DDG-51 32 5 10 8 8 8 12     
DDG-
1000 
10  10 6 30  12     
LCS      4 21     
USV ISR            
USV SUW    4 4       
USV 
AMD A 
  8         
USV 
AMD M 
      16     
F-35 (A)        2 4 4  
F-35 (S)    4  2   2  2 
F/A-18 
(A) 
       2 4 4  
F/A-18 (S)    4  2   2  2 
EA-18        4    
E-2            
P-8            
MH-60         4   
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AH-1        2 16   
MQ-4             
MQ-8          2   
MQ-9         2 8   
TERN         4   
 
Table 43.   Friendly Force Platform and Missile Speeds. Source: SEA 
27 (2018). 
 
















































Carrier 10     120      
Renhai   20  50   20     
Surface Combatants   Aircraft   Missiles 
CVN 34 F-35 1100 SM-2 2300 
LHA/LHD 25 F/A-18 1085 SM-3 6620 
LPD 25 EA-18 1085 SM-6 2300 
CG 32 E-2 400 LRASM 650 
DDG-51 32 P-8 550 MST 650 
DDG-1000 35 MH-60 120 HARPOON 470 
LCS 45 AH-1 120 ESSM 2630 
USV ISR 0-60 MQ-4 320 AIM 1650 
USV SUW 0-60 MQ-8 150 AMRRAM 2630 
USV AMD 0-60 MQ-9 330 HARM 1200 
 TERN 70   
Speeds in Knots (Nautical Miles per Hour)   
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Luyang   30 10    10     
Jiangkai   6    18     
Jiangdao   4         
Houbei   6  2       
LHD     10       
LPD     10       
LST      5       
J-11         2  4 
J-15(A)          2 2 
J-15 (S)  4          
J-16 (A)         2 2 4 
J-16 (S)  4 6         
J-16D (EW)        8    
J-20         2 2 4 
Q-5 4         4  
H-6K 6   6        
KJ-3000            
Y-8FQ            
Z-18   2         
Z-8AEW   2         
Table 45.   Enemy Force Platforms and Missiles Speeds. Source: SEA 
27 (2018). 
Surface Combatants   Aircraft   Missiles   
Type 001/002/003 Carrier 22 J-11 Fighter 660 DF-21D 6620 
Type 055 Renhai  25 J-15 Fighter 1130 DF-26 7920 
Type 052 Destroyer  22 J-16 Fighter  660 YJ-62 465 
Type 054 Frigate  20 J-16D EW 660 HY-2 540 
Type 056 Corvette  20 J-20 Fighter  1130 YJ-12 1980 
Type 022 Missile Boat 30 Q-5 Surface Attack 370 YJ-18 1980 
Type 075 LHD 20 H-6K Bomber  560 YJ-62 465 
Type 071 LPD 20 KJ-3000 AEW  220 YJ-83 600 
 144 
 
Type 072 LST  20 Y-8FQ MPRA 350 YJ-100 465 
 Z-18 Helo  120 FN-16 1110 
Z-8AEW 120 HQ-10 1330 
Soaring Dragon 300 HQ-16 2770 
Pterodactyl 120 CM-102 2380 
Dark Sword  600 PL-9 2300 
 PL-12 2625 
VLRAAM  3990 
Speeds in Knots (Nautical Miles per Hour) 
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APPENDIX C. GENERIC SENSOR AND MISSILE PERFORMANCE 
AND EXAMPLE PROBABILITIES FOR THE FTE KILL CHAIN 
This appendix annotates the capabilities and performance parameters for the 
generic sensors and missiles onboard enemy platforms. Table 47 explicitly depicts what 
primary sensors are used for the Find and Target phase for each of the enemy platforms 
and Tables 49 and 50 give specific examples of the performance expectations when an 
enemy platform is assigned to find, target and engage a friendly force carrier.  
Table 46.   Generic Sensor Ranges. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 
Sensor Range (Nautical Miles) 
Visual  10 
Infrared 25 
ESM (Electronic Support Measures)  150 
Air Search Radar  160 
Surface Search Radar  150 
Fire Control Radar  40 
Navigation Radar 40 
Phased Array Radar  180 
AESA (Active Electronic Scanned Array Radar)  200 
Over the Horizon Radar  1800 
Synthetic Aperture Radar – Maritime  530 
Synthetic Aperture Radar – Space  4000 
 
Table 47.   Primary Sensors used by Enemy Platforms in the Find and 
Target Phase. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 
Enemy Platform Primary Sensor in 
FIND Phase 
Primary Sensor in 
TARGET Phase 
Carrier Phase Array Radar Phase Array Radar 
Renhai  Phase Array Radar Phase Array Radar 
Luyang  Over the Horizon 
Radar 
Phase Array Radar 
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Jiangkai Phase Array Radar Phase Array Radar 
Jiangdao Phase Array Radar Phase Array Radar 
Houbei Surface Search Radar Fire Control Radar 
LHD Air Search Radar Fire Control Radar 
LPD Air Search Radar Fire Control Radar 
LST  Surface Search Radar Fire Control Radar 
J-11 Air Search Radar Fire Control Radar 
J-15(A) AESA AESA 
J-15 (S) AESA AESA 
J-16 (A) AESA AESA 
J-16 (S) AESA AESA 
J-16D (EW) AESA AESA 
J-20 AESA AESA 
Q-5 Air Search Radar Fire Control Radar 
H-6K Air Search Radar Fire Control Radar 
KJ-3000 Over the Horizon 
Radar 
Over the Horizon 
Radar 
Y-8FQ Over the Horizon 
Radar 
Over the Horizon 
Radar 
Z-18 AESA AESA 
Z-8AEW Air Search Radar Fire Control Radar 
DF-21(D) SAR (Space) SAR (Space) 
DF-26 SAR (Space) SAR (Space) 
YJ-62 Over the Horizon 
Radar 
Over the Horizon 
Radar 
HY-2 Over the Horizon 
Radar 
Over the Horizon 
Radar 
Table 48.   Enemy Missile’s Terminal Guidance and Range 
Specifications. Adapted from SEA 27 (2018). 
Missile  Terminal Guidance  Range (Nautical Miles)  
DF-21D ASBM  Active Radar  800 
DF-26 ASBM  Active Radar 1730 
HY-2 ASCM Infrared 125 
YJ-12 ASCM GPS 215 
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YJ-18 ASCM GPS  290 
YJ-62 ASCM Active Radar  215 
 
YJ-83 ASCM Active Radar  100 
YJ-100 ASCM Inertial Navigation 
System  
430 
FN-16 MANPAD Infrared 4 
 
HQ-10 SAM Infrared 65 
HQ-16 SAM  Active Radar  65 
CM-102 ARM Radiation Seeking 65 
PL-9 Air to Air Infrared 12 
PL-12 Air to Air Active Radar 60 
VLRAAM Air to Air Active Radar  180 
 
The tables below depict an example of the probabilities associated with finding and 
targeting a friendly carrier (CVN) as well as the associated probabilities of successfully 
engaging the CVN. Each probability is linked to a specific generic sensor, therefore, as an 
example, if an enemy platform is using a phased array radar to find the CVN, then the 
applicable probability of finding (given that the sensor is within the specification range) is 
90%. 
Table 49.   Example of Sensor Performance against Friendly Force 
CVN 
Enemy Sensor Probability of 




Visual  90% 0% 
Infrared 80% 0% 
ESM (Electronic Support 
Measures)  
100% 0% 
Air Search Radar  40% 0% 
Surface Search Radar  85% 0% 
Fire Control Radar  0% 99% 
Navigation Radar 70% 0% 
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Phased Array Radar  90% 80% 
AESA (Active Electronic 
Scanned Array Radar)  
99% 85% 
Over the Horizon Radar  80% 50% 
Synthetic Aperture Radar – 
Maritime  
70% 0% 
Synthetic Aperture Radar – 
Space  
80% 80% 
Table 50.   Example of Missile Performance against Friendly Force 
CVN 
Enemy Missile  Probability of ENGAGING the 
CVN  
DF-21D ASBM  95%  
DF-26 ASBM  92% 
HY-2 ASCM 90% 
YJ-12 ASCM 90% 
YJ-18 ASCM 85% 
YJ-62 ASCM 90%  
 
YJ-83 ASCM 92%  
YJ-100 ASCM 92% 
FN-16 MANPAD 10% 
 
HQ-10 SAM 0% 
HQ-16 SAM  0%  
CM-102 ARM 80% 
PL-9 Air to Air 0% 
PL-12 Air to Air 0% 
VLRAAM Air to Air 0%  
 
Lastly, the following three tables depict the probability of kill for each of the enemy 
and friendly force missiles, as well as the friends force countermeasure effectiveness. Table 
51 has three columns categorizing the probability of kill for three groups of platforms: High 
Value Units (CVN, LHD/LHA), Missile Carriers (LPD, LCS, DDG-51, DDG-1000, CG, 
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USV SUW, USV AMD) and Aircraft (all air platforms). Table 52 has a similar layout, 
except the probabilities are broken down into: Surface Vessels, Aircraft, and missiles. 
Table 53 lists the friendly force countermeasures and their applicable effectiveness against 
enemy missiles. 
Table 51.   Enemy Missile Performance Probabilities 
Enemy Missile  Probability of Kill 
(High Value Unit) 




DF-21D ASBM  95%  90%   - 
DF-26 ASBM  92% 92% - 
HY-2 ASCM 90% 80% - 
YJ-12 ASCM 90% 85% - 
YJ-18 ASCM 85% 80% - 
YJ-62 ASCM 90%  80% - 
 
YJ-83 ASCM 92%  90% 25% 
YJ-100 ASCM 92% 85% - 
FN-16 MANPAD 10% 20% 70% 
 
HQ-10 SAM - - 80% 
HQ-16 SAM  - - 85% 
CM-102 ARM 80% 80% 50% 
PL-9 Air to Air - - 80% 
PL-12 Air to Air - - 90% 
VLRAAM Air to Air 0%  0% 95% 
Table 52.   Friendly Missile Performance Probabilities 







Standard Missile-2 - 85% 80% 
Standard Missile-3 - - 95% 
 
Standard Missile-6 92% 90% 85% 
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile 92% - - 
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Maritime Strike Tomahawk 90% - - 
Harpoon 85% - - 
HARM 85% - - 
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles - 85% 80% 
Sidewinder - 85% - 
Hellfire 80% - - 
 
Advanced Medium Range Air to Air 
Missile 
- 90% - 
Table 53.   Friendly Countermeasure Performance Probabilities 
Friendly Countermeasure Probability of Kill (Missile) 
Flare 50% 
IR Smoke 50% 
 
Chaff 70% 
Active Decoy 80% 




APPENDIX D. MISSION ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA AND SCORING 
This appendix details the scoring matrix and applicable scores for each of the 
friendly platforms. The results were then used to facilitate a systematic method for the 
enemy forces in their applicable mission assignment to a type of friendly force platform. If 
a friendly force platform had the highest-ranking score among potential targets, then it 
would be more probable that the enemy would be assigned to find, target and engage that 
specific friendly force platform type.  
Table 54.   Scoring Criteria Definition. Source: SEA 27 (2018). 
COMBAT POWER SCORE LEVEL OF REACH  
Platform & Assets > 300 missiles/bombs 10 Range > 1000 nautical miles  
Platform & Assets 250 – 299 missiles/bombs 9 Range 800 – 999 nautical miles  
Platform & Assets 200 – 249 missiles/bombs 8 Range 600 – 799 nautical miles 
Platform & Assets 100 – 199 missiles/bombs 7 Range 400 – 599 nautical miles 
Platform & Assets 80 – 99 missiles/bombs 6 Range 200 – 399 nautical miles 
Platform & Assets 50 – 79 missiles/bombs 5 Range 100 – 199 nautical miles 
Platform & Assets 25 – 49 missiles/bombs 4 Range 60 – 99 nautical miles 
Platform & Assets 10 – 24 missiles/bombs 3 Range 25 – 59 nautical miles 
Platform & Assets 5 – 9 missiles/bombs 2 Range 10 – 24 nautical miles 
Platform & Assets 3 – 4 missiles/bombs 1 Range 4 – 9.99 nautical miles 
Platform & Assets 0 – 2 missiles/bombs 0 Range 0 – 3.99 nautical miles 
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Table 55.   Scoring of Friendly Platforms. Adapted from SEA 27 
(2018). 
FRIENDLY 
PLATFORM   
COMBAT 
POWER SCORE  
LEVEL OF 




CVN  10 8 9.20 1 
LHA/LHD 9 7 8.20 2 
LPD 5 5 5.0 6 
CG 7 8 7.40 3 
DDG-51 6 7 6.40 5 
DDG-1000 6 8 6.80 4 
LCS 4 5 4.40 8 
USV ISR 0 8 3.20 14 
 
USV SUW 2 4 2.80 15 
USV AMD-
AIR 
2 4 2.80 15 
USV AMD-
MISSILE 
3 4 3.40 12 
F-35 3 7 4.60 7 
F/A-18  3 7 4.60 7 
E/A-18 1 7 3.40 11 
E-2D 0 10 4.00 9 
P-8 0 9 3.60 10 
MH-60 1 5 2.60 16 
AH-1 3 4 3.40 13 
MQ-4 0 8 3.20 14 
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MQ-8 0 5 2.00 18 
 
MQ-9 3 7 4.60 7 
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APPENDIX E. ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 
This appendix illustrates the probabilistic weather condition for each run and its 
associated sensor degradation factor effect. Also Figure 46 shows how the maritime clutter 
was calculated.  
Table 56.   Weather Conditions. Source: SEA 27 (2018). 




Sensor Degradation Factor  
70% 1: Negligible 0% 
20% 2: Marginal  10% 
10% 3: Poor  30% 
 
Figure 46 depicts the AIS tracks in the SCS. The mean clutter was determined to 
65 vessels with a standard deviation of 10 vessels. 
 
Figure 46.  AIS Tracks in the Prescribed Area of Operation. Source: 
Marine Vessel Traffic (2018). 
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APPENDIX F. DEGRADATION FACTORS 













Visual  1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Infrared 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
ESM (Electronic 






















Fire Control Radar  0.75-1.0 0.5-1.0 0.75-1.0 0.75-1.0 1.0 
Navigation Radar 0.75-1.0 0.5-1.0 0.75-1.0 0.75-1.0 1.0 
Phased Array Radar  0.75-1.0 0.5-1.0 0.75-1.0 0.75-1.0 1.0 
AESA (Active 
Electronic Scanned 
































Radar – Space  
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
GPS-Missile 
Terminal Phase 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0-0.8 
0 = Maximum/Complete Degradation  
 1 = No Degradation to Sensor  
>1 = Adverse Impact (Increased Signature) for Friendly Platforms  
Ranges follow a uniform distribution between noted minimum and maximum 
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APPENDIX G. E-2D AND USV ISR PLATFORM PERFORMANCE 
The following table depicts the generic unclassified ranges of the U.S. Navy’s 
missile arsenal. These ranges are assuming no additional help from friendly assets in 
extending the missile range coverage. 
Table 58.   Friendly Force Missile Ranges 
Friendly Missile Range (Nautical Miles) 
Standard Missile-2 60 
Standard Missile-3 1000 
 
Standard Missile-6 150 
Long Range Anti-Ship Missile 300 
Maritime Strike Tomahawk 100 
Harpoon 65 
HARM 80 




Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile 75 
 
The following matrices depict the effective range of each friendly missile type (in 
nautical miles) for every E-2D and USV ISR platform combination. The simulation model 
only considers the two mentioned platforms as either 1 or 0, meaning that it is either present 
or not present in a given run. Of note, the SM3 is not listed because its effective range is 
1000 NM and there is no extended range benefit when either platform is present. 
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Figure 47.  E-2D and USV ISR Platform Performance Matrix 
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APPENDIX H. SAMPLE DATA EXTRACTED FROM MODEL 




































1 1 5 13 16 0.006 0.284 0.671 0.429 0.571 0.825 0.256 1659.12 
2 1 4 19 8 0.011 0.289 0.658 0.536 0.527 0.853 0.101 1413.16 
40 1 3 4 10 0.014 0.411 0.738 0.442 0.547 0.810 0.266 881.67 
370 1 5 1 23 0.015 0.443 0.698 0.432 0.500 0.629 0.570 1564.51 
371 0 19 4 9 0.006 0.308 0.510 0.402 0.585 0.802 0.306 1648.92 
372 0 11 21 22 0.016 0.275 0.711 0.362 0.491 0.600 0.475 2578.31 
380 0 15 17 17 0.014 0.205 0.698 0.657 0.638 0.907 0.133 2369.04 
5000 1 14 17 5 0.016 0.176 0.752 0.625 0.519 0.881 0.227 1708.43 
5001 1 23 24 13 0.009 0.111 0.745 0.843 0.521 0.873 0.077 2887.79 
5002 0 15 17 16 0.007 0.295 0.745 0.616 0.569 0.874 0.093 2315.72 
5004 0 2 19 2 0.009 0.199 0.738 0.645 0.505 0.861 0.186 954.04 
5005 1 24 7 23 0.011 0.225 0.718 0.564 0.530 0.851 0.169 2811.52 
5010 0 10 0 8 0.009 0.262 0.510 0.352 0.598 0.860 0.249 959.76 
15354 0 20 22 3 0.015 0.416 0.691 0.447 0.479 0.697 0.449 2084.09 
15357 1 0 0 1 0.011 0314 0.738 0.320 0.539 0.519 0.560 672.40 
15359 0 14 21 14 0.008 0.301 0.564 0.599 0.568 0.697 0.501 2311.70 
15360 1 8 25 22 0.010 0.375 0.738 0.364 0.514 0.819 0.317 2608.85 
Sample Values for Visualization  
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APPENDIX I. HISTORICAL COST DATA CITATIONS 
Table 60.   Citations for the Parametric Cost Analysis 
Vessel Name Country Source 
Amazonas-
class corvette 
Brazil Fraser, Douglas. 2012 “BAE Systems Sells Patrol 
Vessels to Brazil - BBC News.” BBC. 





Canada WebCite Query Result. 2009. “Contract for 








Canada CDN Military. 2006. “New Training Vessels for the 






China Jr, Richard D Fisher. 2015. “China, Argentina Set for 
Defence Collaboration, Malvinas-class OPV 









China Galrahn. 2018. “Janes Discusses Chinese 
Streetfighter.” Information Dissemination. 





Vessel Name Country Source 
Iver Huitfedt-
class Frigate 
Denmark Cavas, Christopher P. 2014. “Sleek, Modern and 
Built on a Budget – Denmark’s Latest 






Egypt Briganti, Giovanni De. 2014. “DCNS Confirms Sale 
of 10 Gowind Corvettes, Expects More.” 






England Hansard, Westminster, and House of Commons. 
“House of Commons Hansard Written 
Answers for 5 Jul 2001 (pt 5).” House of 
Commons - Transport, Local Government 







Finland Sanomat, Turun. 2011. “Uusi Ulkovartiolaiva on 
Kallein Vartioalus Koskaan.” Ts.fi. 






France Tran, Pierre. 2017. “DCNS, Thales Jointly Secure 
$4B French Frigate Deal.” Defense News. 









Germany Navy Recognition. 2016. “German Navy to Get Five 
More K130 Braunschweig-class Corvettes.” 









Holland WebCite Query Result. n.d. “Holland Class Patrol 







India Economic Times. 2018. “INS Kavaratti: Anti-
submarine Warfare Class Stealth Corvette 







India StratPost News. 2010. “Naval OPV Launched.”  
December 07, 2010. 
https://www.stratpost.com/naval-opv-
launched/ 
Protector Israel Wikipedia. 2018. S.v. “Protector USV.” Last 
modified 24 May 2018. 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protector_USV 
Seagull Israel  Strategy Page. 2017. “Surface Forces: Droids Do 






Italy Wikipedia. 2018. S.v. “Comandanti-class Patrol 








New Zealand Wikipedia. 2018. S.v. “Protector-class Inshore Patrol 






New Zealand Radio New Zealand. 2010. “Offshore Patrol Boat 






Oman Naval Technology. n.d. “Khareef Class Corvettes.” 





Romania Butu, Alina Grigoras. 2017. “Defence Ministry to 
Buy 4 Corvettes by 2024 in a EUR 1.6bn 






Russia Kostrinskji, Herman. 2017. “‘Karakurty’ Smear on 





South Korea Deagel. 2017. “Gumdoksuri.” Last modified 





South Korea Naval Today. 2016. “South Korea Awards Contract 









Spain Gaeth, Jonas. n.d.”Diciotti-Class at AFM 
MARITIME SQUADRON 2nd Regiment.” 




BAM Spain Jane’s by IHS Markit. 2018. “Two new Spanish 
BAM OPVs to be in service by 2019, says 





Sweden Summers, Chris. “Technology | Stealth Ships Steam 






Taiwan Taipei Times. 2014. “‘Carrier-killer’ Starts Trials.” 






UAE Jane’s by IHS Markit. 2018. “ADSB launches fourth 
Baynunah-class corvette.” Aug 15, 2018. 
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/jni74909-
jni-2012 
MDUSV USA Barton, Timothy, and Brintzinghoffer, Dan. 2018. 
“SEA HUNTER and Maritime Autonomous 
Behaviors.” Presentation at Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, March 2018.  
CUSV USA Eckstein, Megan. “Stackley: RMMV, CUSV, 
Knifefish Will All Play a Role in LCS 




Hammerhead USA Naval Drones. n.d. “Hammerhead USV-T.” 








USA Pike, John. n.d. “FFG-7 Oliver Hazard Perry - class.” 





USA O’Rourke, Ronald. 2018. Navy Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress. CRS Report No. RL33741. 






USA O’Rourke, Ronald. 2018. Navy Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress. CRS Report No. RL33741. 





USA O’Rourke, Ronald. 2018. Navy Force Structure and 
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues 
for Congress. CRS Report No. RL32665. 





USA Defense Industry Daily. 2007. “USCG National 
Security Cutters: Bad News, Good News.” 






USA O’Rourke, Ronald. 2018. Coast Guard Cutter 
Procurement: Background and Issues for 
Congress. CRS Report No. R42567. 




Vessel Name Country Source 
Heritage-class 
cutter 
USA O’Rourke, Ronald. 2018. Coast Guard Cutter 
Procurement: Background and Issues for 
Congress. CRS Report No. R42567. 





USA O’Rourke, Ronald. 2018. Coast Guard Cutter 
Procurement: Background and Issues for 
Congress. CRS Report No. R42567. 
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